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Supervisor:  Mark A. Lawrence 
 
This study examines the official diplomacy and transnational discourse 
surrounding the spread of the international gold standard between 1867 and 1900.  The 
sustained nature of these exchanges among advanced and emerging economies of the 
period was driven by global deflationary pressures that coincided with dramatic monetary 
policy changes in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.  As such, the diplomatic struggle 
between states that sought to alter the international gold standard and those that defended 
the emerging monetary status quo offers a clear window into the politics of nineteenth-
century globalization.  Between 1878 and 1897, the United States led efforts to modify 
international monetary relations by replacing the gold standard with an international 
bimetallic standard.  The central object of US diplomacy was to change the gold standard 
policy of Britain.  The nineteenth-century global economy was largely a creation of 
British policy and historical circumstances.  A change in British policy, thus, implied a 
change for the entire commercial world linked to Britain. 
I make two central arguments about these diplomatic events.  First, that the US 
campaign for an international bimetallic standard was pursued with far more policy-
  vi 
minded purpose than previous interpretations allow.  Prior studies have judged most of 
these efforts as sideshows driven by the calculations of electoral politics rather than 
sincere responses to global economic conditions.   
Second, I argue that the policy proposals embodied in US efforts emerged within 
a far broader, far lengthier transnational discourse than previous interpretations suggest.   
Past studies have portrayed the economic views that underpinned US diplomacy as 
peripheral ideas espoused by a minority far from the mainstream in economic thought.   
Persistent US initiatives to alter international monetary relations through 
diplomacy ultimately ended in failure.  This result, however, rested more on failures of 
politics than on the outré nature of international bimetallism and its advocates.  At several 
key junctures, considerations of geopolitical rivalry and the constraints of political 
ideology in Europe overwhelmed US efforts.  This failure left in place the deflationary 
pressures imposed by the gold standard until the late nineteenth century, when new gold 
discoveries provided exogenous monetary relief and removed the impetus for further 
diplomacy. 
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Introduction: A Clockwork Globe Unhinged 
 
However the silver question may be decided, it cannot fail to be regarded in history as 
one of the most important public questions of our time. 1 
George A. Walker, 1877 
The United States, the Gold Standard, and Nineteenth-Century Globalization 
 
The floors of the crowded Chicago Coliseum rumbled and strained under the 
crescendos of applause directed at the young man speaking from the podium.  It was the 
ninth of July 1896.  That afternoon at the Democratic National Convention all the 
tensions and anxieties accumulated over decades of extraordinary economic development 
in the United States seemed ready to surge over the levees of tradition—ready to fracture 
long-standing societal assumptions and political coalitions that defined the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  Americans, in the three decades since the Civil War, had 
experienced a remarkable period of change marked by new and interlocking patterns of 
economic development.  Rapidly expanding manufactures brought international flows of 
capital and labor into the industrializing cities of the United States, creating new 
American wealth as well as new social dilemmas and nativist anxieties.  New immigrants 
in unprecedented numbers not only manned urban factories but also built railroads, 
settled new agricultural lands, and helped pacify indigenous populations in the American 
                                                 
1 George A. Walker, “The Belgian Monetary Documents,” The Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 
(1849-1894) 12, no. 6 (December 1877): 420. 
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West.  While citizens and public officials focused on controlling this region, turning it to 
productive purposes, and integrating it into the national economy, they watched warily as 
European states pursued similar economic advantages by means of renewed imperial 
expansion.   
Change on this scale inspired both hopes and fears.   Henry Adams, a keen 
observer of American life, wrote that the task was “so big as to need the energies of a 
generation.”  It required new machinery, he continued, “capital, banks, mines, furnaces… 
together with a steady remodeling of social and political habits, ideas, and institutions to 
fit the new scale.”2  In Chicago that summer, the Democrats, who had gathered to 
approve a platform and nominate a presidential candidate, faced a series of problems 
associated with these changes.  How to restrain the worst practices of the railroads and 
other outsized corporations?  How to protect the laborer and the farmer from downward 
pressures on wages and prices?  How to preserve US prerogatives in the western 
hemisphere without following Europe down the path of imperialism? 
However, the most pressing question—and the one which brought the crowded 
convention hall to jubilation—was the money question.  What would be the standard of 
value for American currency, gold alone or gold and silver together?  The answer of the 
Democratic Party (and the Populist Party) to the money question was gold and silver.  
Free silver, as this policy had been named in shorthand, called for the restoration of 
bimetallism—the unlimited coinage of silver currency alongside the unlimited coinage of 
gold currency in the United States.  The United States had operated on a monometallic 
                                                 
2 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (New York: Everyman, 1946), 240. 
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gold currency since 1893, and the US government had been paying its obligations in gold 
for much longer, since 1879.  Both policies resulted from a political consensus carried 
forward mainly by the Republican Party.  Republicans were determined to restore the 
United States government to conservative financial principles after the monetary 
exigencies of the Civil War.  By 1896, however, the intervening decades had been 
marked by repeated cycles of economic boom and bust.  To contemporary observers, the 
increasingly large investment banks that funded public and private enterprise seemed to 
be at the center of each successive downturn.  What made matters worse, especially to 
bankrupted industrialists or indebted farmers such as those gathered at Chicago, was that 
banks seemed to profit even in the slumps, buying up assets of failed enterprises at 
bargain-basement prices.  The banks, more significantly, profited by the appreciation of 
gold under the monetary demands of the gold standard, which made debts denominated in 
gold increasingly difficult to meet in real terms.  American bankers and many political 
leaders championed the maintenance of the gold standard.  Silverites, as proponents of 
free silver were called, stood in frank opposition to the gold standard and to the power 
and influence over policy seemingly possessed by the banks.  
In Chicago that evening, the young speaker, William Jennings Bryan, age 36, 
conjured a stark rhetorical picture, linking free silver with prosperity and American 
tradition, while associating the gold standard with the Roman crucifiers of Christ. “You 
shall not crucify mankind on a cross of gold,” he concluded his speech defiantly.  In a 
single stroke, Bryan electrified not only those present in the convention hall but also the 
entire political and financial world.  During the presidential campaign the followed, 
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Bryan and his free silver gospel made the entire system of international finance tremble 
for fear that the United States, the world’s largest destination for European investment, 
might soon devalue its currency and therefore all debt obligations.  “The possibility of 
Mr. Bryan’s election creates great insecurity,” wrote one prominent London investment 
banker, warning that free silver threatened “a complete dislocation of the basis of [foreign 
trade and investment] between East and West.”3  
As such concerns suggest, these familiar events of American history were part of 
a larger international story during the first age of modern globalization.  This dissertation 
demonstrates that American battles over the money question were one local aspect of a 
far greater, far lengthier global economic and political episode.  Between 1873 and 1897, 
the United States engaged France, Germany, and Britain in diplomatic efforts to resolve 
global monetary instability.  The United States advocated an international monetary 
agreement for the joint restoration of gold and silver currency by the leading commercial 
powers.  International bimetallism, as this policy became known, was distinctly opposed 
to the bimetallism advocated by free silver advocates, which insisted on unilateral US 
monetary changes within an unstable global monetary environment.  International 
bimetallism, alternately, promised to restore declining trade between gold-currency and 
silver-currency nations and to relieve deflationary pressures on prices by establishing a 
coordinated international monetary regime.   
The pursuit of international bimetallism by the United States represents an 
underappreciated aspect of the well-documented standoff between free silver and the gold 
                                                 
3 London banker Joseph Herbert Tritton quoted in Washington Post, 27 July 1896.  
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standard in American domestic politics.  Many contemporaries dismissed international 
bimetallism as mere political rhetoric designed to keep wavering silver advocates within 
the Republican Party camp during uncertain electoral contests.  The international archival 
sources for this study, however, reveal a far different picture of the origins and outcomes 
of international bimetallism.  First, the efforts of the United States to secure an 
international bimetallic agreement were pursued consistently for more than two decades 
by every administration from Rutherford Hayes to William McKinley. Second, and more 
important to the argument presented here, the policy ideas that became international 
bimetallism represented a well-developed strand of economic thought that emerged as 
early as 1867.  It did so within an intensive transnational debate among academic 
monetary experts, leading European bankers, and policymakers over monetary questions 
posed by advancing global market integration.   
 Bryan’s electrifying speech and the presidential campaign that followed marked 
the high point of the popularization and politicization of the money question both in the 
United States and across the commercial world.  In the years before 1873, international 
aspects of the money question—what standard of value a nation should use as currency 
and to what extent nations ought to maintain currencies on the same basis—remained the 
province of private monetary experts.  These people were both participants in, and 
theorists of, Europe’s expanding financial markets.  They pursued the rationalization of 
international monetary relations in the same spirit as other rationalizing projects of the 
age such as the international establishment of the metric system and the universal system 
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of weights and measures.4  These efforts reflected a broad transnational confidence in 
science, progress, and liberal economic thought that defined the greater European world 
in the mid-nineteenth century.  As one theorist remarked to his colleagues, “The 
rapprochement between the economic interests of nations brought forth by improvements 
in commerce can be made even stronger by the benefits of the unification of currencies.”5  
In this earlier period, money questions remained the preserve of such men—and 
remained obscure in public life even to many of the policymakers who often approved 
consequential monetary legislation. 
The year 1873 changed all that.  In what financial historian Charles Kindleberger 
has characterized as the first truly global financial crisis, a repeating cycle of economic 
busts began that seemed to touch all national economies involved in global trade and 
investment.6  The money question was popularized during the effort to understand the 
origins of financial crashes and depressions over the succeeding decades.  With many 
regions, especially Germany and the United States, experiencing the dilemmas of large-
scale industrial unemployment for the first time, the money question became a question 
of government action.  What, if anything, should the government do to aid economic 
relief and recovery?  Which monetary policy would foster stable prices and economic 
growth?  In the United States, these were the touchstones for the conflict between gold 
                                                 
4 See, for further detail, Richard Olson, Science and Scientism in Nineteenth-Century Europe (University of 
Illinois Press, 2007). 
5 French Foreign Minister, the Marquise de Moustier, addressed the 1867 International Monetary 
Conference, noting the connection between the spirit of the Universal Exposition and the object of the 
Conference, monetary unification. The translation from French is my own.  See Conférence Monetaire 
Internationale: Procés-Verbaux (Paris: Imperial Government of France, 1867), 8. 
6 Charles Poor Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: 
Basic Books, 1978). 
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currency and paper currency factions during the Grant administration.   Later, after 1875, 
they defined the standoff between gold currency and free silver factions in domestic 
politics.  In the years between 1875 and 1897, proposals for international bimetallism 
moved first to the center of the American political debate and then, through US 
leadership, they moved to the center of great power diplomacy between the United States 
and Europe.  The ideas that underpinned these efforts emerged among financially 
conservative economists and bankers familiar with the dynamics of the changing global 
economy.  By the time William Jennings Bryan was nominated for president in 1896, 
international bimetallism was at the center of domestic policy debates and international 
diplomacy at the highest levels of government on both sides of the Atlantic. 
International Bimetallism and Anglo-American Relations 
 
What has happened might perhaps be a lesson for the Americans and proof that they are 
not quite as independent from the rest of the world as they imagined. 7 
 – Alphonse de Rothschild, 1893 
 
This study examines these transnational debates and diplomatic struggles over the 
international gold standard during the late-nineteenth century as a window into the larger 
process of nineteenth-century globalization.  I argue that the emergence of the modern 
global economy during this period was shaped as much by politics and policy choices as 
                                                 
7 Alphonse de Rothschild to NMR & Sons, 7 September 1893, Family and Business Letters, T File 
Extracts, folder 3, entry 59, Rothschild Archive. 
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by immutable economic forces.  In the globalization of markets, Great Britain, the 
leading commercial power of the era, most often made policy choices with little regard 
for communities in the emerging economies of the world, including the United States.   
In the United States, these imbalances of economic power defined transatlantic 
relations and deepened regional tensions within the United States between an 
Anglophobic American West and a Northeast deeply enmeshed in British trade and 
investment.  The United States, with its export-oriented agricultural frontiers and its 
ongoing reliance on British capital, retained many characteristics of an emerging 
economy late into the nineteenth century.  In 1896, though Bryan’s crusade for free silver 
ultimately fell short of victory, it did bring into sharp focus the problems posed by such 
globalizing linkages to Britain under the gold standard.  Despite the well-documented 
excesses of populist rhetoric regarding the money question, there remained an ember of 
truth to the charges of economic enslavement posed by adherence to the British system.  
In Bryan’s view, the Cross of Gold was imposed upon the American people not only by 
wire-pullers on Wall Street but also by Great Britain, the center of international finance 
and the world’s leading gold-standard power.  Bryan and other free silver spokesmen 
very deliberately drew connections between the influence of international finance and 
American distress. “There will be a declaration of war,” said one free silver spokesmen.  
“The foe to be outlawed will be the money power and this generalization is designed to 
include… the capitalists of Europe.”8  Bryan himself portrayed the deflationary 
                                                 
8 Free silver spokesman A.J. Warner made these remarks at the 1893 Populist Convention.  Quoted in New 
York Times, 31 July 1893. 
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constraints of the gold standard in terms that echoed the outrages of British rule that 
sparked the American Revolution.  “It is the issue of 1776 all over again,” he said to his 
Chicago audience.  “Our ancestors, when they were but three million, declared their 
political independence of every other nation on earth.  Shall we, when we have grown to 
seventy million, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers?”9  Despite the 
hyperbole of such sentiments, there was substance behind these charges.  The necessity 
on the part of the United States to maintain good relations with the investment houses of 
London, in particular, guided US policy choices through successive Republican and 
Democratic administrations.  The US effort to establish international bimetallism—and 
especially to involve Britain in that agreement—represented an effort by American 
financial conservatives to alleviate the pressures imposed by the British gold standard.  
British monetary policy was the other cross of gold that, alongside the domestic gold 
standard, significantly shaped the battle over the money question in the United States.  
Historiography 
 
Why did successive US administrations pursue international bimetallism so 
consistently?  To what extent were US efforts driven by the realities of the ongoing 
integration of a global market economy, in general, and the spread of the international 
gold standard, in particular?  Historians of American foreign relations have mostly 
neglected this important subject, likely for two reasons.  First, the technical nature of 
                                                 
9 Quoted in “Bryan’s Great Speech: An Oration that Won the Presidential Nomination,” Washington Post, 
11 July 1896. 
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monetary theory and economic discourse remains an obstacle similar to examining 
sources in an unfamiliar foreign language.  Second, US efforts to establish international 
bimetallism ended with more defeats than clear victories.  Therefore these developments 
do not fit well into narratives of growing US economic power and geopolitical influence 
in the late nineteenth century.   
There have been, however, a few souls brave enough to address the question.  The 
literature on the subject, produced many years ago, largely explains US efforts to 
establish international bimetallism as a matter of political expediency that emerged 
within the context of domestic politics of the late nineteenth century.10    This 
interpretation, for the most part, is a function of the sources employed, which in all three 
major works are confined to official US reports and government records regarding 
monetary diplomacy.  The first two works, in chronological appearance, are also overly 
influenced by the contemporary politics of their times.  Published in 1898, Henry B. 
Russell’s International Monetary Conferences offers a journalistic account of these 
events from the viewpoint of a contemporary financial conservative.  Russell places 
much of the blame for the failure of the US diplomatic efforts on the insurgency of 
American free silver populists.  Published in 1933, “Silver Diplomacy” by Jeanette P. 
Nichols offers a brief overview that likewise indicts American actions for the failure of 
monetary diplomacy.  Both studies reflect prevailing suspicions directed at monetary 
reformers in these periods.  Debate on monetary questions intensified in parallel with the 
                                                 
10 Walter T. K Nugent, Money and American Society, 1865-1880 (New York: Free Press, 1968).  See also, 
Jeannette P. Nichols, “Silver Diplomacy,” Political Science Quarterly 48, no. 4 (December 1, 1933): 565–
88.  Henry B. Russell, International Monetary Conferences (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1898). 
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economic depressions of the 1890s and 1930s.  In both eras, conservative opinion favored 
orthodoxy in financial affairs and deprecated new and alternative economic policy 
proposals.  These contemporary attitudes tended to reinforce the view, first raised in the 
1890s, that American efforts to establish international bimetallism represented nothing 
more than domestic political maneuvers, rather than offering a practicable alternative to 
the existing international monetary regime of the late nineteenth century.  Both Russell 
and Nichols also lack a thorough appreciation of the global sources of ongoing monetary 
instability during the period and the depth of intellectual discourse on the subject.   
Though it only covers events through 1880, Walter Nugent’s Money and 
American Society, published in 1968, offers a more balanced portrait of the global 
economic circumstances and geopolitical obstacles confronting US advocates of 
international bimetallism.  In his coverage of the first two International Monetary 
Conferences, in particular, Nugent accurately depicts international monetary relations 
before the 1870s as a de facto system of international bimetallism rather than a single 
gold or silver monetary system.  Before 1873, among the commercial powers, only 
Britain and Portugal maintained a gold standard currency; continental Europe and the 
United States had longer histories with silver or bimetallic currencies than they did with 
gold.  Nugent demonstrates that international bimetallism was a realistic and sincerely 
pursued US initiative.  In this sense, he presents the monetary world as it was before the 
first internationalization of the gold standard in the 1870s.  Taken together, these studies 
offer an important, if incomplete, interpretation of the US pursuit of international 
bimetallism.   
  12 
This dissertation reaches a different conclusion, based on international, multi-
archival research.  It shows that US monetary diplomacy originated in a far broader and 
lengthier transnational debate than previously understood, and it demonstrates that 
American efforts were pursued with far more policy-minded purpose than previous 
interpretations allow.  Economic thought itself was changing rapidly in response to 
globalization and to new quantitative methods during this period.  Likewise, in world 
politics, the rise of new imperial powers and the destabilization of the British world order 
gave urgency to the search for a monetary accord that might limit tensions over 
international economic competition.  As the sources used illustrate, the pursuit of 
international bimetallism was never as peripheral to American foreign policymakers of 
the era as it has been to historians of US foreign relations.   American statesmen pursued 
international bimetallism consistently because changes in monetary relations, then as 
now, could effect changes across the entire global economy, including the debt-deflation 
issues faced by the United States.  This study, thus, places globalization—and the 
problems globalization presented—at the center of US foreign policymaking in the late 
nineteenth century.   
Any study of international monetary relations during the late nineteenth century 
must engage with the considerable historiography generated on the subject by economic 
historians.  The question of international bimetallism, to the extent it has been addressed, 
has been inseparably intertwined with questions about the spread of the gold standard 
beyond Britain beginning in the 1870s.  These historical developments have been 
inseparable because conversion to gold standard currencies by successive countries 
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involved the simultaneous demonetization or restriction of silver currencies.  In addition, 
these questions have been intertwined because the international gold standard slowly 
displaced a de facto international bimetallic monetary regime.  In this regard, the pursuit 
of international bimetallism among the commercial powers late into the 1890s presents a 
problem for those economic historians who have argued that that international gold 
standard emerged inevitably out of the exigencies of expanding global trade or 
technological advancement.11  To solve this problem, economic historian Barry 
Eichengreen, to cite just one example, has made a Kuhnian argument, suggesting that 
bimetallism persisted after midcentury despite the advantages of an international gold 
standard until the disadvantages of the prevailing bimetallic paradigm became so 
pronounced that countries were forced to abandon the prior regime.12  A corollary to this 
argument raised in the work of Ted Wilson has been that the international gold standard 
emerged by default rather than by deliberate action and that the pursuit of international 
bimetallism, therefore, remained a futile effort throughout the period.13   
A second line of argument, opposing this “inevitability of the international gold 
standard” argument, is represented in the works of Marc Flandreau and Giulio 
Gallarotti.14  In both cases, these economic historians emphasize that structural changes 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Angela Redish, “The Evolution of the Gold Standard in England,” Journal of 
Economic History, 50: 789-805.  For an overview, see Michael Bordo, “The Gold Standard: The 
Traditional Approach,” in Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz, eds., A Retrospective on the Classical 
Gold Standard, 1821-1931 (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1984). 
12 Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 13-15.  
13 Ted Wilson, Battles for the Standard (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2000). 
14 Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 
1880-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  See also Marc Flandreau, The Glitter of Gold: 
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of the nineteenth-century global economy are insufficient to explain the emergence of the 
international gold standard and the demise of an informal bimetallic regime.  While 
conceding the material advantages presented by currency uniformity in general—and the 
advantages of alignment with British monetary practices in particular—these historians 
contend that political and other non-economic factors played a significant role in the 
course of nineteenth century monetary relations.  Regarding the limited results of efforts 
to reach an international bimetallic agreement after 1878, in particular, Gallarotti 
concludes that Britain failed to cooperate even though rational incentives dictated that an 
international bimetallic regime should have been constructed.15  This second line of 
argument seems to acknowledge the social and political complexities in which the 
question of international bimetallism developed and the contingencies that produced the 
ultimate outcomes. 
While acknowledging the contributions of both interpretations, the evidence 
presented in “The Other Cross of Gold” more readily confirms the second argument—
namely that the fate of international bimetallism rested much more on the contingencies 
of domestic politics and geopolitics on both sides of the Atlantic.  This study finds, in 
contradiction to the inevitability thesis, that the pursuit of international bimetallism did 
not represent the fragmentation of an outmoded monetary regime.  It represented the 
opposite: a set of international monetary proposals that rose to policy questions at the 
highest levels of government as a result of new economic thinking and empirical study of 
                                                                                                                                                 
France, Bimetallism, and the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1848-1873 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
15 Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, 224.  
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the rapidly integrating world economy.  In this view, insistence by Britain and others on 
the gold standard represented a set of economic arguments out of sync with economic 
realities between 1873 and 1896.   Though Flandreau and Gallarotti emphasize the 
politics of the emergence of the international gold standard, their work is less focused on 
British motives, beyond the contention that Britain acted contrary to its rational interest.  
This study builds upon their emphasis on contingency and non-economic explanations of 
efforts to establish international bimetallism.  It frames the pursuit of international 
bimetallism, however, as a question of US foreign policymaking and necessarily dwells 
on different points of emphasis than these economic histories.  In doing so, it reveals a 
more detailed portrait of both sides of the long transnational debate and diplomatic 
struggle over the gold standard and international bimetallism that defined the late 
nineteenth century.   
This study also offers new ways of viewing the broader debate over the nature of 
US foreign policymaking in the late-nineteenth century.  To interpretations that 
emphasize the search for new markets abroad, this case adds a layer of complexity, 
demonstrating that efforts to defend the United States from global economic forces 
played a complementary role to the domestic economic imperatives that inspired the 
drive for markets.16  To interpretations that maintain that US foreign policy remained ad 
hoc, politicized, and amateurish prior to the 1890s, this case presents a distinct outlier, 
                                                 
16 For the exemplar search for markets interpretation, see Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An 
Interpretation of American Expansion,1860-1898, 35th anniversary ed, Cornell Paperbacks (Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).  LaFeber built upon the Gallagher and Robinson-influenced thesis of 
open-door imperialism of his advisor,  William Appleman Williams in The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Pub, 1959).  See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of 
Free Trade,” The Economic History Review 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1953): 1–15.      
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marked by a consistent foreign policy informed by experts and acted upon by senior 
policymakers over two decades.17  A fresh examination of the global context of US 
monetary diplomacy thus expands our framework for understanding US foreign 
policymaking during this period.  
Methodology 
 
This study, foremost, is an effort to reinterpret a broad set of international sources 
in light of a deeper understanding of changing economic thought in the late nineteenth 
century.  This period was a watershed moment in economics as the discipline underwent 
revolutions that paralleled the larger transformation of the sciences.  Economics changed 
during this period from a branch of natural philosophy into a social science under the 
pressures of immense accumulations of real-world data and larger patterns of 
professionalization in the sciences.  The economy envisioned by eighteenth-century 
philosophers as a kind of clockwork globe naturally moving toward equilibrium was 
being displaced by new data and new scholarship.  The development of the monetary 
                                                 
17 To be sure, the pursuit of international bimetallism waxed and waned between the 1870s and 1890s.  It 
was pushed more forcefully by Republican administrations than Democratic administrations.  Nevertheless, 
as I argue, leaders from both parties were driven toward international bimetallism by the necessity for 
continued foreign investment in the United States and by the larger project of restoring the United States to 
orthodox financial principles following the Civil War.  In this early stage of US efforts, bipartisan support 
in the Senate for international bimetallism represents an early indicator of the consistency of these efforts 
over two decades.  For a concise restatement of the ad hoc view of  US foreign policymaking during this 
period, see David M. Pletcher, “Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment, 1861-1898” in William H. 
Becker and Samuel F. Wells, eds., Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy 
Since 1789 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).  See also, Robert L. Beisner, From the Old 
Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900 (New York: Crowell, 1975).   
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ideas and arguments favoring international bimetallism, especially refinements of the 
quantity theory of money emerged in this context.18   
A second goal of this project is to view these events of international monetary 
relations, and US foreign policymaking generally, in light of recent research by economic 
historians who identify the late nineteenth century as a period of remarkable 
globalization—one that parallels the dynamics of contemporary globalization in our own 
time.  These realizations have particular implications that my own research confirms.  
Foremost, the emergence of globalization in both periods resulted more from the interests 
and policymaking choices of the leading economic nations than from immutable world-
historic forces.  Though geopolitical stability among the Western countries and 
technological innovation made contributions to globalization in the age of steam and 
telegraph, the foremost drivers were the power and influence of Britain and British 
economic thought.  In the late nineteenth century, the intellectual and political triumphs 
of classical economics and those interests that benefited from such policy changes, first in 
Britain, were crucial to the process.  As Harvard economic historian Jeffrey A. Frieden 
has noted of the period, “Globalization was a choice, not a fact…  Globalization needs 
supportive governments and supportive governments need domestic political support…  
The integrated world economy before 1914 rested on government actions to sustain it.”19   
                                                 
18 Alfred Marshall first published a treatise on money in 1875 and further developed his theory until the 
end of the century.  See David Laidler, The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory: The Development of 
Neoclassical Monetary Economics, 1870-1914 (Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1991). See also Philip 
Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989).  Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). 
19Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007), xvii. 
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Though contemporaries never used the word globalization in their own discourse, 
its utility as a means of analysis outweighs anachronistic risks associated with its use.  In 
the late nineteenth century, American experts and leading policymakers involved in the 
diplomatic pursuit of international bimetallism, from Senator John Sherman to President 
William McKinley, understood clearly the dynamics of global market integration we now 
characterize as globalization.  This understanding, demonstrated in both their public and 
private utterances, gives further credence to the argument that international bimetallism 
was pursued consistently and sincerely by the United States because of ongoing global 
monetary instability and the dangers these global problems posed to the United States.  
Situating US monetary diplomacy both in the context of nineteenth-century globalization 
and in the context of a far broader, far more fluid transnational debate within economics 
has required me to reassess the significance of these efforts. 
Implications 
 
By looking at US, British, and French sources on the subject in light of these two 
points of emphasis, I draw new conclusions about US efforts to establish international 
bimetallism during this period.  I argue, first, that US bimetallic diplomacy was part of a 
larger transnational debate over monetary policy than previous interpretations concede.  
Second, I argue that the ultimate failure of US diplomatic initiatives stemmed more from 
encroaching geopolitical priorities and political ideology than from the outré nature of 
international bimetallism itself.   Finally, I argue that the diplomatic struggles over 
international monetary relations under the gold standard had significant consequences, 
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despite the ultimate failure of US efforts to establish international bimetallism.  Chapter 
1, “Transnational Origins of US Monetary Diplomacy, 1867-1878,” situates the policy 
ideas and arguments for international bimetallism in the context of rapidly changing 
European financial centers and the emerging tensions in economic thought between 
advocates of classical liberal economics and contemporary experts who were more 
familiar with the working realities of money markets.  It also demonstrates why these 
initially European ideas were so readily taken up by advocates in the United States.  
Chapter 2, “The Fall and Rise of US Bimetallic Diplomacy in World Politics, 1878-
1881,” examines the intellectual and geopolitical tensions that complicated the first 
efforts by the United States to rearrange international monetary relations under the gold 
standard.  As this chapter demonstrates, bimetallic ideas and arguments found increasing 
intellectual acceptance among academics and policymakers, while imbalances of 
geopolitical power prevented an international monetary agreement during this period.  
Chapter 3, “Global Depression and the Challenge to the British Gold Standard, 1881-
1891,” examines the people, ideas, and forces shaping the challenge to Britain’s 
monetary policy.  Movement of British opinion on the subject resulted from both 
domestic and foreign efforts within the distinctly transnational context of world capital 
markets.  Chapter 4, “Failing to Save the World: The United States, Britain, and Silver, 
1889-1893,” assesses the ongoing global monetary instability left unresolved by the 1881 
International Monetary Conference and the revival of bimetallic interest groups in the 
decade culminating in the Brussels International Monetary Conference.  Chapter 5, 
“Reunion of Financial Conservatives, 1893-1900,” demonstrates the ways in which 
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global monetary problems under the gold standard and subsequent high level diplomacy 
over international bimetallism shaped Anglo-American rivalry and rapprochement in the 
middle years of the 1890s.   
Taken together, these chapters trace the arc of US initiatives to establish 
international bimetallism.  Over the long term, the question of international bimetallism 
as policy experienced surges of support in both Europe and the United States that most 
often coincided with periods of economic distress.  Yet at the same time, international 
bimetallism witnessed a steady climb in status marked by increasing scholarly validation 
by new quantitative economists such as Alfred Marshall of Cambridge and Francis A. 
Walker of Yale.  The disjuncture between the growing scientific acceptance of 
international bimetallism and the failure of policymakers to find agreement based on that 
acceptance suggests that US monetary diplomacy met with little success for reasons other 
than the merits and deliberate nature of US efforts.  The power and influence of Britain as 
leading financial nation held ultimate sway over the fate of the international gold 
standard.  Yet, as this study repeatedly shows, British policymakers clung to the ideas of 
the gold standard long after its limitations had been revealed by contemporary experience 
and by the findings of academic economists. 
Beyond tracing the transnational origins and complex outcomes of US monetary 
diplomacy, this study also represents an important case study in late nineteenth century 
US foreign policymaking.  The continued reliance by the United States on British capital 
markets late into the 1890s suggests one source of influence on wider US foreign 
policymaking during the period.   The globalizing connections of foreign investment (and 
  21 
export markets) shaped US deference toward Britain, in particular, and to the European 
powers, in general.20  The ties of foreign trade and investment among American financial 
conservatives acted as a deterrent to hostile relations with Britain and Europe even as the 
United States emerged as the largest industrial economy in the world.    
In this respect, the diplomatic struggles over international bimetallism illuminate 
the extent to which financial conservatism represented a deeply-rooted set of assumptions 
shared by Republicans leaders in the United States and Conservative Party leaders in 
Britain.  These shared sentiments, especially in the wake of the radical monetary 
insurgency of William Jennings Bryan, prefigured and helped move the two nations 
toward diplomatic rapprochement.  Shared financial conservatism, perhaps more than 
shared sentiments of Anglo-Saxon affinity or still-emerging geopolitical threats to Britain 
to which other interpretations have pointed, provides a more immediate and material 
rationale for renewed transatlantic good will that should be included in interpretations of 
this scholarly question.21  As just one measure of the importance of these shared financial 
principles, the most intensive growth period in Anglo-American trade and investment in 
the hundred years before the First World War occurred between 1896 and 1913, 
beginning with the election of William McKinley.22  Bilateral negotiations regarding 
                                                 
20 Historian Jay Sexton has made this argument with great subtly regarding US policy toward Britain in the 
antebellum period.  See Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the 
Civil War Era, 1837-1873 (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005). 
21 For representative examples of each view, see Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-
Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904 (Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1981). See also Bradford 
Perkins, The Great Rapprochement; England and the United States, 1895-1914, 1st ed. (New York: 
Atheneum, 1968). 
22 Driven by foreign demand, agricultural prices in the United States rose 78 percent during this period.  
British foreign investment, most of which was destined for America, represented more than half of all 
British capital invested in the same interval.  Figures quoted in Frieden, Global Capitalism, 16. 
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international bimetallism between the McKinley administration and the Salisbury 
government in Britain involved an extended exchange that confirmed shared transatlantic 
sentiments of financial conservatism.  By 1900, economic conditions and Anglo-
American relations had reached such a positive state that the United States set into law 
the same answer to the money question upon which Britain had for decades insisted: a 
national currency backed by the gold standard. 
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Chapter 1: Background to Danger: Transnational Origins of US 
Bimetallic Diplomacy, 1867-1878 
 
Fears have begun to be entertained by men of business that before long the 
principal commercial nations will be involved in a struggle for gold…  The first cause of 
scarcity of the metal was the adoption by Germany of the single gold standard…  Since 
then, we find that at least £150 million sterling has been taken away within the last few 
years.  It is certainly not improbable that we may have a very great scarcity of gold 
before long, leading to a determined struggle between the chief banks of the more 
advanced nations to preserve their own reserves. 
Saturday Review of Politics, February 18811 
Introduction 
 
The finest recent accounts by historians still characterize the nineteenth century in 
Europe as an era of remarkable peace.2  And yet, in the years after 1873, the great powers 
of Europe, along with the United States, found themselves at war.  Most contemporary 
observers agreed that the trouble began with Germany.  The conflict escalated as the 
remaining powers took actions in self-defense.  As circumstances worsened, white-hot 
debates erupted among politicians, editors, and international experts in the capitals of 
                                                 
1 “The Threatened Struggle for Gold,” Saturday Review of Politics, vol. 51, no. 1319 (February 5, 1881): 
176. 
2 See, for example, T.C.W. Blanning, ed., The Short Oxford History of Europe: Europe, 1789-1914 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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Europe and America.  In each, the debate descended into rival camps.  One side agitated 
for unilateral action.  The other pleaded for collective action among nations, arguing for 
an international conference to halt the conflict.  The war did not end with clarifying 
victory for either side.  The lessons of the conflict, therefore, remained ambiguous, 
blurred by restored peace and prosperity. 
How could such a conflict remain obscured?  Because, as readers may have 
surmised, the war was not a conventional one; it was a monetary war.  It was a war for 
gold.  Between 1873 and 1897 the leading commercial nations engaged in an ongoing 
competition to retain their national gold reserves while the spread of the international 
gold standard placed unprecedented demand on world gold supplies.  The 
macroeconomic consequences were, in many cases, similar to war.3  Contemporary 
observers certainly saw the competition for gold and its consequences in martial terms.  
“That which is involved here is in reality a kind of warfare,” suggested one London 
monetary expert.4  In the United States, a respected financial journal echoed the language 
of war, calling the initial crisis “a general struggle among all the commercial nations of 
the world.”5  The analogy to war also shaped monetary discourse among those seeking 
                                                 
3 During this period, instability in the international monetary system persisted, contributing to deflationary 
pressures on prices worldwide, the disruption of currency exchanges and trade between countries on 
differing standards, as well as instability in credit markets.  See, for example, Milton Friedman, A Monetary 
History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).  Also, the initial 
spread of the international gold standard during the 1870s occurred just as the era of unprecedented mid-
century gold discoveries and rates of annual extraction declined. See, for example, Marcello De Cecco, 
Money and Empire: The International Gold Standard, 1890-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 22-75. 
4 Ernest Seyd to United States Monetary Commission, 12 Jan 1877, Report and Accompanying Documents 
of the United States Monetary Commission, vol. 2, 44th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate. Report, no. 703 
(Washington: GPO, 1877), 110. 
5 Samuel Dana Horton, “Specie Payments and the Double Standard,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical 
Register 11, no. 1 (July 1876): 1.   
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solutions, some insisting that “nations must act in self-defense” while others sought “a 
monetary peace” through international agreement.6  The gold competition among nations 
fostered worldwide economic disruptions leading directly to waves of popular discontent 
that raised the specter of revolution at home and intensified the search for markets and 
empire abroad.7   
This chapter furthers the scholarly understanding of US foreign policymaking 
during the late nineteenth century by examining American responses to this era of global 
monetary instability.8   US officials and opinion leaders called for an international 
agreement that jointly established the major commercial powers on currencies backed by 
silver and gold at a universal ratio.  International bimetallism, as this policy became 
known, presents an illuminating case study of US foreign policymaking for several 
reasons.  Foremost, US diplomacy emerged amidst what economic historians consider the 
                                                 
6 See testimony of Benjamin F. Nourse in Report and Accompanying Documents of the United States 
Monetary Commission, 2:407.  Samuel Dana Horton, “The Silver Bill in Congress,” Bankers’ Magazine 
and Statistical Register 11, no. 7 (January 1877): 530. 
7 In the historiography of US foreign relations of the late-nineteenth century there is an enormous body of 
scholarship that has demonstrated the connections between trade, tariff policy, and the search for overseas 
markets.  My argument can be seen as complementary to this line of argument.  By focusing on less 
examined monetary aspects of US foreign relations, we see more clearly the constraints imposed by the 
spread of the international gold standard on the American debate between free traders and protectionists in 
the late nineteenth century.  On one side, protectionism seemed to ensure the viability of the US gold 
standard by tilting international trade toward a favorable balance of payments for the United States.  On the 
other side, the expansion of free trade seemed to promise economic gains and a level domestic economic 
playing field to producers in the American South and West.  For the most recent and useful assessment of 
tariffs and free trade, see Marc-William Palen, “Foreign Relations in the Gilded Age: A British Free-Trade 
Conspiracy?,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 217–247. For a detailed account of domestic 
regionalism in the formation of US foreign policy during this period, see  Peter Trubowitz, Defining the 
National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998). 
8 My own views of the dynamics at work in American foreign economic policymaking during this period 
have been invaluably shaped by the scholarship of Edward Crapol.  See, especially, Edward P. Crapol, 
America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth 
Century(Greenwood Press, 1973).   
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first truly global financial crisis and depression.9  The Panic of 1873 most famously 
bankrupted the heavily indebted railroad firms of the United States.  But it also revealed 
the ways in which financial contagion could spread through an increasingly global 
financial system.  The pressure on the bourses of Europe resulted in a worldwide 
retrenchment of international lending.10   
The policy of international bimetallism pursued by the United States had its 
origins in a far broader and lengthier transnational discourse than has been previously 
understood.  In particular, it locates the advent of the policy ideas that became 
international bimetallism not within American governing circles, but in the broader 
circles of international finance centered in London and Paris.11  This view also suggests 
that these ideas emerged much earlier than existing interpretations of US foreign relations 
have identified.  The literature on the subject, sparse yet important, largely explains the 
origins of international bimetallism as US policy in terms of political expediency driven 
by domestic politics during the mid-1870s.12     
                                                 
9 See, for example, Charles Poor Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial 
Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 130-132.   
10 For an outline of financial retrenchment in the British Empire, see De Cecco, Money and Empire, 26-38. 
11 The emergence of international bimetallism as US foreign policy should be viewed as a direct response 
to the deflationary pressures imposed by the extension of the international gold standard after 1873.  The 
intellectual arguments and policy ideas that became the basis for US monetary diplomacy were much more 
robust in Europe and especially in France, where the monetary policy changes of the 1870s displaced a 
long-standing and efficient bimetallic monetary regime.  The European understanding of the global 
economic consequences were crucial to subsequent arguments taken up by American international 
bimetallists.  My line of argument here follows on the important recent work of economic historians of 
Europe.  See, for example, Marc Flandreau, “The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of 
the International Gold Standard, 1870–1880,” The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 04 (1996): 862–
897.   
12 For the most thorough and balanced example, see Nugent, Money and American Society, 1865-1880.  
The common interpretation may be a function of sources employed, which in all three major works are 
generally confined to official US reports and records.  The first two works, in chronological appearance, 
were likely influenced by the contemporary politics of their times, published in 1898 and 1933 respectively.  
  27 
This chapter establishes a very different picture.  It situates US diplomacy within 
the complex, globalized economic environment of the era.  The policies pursued by 
leading policymakers after 1877—President Rutherford B. Hayes, Secretary of the 
Treasury John Sherman, and Secretary of State William M. Evarts—first emerged in the 
market analysis of monetary experts working within the rapidly changing system of 
international finance centered in London and Paris during the mid-1860s.13  To be sure, 
the acceptance of these ideas among US policymakers rested partly on the extent to 
which they aligned with prevailing American financial principles and monetary policy.14  
Nevertheless, the key arguments and policy proposals that came to define US monetary 
diplomacy make little sense without an understanding of the transnational discourse 
surrounding international monetary affairs during this period.  Proposals for coordinated 
international monetary policy first emerged as minority opinions in European financial 
circles.  These ideas spread outward, gaining acceptance with wider audiences on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  This process, which advanced through a combination of changing 
global economic conditions and the conversion of key individuals, culminated with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contemporary attitudes tended to reinforce the view that US monetary diplomacy in the 1870s represented 
nothing more than a domestic political maneuver.    See Nichols, “Silver Diplomacy.”  See also Russell, 
International Monetary Conferences. 
13 Hayes remained a reluctant administrator of official US monetary diplomacy, Secretaries Sherman and 
Evarts, however, appeared to be sincere converts to international bimetallism. Evarts subsequently served 
as the leader of the US delegation to the 1881 International Monetary Conference.   
14 A bimetallic double standard and not the gold standard had been the statutory basis for US money since 
the Coinage Act of 1792, pushed through Congress by then  Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton.  
The Coinage Act of 1873, however, placed the United States on the single gold standard, though the US 
would operate until 1879 on a de facto dual monetary standard that emerged during the Civil War.  Under 
the de facto dual standard domestic debts including those incurred by the US government were payable in 
paper money and sovereign debt obligations to foreign lenders and international payments on trade were 
made in gold.  For a complete discussion, see Friedman, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960, 27-28. 
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American-led International Monetary Conference, which met at Paris in August 1878.  
This chapter traces the arc of these monetary ideas as they were transformed from 
financial analysis to the intellectual basis of US diplomacy.   
This diffusion and acceptance of international bimetallism by a series of 
increasingly important opinion-makers, interest groups, and government officials should 
be viewed as a remarkable success, especially given the obstacles such policies faced.  
On both sides of the Atlantic during the mid-nineteenth century, any adjustments to 
monetary policy confronted entrenched allegiances to the doctrine of the gold standard.  
Among the liberal economic ideals that underpinned mid-century global economic 
expansion, the gold standard stood above the rest because it possessed enormous practical 
and symbolic power.15  To contemporary adherents, the gold standard seemed to simplify 
international payments and spur trade between gold standard countries—and especially 
between emerging commercial nations and creditor Britain.16    Gold stalwarts, especially 
those in Britain, linked the unprecedented mid-century growth of the global economy to 
the gold standard.17   
                                                 
15 For the workings of the classical gold standard, see, for example, Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an 
International Monetary Regime.  See also, Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital.  For the symbolic power and 
political attachment to the gold standard in Britain, see, for example, P. J Cain and A. G Hopkins, British 
Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London: Longman, 1993), 149-150.   
16 Economic historian Steven Bryan has illuminated the financial exigencies and geopolitical interests that 
drove the extension of the international gold standard after 1890.  Steven Bryan, The Gold Standard at the 
Turn of the Twentieth Century: Rising Powers, Global Money, and the Age of Empire (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010).  See also Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold 
Standard and The Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 
17 In reality, the extension of the gold standard significantly disrupted existing trade relations between gold 
and silver standard countries by unfixing exchange rates under the international regime operating prior to 
1873. 
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The gold standard also seemed to symbolize progress, strength, and civilization to 
each nation that followed Britain onto the preeminent monetary standard.  In the face of 
such sentiments, advocates of international bimetallism built networks of influence that 
transcended national boundaries and narrow interest groups—encompassing producer 
interests, leading statesmen, and new quantitative economists in Europe and the United 
States.  The US pursuit of international bimetallism represented an effort at postwar 
stabilization framed and shaped by American officials and experts operating within a 
transnational sphere of political discourse defined by financial, commercial and cultural 
connections with Europe.  The success of international bimetallism, to the extent it made 
adjustment of international monetary affairs the object of great power diplomacy, rested 
partly on the efforts of this informal, transnational network of monetary experts and 
policymakers.18 
By 1877, despite ideological and political obstacles, international bimetallism 
captured the imaginations of US policymakers.  It did so not only because Americans 
began to engage seriously with the transnational debate, but as importantly because the 
United States remained financially dependent on European investment.  The conversion 
to international bimetallism of banker August Belmont and the New York Chamber of 
Commerce that year attested to the ongoing importance of transatlantic financial 
                                                 
18 Historian Gregory Downs has usefully pointed out the limits of narrowly transnational methods of 
historical analysis, warning in particular that historians tend to find transnational networks when they go 
looking for them.  In this case, however, it is clear that the monetary discourse that informed US policy 
emerged from a minority viewpoint advocated by particular individuals and transmitted through particular 
transnational linkages.  See, for more detail, Gregory P. Downs, “The Mexicanization of American Politics: 
The United States’ Transnational Path from Civil War to Stabilization,” The American Historical Review 
117, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 387–409.  Nevertheless, his argument for viewing the post-Civil War period in 
the United States through a transnational lens is very much in alignment with my own analysis of this 
question of monetary diplomacy.   
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connections.19  The emergence of US monetary diplomacy, therefore, can be viewed as a 
product of structural imperatives defined by the position of the United States in the global 
economy.  Previous assessments have highlighted dire domestic political circumstances 
that pushed officials toward international bimetallism.  The harder reality that drove them 
toward monetary diplomacy was the collapse of government debt refinancing operations 
abroad.  Confronted with financial isolation, US policymakers tilted toward the 
arguments and policy proposals of international bimetallism.  
The Triumph of the Gold Standard 
 
 
The ideas that would become the basis for US monetary diplomacy amid the 
worldwide economic depression and monetary instability that began in 1873 were first 
articulated far from the corridors of power in Washington and long before the troubles of 
the period had been set in motion.  Those ideas initially appeared in the European capitals 
of international finance, following the consequential work of the 1867 International 
Monetary Conference at Paris.  The conference produced a broad international consensus 
in favor of the gold standard, urging all commercial nations to adopt the single metallic 
monetary standard.   
The consensus of the Paris Conference reflected prevailing sentiments very 
different from the uncertainty that ruled the depression era of the late 1870s.  While the 
                                                 
19 Belmont corresponded regularly with Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman, expressing his views on 
the financial markets and, by late 1877, his support for international bimetallism.  See, for example, 
Belmont to Sherman, 7 Nov 1877, quoted in John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, 
Senate, and Cabinet (New York: Werner Company, 1896), 491.  
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latter era was defined by anxieties surrounding international economic competition, the 
spirit of economic cooperation between nations predominated at Paris in 1867.  The 
French foreign minister noted these sentiments in his opening remarks to the conference, 
declaring, “The rapprochement between the economic interests of nations brought forth 
by improvements in commerce can be made even stronger by the benefits of the 
unification of currencies.”20  The Monetary Conference was held during the late spring, 
amid the opening of the 1867 International Exposition.  Like the Exposition itself, which 
displayed the latest technological wonders and the exotic produce of expanding empires, 
the International Monetary Conference reflected the optimism and triumphalism of a 
world made new by self-consciously enlightened leaders.   
The statesmen who drove the conference toward agreement on the gold standard 
certainly saw themselves at the liberal vanguard, civilizing society through rationalization 
and reform.   The idea of a universal gold standard emerged within this longer historical 
process of rationalization of the world through application of scientific knowledge, which 
intensified during the mid-nineteenth century.21  The growth of global commerce, in 
particular, created problems that guided the liberal statesmen at Paris toward the gold 
standard.  As one American editorialist in support of the conference argued, “The theory 
of national isolation is fast yielding to the unifying processes of commerce and travel…  
                                                 
20 French Foreign Minister, the Marquise de Moustier, addressed the conference noting the connection 
between the spirit of the Universal Exposition and the object of the conference, monetary unification. The 
translation from French is my own.  See Conférence Monetaire Internationale: Procés-Verbaux (Paris: 
Imperial Government of France, 1867), 8. 
21 For a skeptical view of the transformation of economics into a social science see, Mirowski, More Heat 
than Light.  For a general outline of the professionalization of the sciences in the American context, see 
Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
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Some common medium of international exchange is an idea which has forced itself into 
notice by the increasing intercourse of nations.”22   
While the imperatives of expanding trade made the pursuit of universal money 
urgent, the determination of the conference to make that money gold rested on two 
separate and distinct factors.  The first was the apparent abundance of gold itself; in the 
decades since the mid-century gold discoveries in California and Australia, the yellow 
metal had flooded into world markets.23  The second reason the conference stood for the 
gold standard was the relative economic power of Great Britain.  Britain, in 1867, was 
alone among the great powers in maintaining the monometallic gold standard; but the 
preeminence of British overseas trade and investment posed a powerful incentive to 
trading partners and rivals alike.  The consensus that emerged at the 1867 Conference 
favoring a universal gold standard was, therefore, a creation of contemporary monetary 
realities and the prevailing economic assumptions that defined the greater European 
world in the age of Victorian globalization.24 
                                                 
22 “International Money,” The Independent 21, no. 1081 (August 19, 1869): 8. 
23 Between 1848 and 1870 the amount of monetary gold in worldwide circulation nearly doubled as a 
result of gold discoveries, increasing from £400 million to £750 million, according to calculations made by 
Ernest Seyd.  See, for reference, Ernest Seyd, The Decline of Prosperity: Its Insidious Cause and Obvious 
Remedy (London: Edward Stanford, 1879), 10.  Data gathered by the US Monetary Commission on 
increases in monetary silver and gold combined seem to confirm these estimates.  Between 1839 and 1870 
the world monetary stock increased from $1.42 billion to $3.6 billion.  See, for reference, Report and 
Accompanying Documents of the United States Monetary Commission.  There was also a shared conception 
among contemporaries that these increases had underpinned the remarkable worldwide economic 
expansion between 1848 and 1873.  As one London journal noted: “It will not be questioned that the large 
increase of the world’s money, due to the Australian and Californian gold discoveries, led to a great 
extension of the world’s commerce… The foreign commerce of England rose from £250 million in 1852 to 
£650 million in 1875; the foreign commerce of many other nations rose in like proportion.” Stephen 
Williamson, “The Discrediting of Silver,” The Contemporary Review 35 (April 1879): 121–31. 
24 While the term globalization has many useful definitions that reflect its complexity as a historical 
process, I use the phrase Victorian globalization in order to emphasize the preponderant role played by 
Great Britain in the economic integration of local, national, and regional economies into a single global 
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While the departing delegates to the Paris Conference looked forward to the 
realization of an international gold standard, a number of experts more familiar with the 
day-to-day workings of international monetary exchanges presented a more skeptical, 
worrying assessment of the plan for universal gold money.  This group of dissenters 
counted many prominent figures as members, including banker Alphonse de Rothschild, 
future French minister of finance Léon Say, as well as English theorist and banker Ernest 
Seyd in London.25  Among these, Seyd was the most articulate and prolific opponent of a 
common gold standard among nations.  In London financial circles, he played two 
roles—one as partner in a lesser investment house, Seyd and Company and another as 
theorist of international monetary affairs.  In this latter capacity, Seyd gained a reputation 
for the accuracy of his data and the nuance of his arguments.  In London, he presented his 
work at the Royal Statistical Society, where he would later become a fellow, and his 
commentary on financial news appeared often in the London Times and other prominent 
                                                                                                                                                 
economy in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.  I narrowly define globalization only to make my 
argument more precise and do not intend to preclude the complex processes of global interconnections over 
time.  I view Victorian globalization as a distinctly metropolitan phenomenon, directed by the imperatives 
of the leading commercial nations, especially Britain.  There is a growing literature on this view of 
nineteenth-century globalization.  See Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and 
History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Boston: MIT Press, 2001).  See also 
A.G. Hopkins, “The History of Globalization and the Globalization of History?” in A. G Hopkins, ed., 
Globalization in World History (New York: Norton, 2002).  Contemporary observers noted the intellectual 
consensus in favor of the gold standard that emerged from the 1867 Conference.  See, for example, Reports 
of the United States Commissioners to the Paris Universal Exposition, 1867 (GPO, 1870), 261-264.   
25 All three, among others, testified before the French monetary commission in favor of policies later 
described as international bimetallism between December 1869 and July 1870.  For testimony, see Arthur 
Legrand (editeur scientifique), Depositions Orales Faites Devant Le Conseil Superieur De L’agriculture, 
Du Commerce Et De L’industrie: Dans L’enquete Sur La Circulation Monetaire Et Fiduciaire (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1872). 
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journals.26  Beyond London, Seyd’s reputation as a monetary expert led him to advise, on 
separate occasions, the governments of Britain, France, and the United States.  
Ernest Seyd put forward three central arguments against the international 
extension of the gold standard and made one recommendation for an alternative in a 
series of books and pamphlets published in the wake of the 1867 Conference.  First, in his 
1868 treatise, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges Theoretically and Practically Considered, 
Seyd articulated the technical reasons in favor of the existing patchwork of monetary 
regimes rather than a single international gold standard.27  He argued, in particular, that 
the countries operating on the bimetallic system together provided a balancing 
mechanism to world monetary supplies in periods of currency fluctuation caused by 
shortages or excesses of either monetary metal.  “Whenever the value of the two metals 
altered, these [bimetallic] countries acted as equalizing machines.  They took the metal 
that fell, and sold the metal that rose; and thus the relative value of the two was kept at 
the same point,” explained The Economist of London.28  This was the principle Seyd 
sought to express when he described the bimetallic system as “self-adjusting.”29  This 
                                                 
26 Seyd presented his arguments against the universal gold standard to the Statistical Society on 15 
February 1870; he was made a fellow of the RSS in 1874.  Seyd was called upon in particular to analyze 
new German monetary laws after 1871.  See, for example, Ernest Seyd, “The New German Coinage,” The 
London Times, 27 November 1871.  See also, Ernest Seyd, “International Money of Account,” Journal of 
the Society of Arts 18 (20 May 1870): 599. 
27 Ernest Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges Theoretically and Practically Considered; Followed by a 
Defence of the Double Valuation, with Special Reference to the Proposed System of Universal Coinage. 
(London, E. Wilson, 1868). 
28 This language appeared in a September 1876 editorial in The Economist; quoted by American 
economists Francis Amasa Walker in his subsequent account of the 1867 Conference. Francis Amasa 
Walker, “The Monetary Conferences of 1867 and 1878, and the Future of Silver,” Princeton Review, 
American Periodicals Series Online, June 1879, 28. 
29 Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges Theoretically and Practically Considered; Followed by a Defence 
of the Double Valuation, with Special Reference to the Proposed System of Universal Coinage, 658. 
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function of the bimetallic countries was a critical benefit to the world monetary system as 
a whole.  
In his 1869 pamphlet, The Depreciation of Labour and Property that Would 
Follow the Demonetisation of Silver, the English theorist outlined a second argument, 
raising an explicit warning about the effects of the gold standard on credit markets.  Seyd 
contended that the adoption of the gold standard by more and more countries implied the 
simultaneous demonetization of silver.  The dramatic reduction of monetary reserves 
would engender a corresponding contraction in lending worldwide.  “The most serious 
matter,” Seyd argued, “is the prospective abolition of $2,550 million dollars of silver now 
current as coin.  The $2,550 million would be tantamount to thirty-eight percent [of the 
global money supply].  What would be the effect of this reduction on the contract basis as 
it now exists, and on commerce and civilization?”30  In the same pamphlet and elsewhere, 
Seyd raised a third objection to the gold standard, arguing that its spread would place 
downward pressure on global commodity prices.  These last two arguments both rested 
on the idea that changes in the total supply of money produced broader macroeconomic 
changes.  This concept, revived in the second half of the twentieth century by advocates 
of monetarism, had been a prevalent idea in mid-nineteenth-century economic thought, 
outlined in the works of David Hume and John Stuart Mill before falling out of favor.31  
                                                 
30 Seyd’s 1868 pamphlet on the fall of silver was later reprinted in Ernest Seyd, “The Demonetization of 
Silver: Its Evil Consequences and Ostensible Objects,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 10, no. 
11 (April 1877): 779–85. 
31 For the outlines of the history of the quantity theory of money, see Carl Wennerlind, “David Hume’s 
Monetary Theory Revisited: Was He Really a Quantity Theorist and an Inflationist?,” Journal of Political 
Economy 113, no. 1 (February 2005): 223–237.  For the modern revival by advocates of monetarism, see 
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Seyd, expressing the idea as changes to “the mass of the circulating medium,” made his 
arguments against the gold standard exactly on this basis.   
These concerns led logically to specific policy recommendations in the mind of 
the English theorist.  Seyd was among the first to advise American officials to pursue a 
diplomatic agreement establishing international bimetallism.  In his 1871 pamphlet, 
Suggestions in Reference to the Metallic Currency of the United States, Seyd restated 
advice given to American legislators in correspondence.32  He noted that “the question of 
whether Germany will adopt the single gold valuation or the double valuation has not yet 
been decided…  Here then rises the opportunity of some international agreement…  If the 
United States and Germany come together, they have ample intelligence and sufficient 
power to determine and maintain the [bimetallic] issue.”33   
Concerns about the spread of the gold standard raised by Seyd and others most 
often met with skepticism.  “We regard the scheme [of international bimetallism] as so 
entirely beyond the bounds of practical finance that we did not think it worth discussing,” 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement” in Milton Friedman et al., Studies in the Quantity Theory 
of Money, 1st ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
32  Seyd’s advice was mentioned prominently in the floor debates in Congress that preceded the passage of 
the Coinage Act of 1873, which demonetized silver and established the gold standard (following 
resumption) in the United States.  See United States. Department of the Treasury, Documentary History of 
the Coinage Act of February 12, 1873. (Washington: GPO, 1873).  In an ironic twist, his appearance in the 
Congressional Record as an English banker advising Congress made him the prime suspect in the 
conspiracy to demonetize silver – the Crime of ’73 – later raised by silverite populists in the American 
West.  For background, see “The Ernest Seyd Slander: Emphatically and Completely Proved False,” New 
York Times, 10 October 1896.  See also, Richard Hofstadter, “Free Silver and the Mind of Coin Harvey” in 
Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Knopf, 1966).  Ernest Seyd, 
Suggestions in Reference to the Metallic Currency of the United States of America (printed for private 
circulation, 1871). 
33 Seyd, Suggestions in Reference to the Metallic Currency of the United States of America. 210-211. 
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declared The Economist.34  The failure of bimetallic arguments to gain wider purchase in 
this period, however, rested more on the institutional strength of the gold standard and the 
prominence of its leading advocates.  Most of all, the preeminence of British overseas 
trade and investment gave the gold standard an institutional authority that minority views 
could hardly match.  Inside Britain, both parties in Parliament, the Bank of England, and 
the growing investment houses of the City of London, all confirmed and perpetuated faith 
in the gold standard.35   Beyond British shores most institutions dependent on London 
credit also upheld the vision of the single gold standard.   
The defense of the gold standard was carried forward most forcefully by leading 
economic figures, including William Stanley Jevons, Michel Chevalier, and Samuel B. 
Ruggles.36  No leading figure who supported the gold standard loomed larger, however, 
than Walter Bagehot, editor-in-chief of The Economist.  The magazine, which reflected 
the establishment faith in liberal economic virtues—free trade, laissez-faire government, 
and the gold standard—since it began publication in 1843, was the central ideological 
organ of the City of London and Walter Bagehot was its most articulate contributor.  
Bagehot popularized the lines of argument that defended the gold standard and attempted 
to delegitimize bimetallic reform.  He argued that international bimetallism violated the 
                                                 
34 The Economist, 20 December 1876, reprinted in Walter Bagehot, Some Chapters on the Depreciation of 
Silver (London: Longmans and Company, 1877). 
35 For details, see Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital A History of International Financial Centres 1780-
2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83-100. 
36 William Stanley Jevons, A Serious Fall in the Value of Gold Ascertained: And Its Social Effects Set 
Forth (London: Edward Stanford, 1863).  Michel Chevalier, On the Probable Fall in the Value of Gold, 
trans. Richard Cobden (London: D. Appleton and Company, 1859). English economist William Stanley 
Jevons was, by the late 1860s, already renowned for his marginal utility theory.  The shared views of 
Jevons, Chevalier, and Ruggles regarding the relative abundance of gold contributed to the gold consensus 
reached at Paris in 1867. 
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natural laws of value between silver and gold, adversely disparaged existing credit 
contracts, and remained impractical because it had never been attempted.37   
Taken together, the institutional strength and esteemed positions held by 
advocates of the gold standard limited the wider acceptance of bimetallic arguments in 
the period between 1867 and 1873.  International bimetallism remained a policy 
suggestion, confined largely to financial circles.  Looking back, the American economist 
Francis A. Walker noted that the public debate following the 1867 Conference 
“stigmatized silver as unfit for the money of civilized nations…  It profoundly affected 
the public mind of Europe [and] put every bimetallist… on the defensive.”38 
The Fall of Silver and the Rise of International Bimetallism 
 
Beginning in 1873, anti-gold standard arguments and alternative policy 
recommendations raised by advocates of international bimetallism moved rapidly beyond 
financial circles into a wider public discourse among commercial and political leaders.  In 
a very short period, the analysis first articulated by Seyd and others became the basis for 
sustained interest-group agitation and the object of official government inquiries.  These 
debates over monetary policy between 1873 and 1876 also spread beyond political 
boundaries, becoming questions of national importance in Britain, France, and the United 
States.  It was during this period that American advocates began advancing international 
bimetallism as a basis for US monetary diplomacy.  The rapid acceptance of the case for 
                                                 
37 Bagehot, Some Chapters on the Depreciation of Silver. 114-118. 
38 Francis A. Walker, “The Monetary Conferences of 1867 and 1878, and the Future of Silver,” Princeton 
Review (June 1879): 28. 
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international bimetallism rested on three interlocking developments: the onset of 
international depression after 1873, the collapse of world silver prices, and the apparent 
validation of predictions outlined by bimetallic advocates.   
The spread and intensification of the depression after 1873 was, by virtue of its 
widely felt impact, the predominant contributor to the broader acceptance of international 
bimetallism.  In the United States alone, half of all railroad firms entered receivership 
during the downturn, industrial enterprises failed, and unemployment rose at times to 
unprecedented levels.39   In Europe, the aggregate rate of growth during the 1870s was 
less than one half of one percent, including years of negative growth in 1875 and 1879.40 
Though the nature of the depression remains contested among scholars, it is clear 
that multiple macroeconomic factors contributed to the intensification of the crisis.41  
First, the global downturn represented the kind of extended debt crisis that typically 
follows financial crises; highly indebted industrial firms, agricultural producers, and 
                                                 
39 There are no available statistics on unemployment for the United States in this period, though an 
examination of production across a number of sectors between 1873 and 1878 suggest that economic output 
declined by thirty-two percent. Employment likely fell in similar proportions.  See Samuel Rezneck, 
“Distress, Relief, and Discontent in the United States during the Depression of 1873-78,” Journal of 
Political Economy 58, no. 6 (December 1, 1950): 494–512.  Horace White, a prominent Chicago editor, 
commented on the scale of unemployment, noting, “We see multitudes of operatives thrown out of 
employment, and soup kitchens established, and charities set on foot, to carry them through the weary time 
of revulsion.” See Horace White, “The Financial Crisis in America,” Fortnightly Review 19 (June 1876): 
810–29. 
40 Recent scholarship suggests that aggregate GDP growth for Europe during the 1870s was .43 percent. 
Though the period is often understood as one of ever-increasing economic output, those increases were not 
constant over time and geographic space.  These figures on the instability of aggregate GDP are drawn 
from Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: 
Volume 2, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 31-37.  These statistics, it should be 
remembered, are based on the available data collected by late nineteenth century observers and, therefore, 
should be viewed in approximate terms.   
41 The nature of the economic downturn engaged prominent contemporaries and many economic historians 
since, including Alfred Marshall and Joseph Schumpeter, among others.  For an overview, see A. E. 
Musson, “The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal,” The Journal of Economic History 
19, no. 2 (June 1, 1959): 199–228. 
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governments that did not go bankrupt in the initial panic struggled for years after to pay 
down or refinance debt.42  Second, the depression of the 1870s marked the beginning of 
decades of increasing downward pressure on commodity prices.  By that period, the 
expanding use of steam-powered cargo ships and the construction of railroads had linked 
the vast agricultural interiors of the American Midwest, Eastern Europe, and the wider 
colonized world into competitive global commodity markets for wheat, corn, and other 
staples.43  The result, according to historian Robert Tombs, represented one of three 
seminal events that defined the common history of Europe during the nineteenth 
century.44  These shared experiences extended also to the United States, the largest single 
partner in European trade and investment.  On both sides of the Atlantic, the initial onset 
of the global depression posed significant political consequences, turning liberal parties 
out of power in Britain, Germany, and the United States, and bringing more forcefully 
into politics the agricultural producers and industrial workers hit hardest by economic 
collapse.45  
The second interrelated development that advanced the spread of bimetallic ideas 
after 1873 was the dramatic fall of the price of silver in the money markets of London, 
Paris, Berlin, and New York.  Beginning in early 1874, the world price of silver began an 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Carmen M Reinhart, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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unprecedented and precipitous decline, falling more than 17 percent before 1878.46  
Before this period, the relative values of the monetary metals, silver and gold, had 
remained practically constant in the previous century.  The fall of silver threatened the 
already faltering economies in many countries, first by disrupting exchange rates and 
trade between countries on differing monetary standards and second by threatening the 
value of national currencies backed by specie payments in silver.  The latter fact raised 
anxieties among governing classes because silver prices, by 1874, had fallen below the 
statutory value at which many governments then minted silver into currency.  Any 
government that continued to mint silver in this international monetary environment was 
threatened with dramatic reductions in national wealth.   Under these circumstances, the 
normally reserved Edinburgh Review found it difficult to remain calm:  
Silver has fallen twenty percent.  Silver, one of the reigning metals, 
elected to be a standard of value on account of its stability from the oldest 
times, has undergone the fate of plebian ores… The financial world is in 
tribulation…  The event is heralded with the usual accompaniment of such 
events in the present day – a deluge of pamphlets [and] an impatient cry 
for government action.47   
 
That cry for government action intensified public debate especially in Britain, 
France, and the United States, with a broader group of advocates calling for international 
bimetallism.   In Britain, falling silver was both a commercial and imperial problem, 
discussed as much in the Foreign Office as in financial circles.  “The [silver] question is 
one of real [and] practical importance to our Indian Empire,” one prominent London 
                                                 
46 The silver price in terms of gold fell from 15.50 to 18.33 during this period.  Figure cited in Russell, 
International Monetary Conferences, 135. 
47 Edinburgh Review (Oct 1876):501.  
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journal contended.  “Silver has fallen so much that the Indian resident incurs a very 
serious loss on changing rupees for sovereigns.  The Englishman trading with India 
suffers in the same way.”48  By some contemporary estimates British revenues from trade 
with India and China had declined £10 million by 1876. 49  “The subject [of falling silver] 
is now spreading to other classes,” another journal reported 50   Despite the institutional 
strength favoring the gold standard, the first success of bimetallic reformers nevertheless 
came in Britain with the establishment by Parliament of the Select Committee on the 
Depreciation of Silver in March 1876.  The cry for government action, though limited, 
succeeded because it was concentrated within an influential circle of British merchants 
and officials managing the strategically important relationship with India. 
In France, the public debate that followed the fall of silver was the most 
encompassing.  It occupied the attentions of leading policymakers in ways that 
contributed significantly to the wider acceptance of bimetallic ideas outside of France.  
“The rapid and growing depreciation of silver is now becoming a matter of serious 
uneasiness to the governments [of Europe],” the American minister in Paris reported to 
Washington in early 1876.  “I have thought it would not be uninteresting [for] you to 
know what solutions the most competent French economists propose for a crisis whose 
consequences might prove disastrous for the whole commercial world.”51   
                                                 
48 “The Fall in Silver,” Saturday Review 41, no. 1063 (11 March 1876): 331–332. 
49 Walker, “The Monetary Conferences of 1867 and 1878, and the Future of Silver.” 
50 New York Times, 20 March 1876. 
51 E.B. Washburne to State Department, 27 March 1876, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
1876 (Washington: GPO, 1931), 109. 
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The success of bimetallic arguments in France rested on both the relative 
institutional strength of bimetallism and on the reputation of its leading advocates.  In 
terms of institutional strength, France, despite its support for the gold standard in 1867, 
remained the largest commercial nation adhering to the bimetallic standard.  France had 
operated on the silver and gold standard for more than seven decades and since 1865 had 
been the lead nation in the Latin Union, a bimetallic monetary union that linked 
Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, and France in a common monetary zone.52     
The success of bimetallic arguments in France also depended on the prominent 
position of leading monetary reformers.  This group included Bank of France president 
Gustave Rouland, finance minister Léon Say, and publisher Henri Cernuschi.53  While 
Rouland and Say played a greater role in upholding the bimetallic standard within official 
circles, no French figure contributed more to the spread of international bimetallism 
beyond France than Henri Cernuschi.  In particular, Cernuschi elevated the proposal for a 
diplomatic solution to the silver crisis – a congress of nations to establish international 
bimetallism.  The coordinated action was imperative, in his mind, because the unilateral 
restoration of the bimetallic standard by any one nation would quickly drain a nation’s 
                                                 
52 The Latin Union treaty was signed in 1865 and went into effect in 1866.  Spain and Greece joined 
subsequently in 1868.  The institutional strength of the bimetallic idea also rested on the reversal of pro-
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European Monetary Convention of January 1874,” The Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 8, no. 9 
(March 1874): 687. 
53 Leon Say held the post of finance minister through multiple administrations from December 1873 to 
December 1879, his recognized accomplishments during this period included refinancing and paying the 
Franco-Prussian war indemnity to Germany and removing barriers to internal French commerce. 
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gold reserves through international exchange.54  The simultaneous restoration of silver 
currency was also the only means of increasing the aggregate demand for silver on the 
scale required to restore the metal to its historical value.   
The success of the French bimetallist in placing the conference idea on the 
international agenda was based on his well-regarded reputation and position.  Cernuschi, 
age 48 when the silver crisis swept French politics, was already a wealthy Paris banker, 
publisher of Le Siècle – a leading liberal journal, as well as an ardent republican 
renowned as a compatriot of Garibaldi in Italian unification.55  His republican bone fides 
guaranteed him a place of prominence in the early years of the Third Republic.  
Cernuschi was tall, wore his dark hair long to his shoulders, and was brimming with 
energy, according to accounts.   
His energy likely accounted for two other factors that contributed enormously to 
his success: his prolific publishing on the subject and his tireless travel to promote the 
cause of international bimetallism.  Between 1874 and 1876, the French bimetallist 
published at least five pamphlets on the perils created by a single gold standard and the 
diplomatic solution to the crisis.  These pamphlets were translated, published, and 
reviewed by leading journals in Britain, Germany, and the United States, helping spread 
the arguments for international bimetallism beyond France.   
The reception by pro-gold standard publications was reliably dismissive, 
especially in London.  As one such reviewer remarked, “M. Cernuschi’s faith in his cause 
                                                 
54 Cernuschi to Nourse, 12 November 1877, quoted in “What Is Expected of Silver,” New York Times, 11 
January  1878. 
55 “Cernuschi Arrives,” Harper’s Weekly (6 January 1877). See also  New York Times, 11 December 1876. 
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is equal to his zeal and ability, but faith nowadays does not move mountains, and we 
believe it would be easier to remove all the mountains in England, than to expel [the] 
gold standard from our currency.”56  Outside of financial centers, however, where falling 
silver resulted in unambiguous economic declines, the ideas of the French bimetallist 
were more warmly received thanks also to his tireless travel.  In Liverpool, an English 
port city at the center of Indian trade, Cernuschi addressed commercial and scientific 
leaders in the fall 1876; later the same year he travelled to the United States to do the 
same.  Through these efforts, Cernuschi came to be recognized as the leading advocate of 
international bimetallism.  Fellow advocates credited him with coining the term 
bimetallism itself, replacing a number of less descriptive euphemisms.57  In the early 
years of global monetary instability, Cernuschi pushed the idea of international 
bimetallism outside the bounds of financial circles, making its consideration the object of 
government policymakers in France and beyond. 
In the United States, the fall of silver disrupted an already complex and heated 
political controversy over monetary dilemmas resulting from the Civil War.  By mid-
1875, when the silver crisis blossomed into a national debate, political battle lines had 
long since been drawn between financial conservatives intent on the resumption of specie 
payments and paper-money expansionists insisting on the perpetuation of Civil War fiat 
currency.    After the market value of silver dropped below the level at which the 
government historically had minted silver, monetary expansionists rallied against the 
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recent demonetization of silver by Congress.  Many monetary expansionists, seeing a 
new means to expand the money supply of the United States, hastily transferred their 
allegiances from the greenback crusade to the campaign to restore unlimited silver 
coinage – free silver – to the currency.  To the ruling Republican Party, the first burst of 
silver agitation represented both an ideological challenge and a serious political threat to 
their majority status.58    
In this fraught environment, the arguments for international bimetallism and more 
specifically the proposal for a diplomatic conference spread by virtue of the conversion 
of key individuals and institutions.  The three most significant contributors to the 
American campaign for international bimetallism were business executive George A. 
Walker of New York, publicist Samuel Dana Horton of Ohio, and Yale economist 
Francis Amasa Walker.  Francis Walker was the most prominent figure among them.  By 
the time of the silver crisis, he was already a renowned economist, a former Union 
officer, and commissioner of the US Census.  Walker made the most eloquent and 
substantive arguments in favor of international bimetallism, focusing attention on 
international monetary relations as a functioning system.  “From the moment the 
mechanism of the bimetallic system was broken, every transaction between silver 
countries and gold countries became involved in liabilities to disaster wholly in addition 
to the natural risks of business,” he contended.59   
                                                 
58 For background, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American 
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While Walker gave legitimacy to the arguments for international bimetallism, 
Samuel Dana Horton did more to publicize the new policy proposals than the others.  
Horton, age 32 when the silver crisis emerged in national politics, was a Harvard 
graduate and lawyer with a special interest in monetary affairs.60  In Republican politics, 
he made his reputation speaking eloquently against the Greenback agitation.  He made his 
national reputation as a monetary expert, however, with the publication of Silver and 
Gold, a pamphlet outlining the case for international bimetallism, in 1876.61  The North 
American Review, speaking in praise of the book, declared, “Perhaps no writer in this 
country on the silver question has more forcibly treated the subject than Mr. S. Dana 
Horton of Ohio.”62  Even as his publication drew Horton into a position of influence in 
the national debate, he was careful to note the influence upon him of leading European 
bimetallists.  “It is to me a pleasure,” he said in a subsequent editorial “to be able to 
express my indebtedness to the conversation, criticisms, and suggestions of the most 
devoted living promoter of monetary peace in the world, [Henri Cernuschi].”63   
While Horton popularized the arguments of international bimetallism within the 
realm of public discourse, New York businessman George A. Walker played a crucial 
role influencing Republican policymakers.  George Walker, an Assistant Secretary of the 
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Treasury during the Civil War, remained engaged in international financial affairs in the 
postwar period, translating a number of official foreign documents on European 
economic conditions for the American financial press. 64  In the silver debate, he helped 
build institutional support for international bimetallism; his editorials in Bankers’ 
Magazine and the New York Tribune marked an intellectual shift, on the part of both 
publications, from the orthodox pro-gold standard position to one favoring international 
bimetallism.65  In correspondence with Tribune editor Whitelaw Reid, however, Walker 
related his more consequential interactions with Republican policymakers in 
government.66   
With each of these examples, the connections between monetary theorists within 
European finance and a set of Americans with experience in world economic affairs 
begin to illuminate the intellectual lines of transmission by which international 
bimetallism was transformed from public discourse to policy in the United States.  The 
result, by the campaign season of 1876, was the appointment of a US Monetary 
Commission authorized to inquire into the fall of silver and to make policy 
recommendations.  The work of the Monetary Commission began the first serious 
discussion of international bimetallism in official circles. 
                                                 
64 See, for example, “Book Notices: The Example of France: Two Essays on the Payment of the Indemnity, 
and the Management of the Currency Since the German War, 1870-1874 by Victor Bonnet,” The Bankers’ 
Magazine and Statistical Register (1849-1894) 10, no. 1 (July 1875): 62.  Walker later served as US Consul 
at Paris after 1881.  For biographical details on George A Walker, see Allen Weinstein, Prelude to 
Populism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 131. 
65 See, for example, George Walker, “Bimetallism in Europe,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 
11, no. 12 (May 1878): 850. 
66 Walker, in particular, mentions his interactions with Senator William Boyd Allison.  See, for example, 
George Walker to Whitelaw Reid, 24 December 1877, Box 95, Walker, George file, Whitelaw Reid Papers, 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (hereafter LOC).   
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Between 1874 and 1876, arguments for international bimetallism gained ground 
on both sides of the Atlantic after the onset of falling silver prices.  The spread of these 
ideas rested on the efforts of reputable advocates.  In the United States, in particular, the 
conversion to international bimetallism of the American Social Science Association, 
which represented liberal reformers, and the New York Tribune, which shaped 
Republican Party opinion more broadly, represented important milestones on the path to 
official policy.  
 
Radical Alternatives and the Authorization of International Bimetallism 
 
Between 1876 and 1878 the arguments for international bimetallism were 
elevated from debating points in an evolving transnational discourse on monetary affairs 
to the basis for US diplomacy with the European powers.  In this period, the conclusions 
reached by official government inquiries were released and publicized, intensifying the 
debate between defenders of the gold standard and advocates of international bimetallism 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  By 1876, the downturn had defied the confident predictions 
of recovery made by leading economic figures.  In this environment, international 
bimetallism advanced most thoroughly in the United States, where fears of radical 
monetary alternatives moved many prominent financial conservatives toward 
international bimetallism.  Advocates of international bimetallism pressed their program 
among Republican policymakers, culminating in February 1878 with the passage by 
Congress of the Bland-Allison Act.  The Act represented compromise legislation 
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designed by financial conservatives in Congress.  It conceded little ground to free silver 
insurgents at home and authorized the pursuit of an international bimetallism abroad.67   
Before the free silver insurgency upended the course of events inside the United 
States, the transnational debate over monetary affairs focused on a common, recurring 
question: what caused the fall of silver?  Advocates of international bimetallism made a 
simple yet detailed argument that the fall of silver resulted from the decline of aggregate 
demand for silver that followed the spread of the gold standard, especially after 1873.  In 
July of that year, the newly unified German Empire enacted legislation beginning the 
conversion from a patchwork of currencies based on silver to a single imperial currency 
based on the gold standard.  The problem posed by German conversion was one of scale.  
Even before political unification, the German states constituted the largest continental 
economy, representing forty-one million people using a silver standard currency.  The 
replacement of so much silver currency raised anxieties in financial markets and 
policymaking circles alike.68   
Between 1873 and 1876, following German monetary changes, many 
governments limited or excluded silver from national currencies in anticipation of falling 
prices.  In the United States, the 1873 Coinage Act demonetized silver and placed the 
country on the gold standard.  In 1874, Norway and Sweden followed Germany onto the 
gold standard, closing their mints to silver.  Later the same year, France restricted the 
                                                 
67 For the most complete account of the regionalism, national politics, and passage of the Bland-Allison 
Act of 1878, see Weinstein, Prelude to Populism. 
68 When German monetary plans were announced in 1871, Ernest Seyd, speaking for British finance, 
asked, “If the Germans were able to carry out their intention of acquiring gold for the six hundred million 
thalers now in silver, what would be the result to us?  The advent of a California [gold rush] for the benefit 
of one nation alone.” Seyd, “The New German Coinage.” 
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further coinage of silver in coordination with Latin Union countries.  By 1876, as the fall 
of silver prices intensified, the Latin Union ended new silver coinage entirely.   While 
swift action in official circles likely saved national treasuries from devaluation, each 
monetary operation further decreased the price of silver.    By 1876, silver had fallen 
more than 17 percent.69  These developments only reinforced the argument that the 
spread of the gold standard remained the root cause of falling silver. 
As economic conditions intensified the debate over the fall of silver, proponents 
of international bimetallism still faced significant obstacles posed by the institutional 
strength of the gold standard.  In Britain, by July 1876, the report of the Select 
Committee on the Depreciation of Silver was delivered to Parliament.  The report’s 
conclusion rejected the claim that the spread of the gold standard, beginning with German 
monetary operations in 1873, had been the singular cause in the fall of silver.  The 
chairmen of the inquiry, Liberal Party MP George Goschen, admitted that “the 
Committee abstained from taking much oral evidence on this branch of the subject.”70  
Furthermore, the report recommended no government action.  “The real remedy [for the 
silver market],” committee witness Walter Bagehot later commented “is to leave the great 
natural forces of trade to operate unrestricted.”71   
                                                 
69 To observers, the resulting monetary instability showed no signs of ending, in part because Germany had 
yet to sell most of its stock of demonetized silver.  The Edinburgh Review commented, “It would be indeed 
a signal service if the German government could be induced to remove so far as possible to remove the 
mystery which still surrounds the question of their disposable stocks." See “Report on the Select 
Committee on the Depreciation of Silver,” Edinburgh Review 144 (October 1876): 501–35. 
70 Report from the Select Committee on Depreciation of Silver (Great Britain. Parliament. House of 
Commons, 1876), xxi.  
71 The Economist, 15 July 1876, reprinted in Bagehot, Some Chapters on the Depreciation of Silver, 55.  
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In France, by 1876, bimetallic arguments about the fall of silver were also on the 
defensive—an outcome that rested more on the ongoing vulnerability of its bimetallic 
currency than on the institutional strength of the gold standard.  In that year, France was 
forced by falling silver prices to close government mints to silver entirely.  Noting this 
predicament, one economist later remarked, “[France] had declared most explicitly that in 
suspending the coinage of silver it did not take steps toward the single gold standard, but 
placed itself in a position to await events.”72  These dilemmas in France were emblematic 
of monetary challenges faced across Europe even among governments sympathetic to 
international bimetallism.   
While international bimetallism was impeded in Europe, it gained significant 
ground in the United States between 1876 and 1878.   It did so partly because the political 
landscape in America was more intensely shaped by the experiences of debt and 
deflation.  In national politics, four factions competed to control monetary policy: 
defenders of the gold standard, advocates of international bimetallism, paper-money 
expansionists, and silver-money expansionists (see Table 1.0).  
  
                                                 
72 Walker, “The Monetary Conferences of 1867 and 1878, and the Future of Silver.” 
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Table 1.0  
 Proposed Monetary Regimes in U.S. on Spectrum of Nineteenth-
Century Financial Orthodoxy 
  Radical  Conservative  
Monetary 
Regime 
Greenback 
Standard 
Bimetallism or 
Free Silver 
 International 
Bimetallism 
Gold Standard 
Policy  Use of 
government 
managed paper 
currency without 
link to any 
commodity 
value as legal 
tender in the 
United States 
Unlimited free 
coinage of silver 
and gold as legal 
tender and use of 
paper currency 
redeemed in 
silver and gold  
at ratio of 16 to 
1 by U.S. 
government 
 Unlimited coinage 
of silver and gold 
and use of paper 
currency redeemed 
in silver and gold at 
ratio set by 
international treaty 
among leading 
commercial nation-
states 
Unlimited 
coinage of gold 
and use of 
paper currency 
redeemed in 
gold by U.S. 
government 
Supporters Greenback Party 
(1874-1888) 
Populist Party – 
Silver 
Democrats – 
Silver 
Republicans 
 Republican Party 
(Reform Wing) 
Republican 
Party – 
Democratic 
Party (before 
1896) 
Regional 
Strength 
West and South West and South  Northeast Northeast 
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Paper-money expansionists appeared, to conservative observers, most radical 
since they advocated the permanent establishment of a national fiat currency.  As 
members of the Greenback Party, they had already influenced electoral politics, helping 
Democrats depose the Republican House majority in the 1874 elections.  The paper-
money campaign, however, was already in decline by 1877 thanks partly to the rise of 
silver-money expansionists, who advocated free silver—the unlimited free coinage of 
silver as US currency.  As falling silver prices placed the demonetization of silver at the 
center of national politics, the ranks of silver-money expansionists swelled, drawing 
defecting Greenbackers and many moderate Democrats and Republicans into the cause.   
Both varieties of expansionist agitation represented responses to the ongoing 
pressures of the economic depression.  Part of the reason the silver campaign burst so 
powerfully into national politics by 1877 was that, by then, the depression seemed 
unending, longer than any prior decline in the business cycle in the lives of most 
Americans.  “During the past three years there have been mercantile failures with 
liabilities reaching nearly $650,000,000,” remarked American editor Horace White.  
“What followed the panic, and what continues to this day, is the painful and impossible 
effort to pay a very large amount of indebtedness with a relatively small amount of 
capital.”73   
In this environment, financial conservatives in both parties grew increasingly 
alarmed.  At stake, especially for the ruling Republican Party, was the largest postwar 
political project outside of Reconstruction: the restoration of government financial affairs 
                                                 
73 Horace White, “The Financial Crisis in America.” Fortnightly Review 25 (1876): 810-829. 
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to conservative economic principles.  In the United States, unlike elsewhere, advocates of 
international bimetallism and the gold standard were increasingly drawn together to halt 
the insurgency of monetary expansionists.  The establishment by Congress of the US 
Monetary Commission, during the 1876 campaign season represented not only the first 
official inquiry into the fall of silver but also the beginning of an official shift toward 
international bimetallism.74     
To financial conservatives, international bimetallism seemed to offer an attractive 
solution to the problems of deflation and the report of the US Monetary Commission 
advanced the arguments for international bimetallism in several important ways.  The 
report gathered testimony and data from all sides, including significant contributions by 
Seyd and Cernuschi.  The energetic Cernuschi testified in person, travelling to the United 
States for the singular purpose of appearing before the Commission.   In testimony over 
two days, the French banker and publisher forcefully advanced bimetallic arguments for 
the fall of silver and the need for an international conference as remedy.  “My desire is 
that a general agreement shall be adopted by the different nations,” he concluded.  
Cernuschi, however, added a new corollary, arguing that short of diplomatic action if the 
respective nations could restore silver at the existing Latin Union mint value, the 
cumulative effect would represent a de facto international monetary agreement.75  The 
                                                 
74 The commission was the work of moderate silver monetary expansionists in the House.  The resolution 
passed in both chambers with the votes of these moderates who sought a solution and financially 
conservative Republicans who wished to keep it out of politics. See Weinstein, Prelude to Populism, 122-
123. 
75 The Latin Union mint ratio was 15.5 to 1 while the prior US mint ratio was 16 to 1.  Cernuschi and 
others argued for the restoration of silver at 15.5 to 1 to encourage an end to minting restrictions in 
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proposal to create such a large monetary zone between the United States and the Latin 
Union countries by so simple an alteration of law appealed not only to American silver-
money expansionists but also to international bimetallists who saw a means to end global 
monetary instability.  As the North American Review noted sympathetically, “It must be 
obvious that if such a powerful combination should agree to make the ratio of silver to 
gold, say 15 ½ to 1, all future fluctuations of silver would cease.”76   
Though the subsequent findings of the US Monetary Commission largely 
reflected the policy recommendations of silver-money expansionists in Congress, the 
ideas of international bimetallism significantly shaped the final report.  The majority 
report called for silver restoration at the Latin Union mint ratio of 15 ½ to 1, as Cernuschi 
had advocated.  The majority report also concluded that the fall of silver had been caused 
by changes to monetary policy that followed the German conversion to the gold standard.  
Though the Commission did not endorse a diplomatic conference to coordinate monetary 
policy, international bimetallism was advanced significantly by the acceptance of these 
conclusions in the final report of the Commission.   
Arguments for international bimetallism advanced further in the United States 
than in Europe partly because of American structural dependencies within the system of 
international finance.  In particular, by late 1877, threats posed to US government debt 
refinancing operations hastened the official shift toward international bimetallism.  
During the campaign season that year, a wave of discontent swept silver-money 
                                                                                                                                                 
bimetallic countries. For the full testimony of Henri Cernuschi, see Report and Accompanying Documents 
of the United States Monetary Commission, 2: 473-511.  
76 Moore, “The Silver Question.” 
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expansionists from all parties into Congress, making legislative action all but inevitable 
the following year.  Emboldened free silver men already in Congress decided not to wait 
a moment further, passing a bill for the immediate restoration of silver by overwhelming 
majority on 5 November 1877.    
What disturbed Republican leaders most was the number of votes in favor cast by 
their own party.  The triumph of silver remonetization in Congress posed a direct threat to 
Republican efforts to restore the government to conservative financial principles.  To 
ensure the success of specie payments, as the Resumption Act of 1875 mandated, the 
Treasury Department had been busy refinancing government debt with new bonds 
designed to secure gold reserves large enough to facilitate payments.  By making all 
government debts payable in devalued silver, the bill in Congress threatened these 
important operations.  Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman expressed the anxieties of 
the administration: “Already the agitation in Congress has crippled this department very 
much… I only fear that the premature action of Congress will defeat our plans for 
resumption.”77  The sentiments of Sherman did not represent idle fears, but real-world 
consequences, as reactions to Congress from bond markets indicated.  In the London 
market, the price of US government bonds dropped before sales were halted altogether.  
N.M. Rothschild and Company, then a key subscriber in US refinancing operations, 
declared in correspondence with the US Treasury agent that it was urgent for the 
                                                 
77 John Sherman to Horace White, 5 Nov 1877, Box 606, Letter Press-Copy Books v. 2, John Sherman 
Papers, LOC. 
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American president to announce a veto threat of the silver bill if the credit of the United 
States was to be saved.78     
By late 1877, the urgent necessity to maintain the public credit of the United 
States government imposed a particular logic upon the thinking of financial conservatives 
that moved US officials toward a policy of international bimetallism.  Sherman publicly 
stated the importance of this thinking during the crisis: “There is no tradition of the 
national government more sacred than that which holds it to a rigid, faithful observance 
of the public [credit].  It is by this alone that we are able to sell our bonds…  The 
confidence thus inspired and thus evidenced is the best property of the nation, worth 
more in times of adversity than all the gold and silver that can be accumulated.”79  This 
necessity to maintain the good credit of the United States hastened the conversion to 
international bimetallism of key public figures and policymakers, including Samuel B. 
Ruggles and August Belmont of New York, as well as Treasury Secretary John Sherman 
and Senator William Boyd Allison.80   
While Ruggles and Belmont represented influential shifts toward international 
bimetallism outside government, the conversion of Secretary John Sherman and Senator 
William Boyd Allison were the most consequential changes among those in positions of 
                                                 
78 Sherman received regular updates from Treasury Agent Charles Conant in London in a series of letters 
that fall.  See, for example, John Sherman to Charles F. Conant, 24 Nov 1877, Box 606, Letter Press-Copy 
Book v. 2, John Sherman Papers, LOC. 
79 John Sherman, “Opinion of Secretary Sherman,” North American Review, December 1877. 
80 “Need of a Monetary Conference,” New York Times, 12 September 1877.  In correspondence to 
Secretary John Sherman, Belmont pleaded for amendments to the silver bill that would provide for an 
international monetary agreement: “We might then arrive at the passage of a bill for the appointment of a 
half a dozen, or a dozen, scientific and practical men to meet an equal number of experts on the part of the 
Latin Union in conference.”  Belmont to Sherman, 29 November 1877, quoted in Russell, International 
Monetary Conferences, 183.  See also, Sherman to Belmont, 14 September 1877, Box 606, Letter Press-
Copy Book v. 2, John Sherman Papers, LOC. 
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power.  Sherman, by the time of the crisis, was already the most important Republican 
voice on matters of national finance.81  Sherman, age 54, was also a shrewd politician and 
was most responsible for steering the Republican Party toward a moderate policy course 
at a time when many fellow Republicans argued for a combative defense of the gold 
standard.  In the 1877 annual report from the Treasury, Sherman struck a conciliatory 
tone toward silver-money expansionists, endorsing the use of silver as subsidiary coinage 
and calling on Congress to pursue an international monetary conference.82  These public 
stands by Sherman moved the policy question of international bimetallism within range 
of acceptable political discourse on monetary questions, giving cover to many more 
financial conservatives in Congress looking for a compromise solution. 
While Secretary Sherman contributed his considerable reputation to the moderate 
alternative offered by international bimetallism, Senator Allison of Iowa was most 
responsible for securing the specific amendments in Congress that made international 
bimetallism official US policy.  Allison, age 48, had been a reliable advocate of railroad 
and banking interests since entering Congress in 1862.  That reputation as a stalwart of 
Republican economic policies contributed to his rapid rise to chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee by 1877, only four years after entering the upper chamber.  Though 
renowned as a financial conservative, Allison—as a representative of the West—was also 
more sensitive to the problems of debt faced by agricultural producers than many of his 
                                                 
81 Sherman played a lead role in the passage of the 1873 Coinage Act, which demonetized silver—and in 
the Resumption Act of 1875, committing the US to specie payments in January 1879.  
82 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Year 1877 
(Washington: GPO, 1877), ix. 
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colleagues in Washington.  He was, therefore, more open to new monetary proposals in 
the debate that followed the worldwide fall of silver prices.83   
It was in this context that Allison emerged as a sincere convert to the ideas of 
international bimetallism.  In the year prior to the passage of the Bland-Allison Act, he 
corresponded with two of the leading American advocates of international bimetallism, 
Samuel Dana Horton and George A. Walker.84   “I think you are right,” he wrote to 
Walker in reference to the idea that silver be restored by international agreement at the 
ratio recommended by Walker (and by Cernuschi).85  These private sentiments aligned 
closely with his public comments favoring international bimetallism—and attest to the 
sincerity of his efforts to make international bimetallism official US policy.86  This 
correspondence also explicitly connects Allison to the emerging transnational network of 
monetary experts and government officials that had advocated international bimetallism 
since 1867.  While caution is always required when drawing causal connections—
especially regarding the transmission of ideas in popular debate—the sources in this case 
show that Allison at minimum came to articulate the ideas and arguments for 
                                                 
83 See, for biographical detail, Leland L. Sage, William Boyd Allison: A Study in Practical Politics (Iowa 
City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1956), 60-157. 
84 See, for example, William B. Allison to Samuel D. Horton, 18 Dec 1877, Box 521, Letter Press-Copy 
Book October 1877 – January 1878, William B. Allison Papers, Iowa State Historical Society (ISHS).  In 
addition, Walker confided to Republican opinion leader Whitelaw Reid that he had been in correspondence 
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Weinstein, Prelude to Populism, 257. 
85 William B. Allison to George A. Walker, 11 Oct 1877, Box 524, Letter Press-Copy Book October 1877 
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86 Allison’s most extensive public comments for international bimetallism came in a two hour floor speech 
on 15 February 1878.  “The Senate on Silver,” Washington Post, 16 February 1878.  See also, William B. 
Allison, Coinage of Silver Dollars: Speech of Hon. W.B. Allison in the Senate of the United States 
(Privately Published, 1878). 
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international bimetallism after they had been promoted by leading advocates like Horton, 
Walker, Seyd, and Cernuschi.   
The crucial difference between Allison and his fellow international bimetallists 
was his official position in the Senate, which gave him the means to explicitly shape 
policy.  In this capacity, it is clear that Allison made a singular contribution to making 
international bimetallism the basis for official US policy.  According to accounts, Allison 
began his effort in the Senate to authorize diplomatic action nearly alone among his 
colleagues.87  In fall 1877, when the bill unilaterally restoring the United States to silver 
and gold currency passed by the House of Representatives reached the Senate, Allison 
transformed the bill into compromise legislation.  He led recalcitrant financial 
conservatives to support amended legislation, first passing it out of the Senate Finance 
Committee and then leading the floor debate that passed the bill.  The Allison 
amendments replaced provisions for unlimited silver coinage with limited government 
silver purchases and the authorization to pursue monetary diplomacy with Europe.  
Though drafted in committee in November, the amendment for international bimetallism 
did not become part of the bill until the subsequent floor debate.88  In February 1878, the 
resulting Bland-Allison Act passed Congress, making international bimetallism the object 
of US foreign policy.89   
                                                 
87 Sage, William Boyd Allison: A Study in Practical Politics, 152-153. 
88 “Proposed Amendment to the Silver Bill,” New York Times, 30 January 1978. 
89 Though bank directors in London and New York fretted about the allegiance of President Hayes to 
conservative financial principles, Hayes, in the end, vetoed the Bland-Allison compromise.  Congress 
promptly overturned the veto and the legislation became law in February 1878.  Sherman advised Hayes to 
support the bill as the best way to minimize further agitation on the silver issue.  See, for the domestic 
politics, Nugent, Money and American Society, 1865-1880, 247-248. 
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The Bland-Allison Act quelled the free silver insurgency in national politics at 
home—and halted collapsing US bond prices abroad.  By summer 1878, sales of US 
government securities in London had steadily improved.  For Sherman, the resulting 
influx of reserves to the treasury helped secure the public credit and set the stage for the 
successful resumption of gold specie payments in 1879.  Though the immediate threat to 
the Republican financial program was ended, the ongoing instability in international 
monetary affairs continued, making the success or failure of future diplomatic action 
crucial to economic recovery worldwide. 
Conclusion 
 
By early 1878, international bimetallism had been transformed from minority 
views among monetary experts in London and Paris to the basis for US monetary 
diplomacy.  This outcome resulted from multiple causal factors within a distinctly global 
context.  Looking through a transnational lens makes clear that these developments 
emerged from a much larger and far lengthier transnational discourse on monetary affairs 
than previous interpretations have suggested.  An examination of primary sources beyond 
governmental records demonstrates that European advocates of international bimetallism 
played a crucial role in fostering the empirical and rhetorical arguments against the 
spread of the gold standard and for an international diplomatic solution.  Seyd, Cernuschi, 
and their American interlocutors also helped forge the intellectual lines of transmission 
that carried bimetallic arguments from financial analysis to official US policy.  The 
success of international bimetallism in the United States rested significantly on these 
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efforts.  However, these efforts should not obscure the structural economic conditions 
that also led US policymakers toward international bimetallism.  The determination to 
preserve the public credit of the United States among bondholders, in particular, drove 
decision-making at the highest levels, as Treasury Secretary John Sherman indicated.  
Given the ideological obstacles and institutional interests arrayed against international 
bimetallism, its ultimate authorization as the basis for US monetary diplomacy suggests 
both the influence of an ongoing transnational discourse and the urgent economic realities 
faced by American policymakers during this period.   
The advent of American diplomatic efforts to establish international bimetallism 
and the worldwide monetary crisis that precipitated these efforts were notable 
developments in the course of US foreign policymaking in the late nineteenth century.  
They marked the beginning of a sustained effort by the United States over the next 
twenty years to reform the international monetary system based on the gold standard.  
These pursuits subsequently produced three American-led International Monetary 
Conferences as well as numerous special missions and ministerial discussions with the 
European powers between 1878 and 1897.   
The persistence of these efforts suggest that global economic realities imposed on 
the United States played a role in shaping US foreign policy alongside more thoroughly 
studied domestic economic factors.  In this sense, the pursuit of international bimetallism 
and the intensifying search for markets during this period can be usefully understood as 
complementary efforts to achieve a degree of US economic independence from the 
dilemmas posed by a globalizing world economy.  
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Chapter 2: The Fall and Rise of US Bimetallic Diplomacy in World 
Politics, 1878-1881 
 
Introduction 
 
On 5 April 1881, the hopes of American bimetallists set sail from New York 
harbor aboard the steamship Arizona.1  A large crowd of well-wishers had gathered to 
witness the departure despite the sharp winds that blustered down the docks.  The ship 
itself had been festooned with flags in honor of the distinguished passengers bound for 
Europe: members of the US delegation to the 1881 International Monetary Conference.  
Americans hopeful of some international agreement on the use of silver money had good 
reason for optimism partly because the US mission was led by former Secretary of State 
William Maxwell Evarts.  In one of the first acts of the incoming Garfield administration, 
Evarts had been appointed chief delegate to the Paris Conference.2  The former Secretary 
of State received the commission both because of his intimate familiarity with the issue 
and because of his reputation as a policy-minded Republican and tough negotiator.  
Evarts, a former Assistant United States Attorney for New York, identified with the 
reform-wing of the Republican Party.  His bona fides in this regard had been confirmed 
by the vehement opposition to his cabinet appointment by Senator Roscoe P. Conkling of 
New York, leader of the spoils-wing of the Party.  His reputation as a successful 
                                                 
1 “Eminent Men Go to Sea,” New York Times, 6 April 1881. 
2 On 9 March 1881, President James Garfield nominated and the Senate confirmed the appointments of 
William Evarts as Commissioner of the United States to the International Monetary Conference at Paris.  
See, “Important Offices Filled,” New York Times, 10 March 1881. 
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negotiator also preceded him into high office.  Before his cabinet service, Evarts had 
successfully represented President Johnson during impeachment, the United States in the 
Alabama claims arbitration with Britain, and Rutherford B. Hayes before the electoral 
commission that decided the election of 1876.3  The choice of Evarts, more immediately, 
rested on his familiarity with and conviction about the cause of international bimetallism.  
Since 1878, he had presided over US bimetallic diplomacy with Europe, organizing the 
1878 International Monetary Conference as well as sending confidential agents on 
subsequent missions to London, Paris, and Berlin.  His close association with the leading 
financial men of New York, as well as his reform-minded outlook, likely informed his 
conviction in the policy proposals for international bimetallism.  Speaking subsequently 
of the importance of international bimetallism in stabilizing global monetary operations, 
he contended: 
This vast expanse of credit in the developed commerce of the world rests 
finally upon the intrinsic money of the world.  If you would have fixity, 
unity, and permanence in the credit operations of the world there must be 
fixity, unity, and permanence in all the intrinsic money of the world upon 
which that credit rests. This credit is a vast globe and this service of the 
precious metals to sustain it is that of an Atlas upon whom the whole 
fabric rests.4   
 
With these convictions and experiences, William Evarts and the US delegation set sail for 
Europe, confident that an international agreement on silver money could soon be reached.  
The optimism for bimetallic diplomacy expressed by Evarts and other advocates 
by early 1881 emerged within the context of rapidly changing world events.  Between 
                                                 
3 For complete biographical details, see Brainerd Dyer, The Public Career of William M. Evarts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1933). 
4 Official Proceedings of the International Monetary Conference 1881 (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and 
Company, 1881), 329. 
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1878 and 1881, the idea of international bimetallism experienced a remarkable reversal of 
fortune, transforming in short order from a radical monetary proposal advocated solely by 
the United States into a serious policy proposal considered at the highest levels of finance 
and government on both sides of the Atlantic.  By late spring of 1881, the leading 
commercial nations of Europe – most importantly the influential gold standard powers, 
Britain and Germany – had agreed to join the diplomatic conference on bimetallism 
convened by the United States.  One British trade journal took measure of the growing 
shift in European sentiments in advance of the International Monetary Conference: 
“Bimetallism is the problem decidedly set for the year 1881 to solve.  Continental 
opinion strongly expresses in favor of bimetallism.  Austria and Italy are expected to 
fully accept the proposals [made by the United States].  If Austria assents, we may take it 
for granted that Prince Bismarck will join con amore.”5  Among policymakers in Europe, 
the declining price of silver and the remedy of bimetallism had become urgent 
geopolitical questions. 
The shift toward international bimetallism in Europe advanced during this period 
in part because the problems raised by the spread of the gold standard remained 
unresolved.  By 1881, these monetary policy changes had contributed to a scarcity of 
gold reserves that worried even the most financially conservative European observers; it 
did so for several reasons.  Foremost, the conversion to the gold standard by Germany in 
1873 and the return to specie payments by the United States in 1879 represented 
                                                 
5 The British Mercantile Gazette of 25 March 1881 was quoted in “The Franco-American Draft 
Resolutions,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 51, no. 13 (April 1881): 433–34. 
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enormous monetary operations, which placed new demands on world gold supplies at a 
time of declining annual production.  As one financial journal warned, “The production 
of that metal is one-third less than it was during the five years of its greatest yield, [a 
period] ending in 1856.  In the meantime, the requirements for metallic money are 
constantly advancing.”6  More proximate concerns for European policymakers were the 
large transfers of gold to the United States made in 1879 and 1880 as payments for 
imported wheat and corn necessitated by disastrous European crop failures.7  Even the 
halting and uneven nature of recovery across the international economy, by 1881, raised 
concerns.  At every turn, the depression seemed to defy prognostications of recovery 
made by prominent followers of laissez-faire doctrine.  In 1879, famed free-trader John 
Bright argued that growth would naturally recur without monetary policy adjustments if 
the economy was left alone to find a new equilibrium.8  Those Englishmen closer to the 
day-to-day operations of London trade and finance, however, appeared less confident.  
As one London banker noted that same year, “England has now entered its sixth year of 
commercial and manufacturing distress and decadence.  There is yet a single ray of light 
shooting up through the dark mercantile horizon.”9  The ongoing depression and the 
renewed scarcity of gold reserves, taken together, made the contest for gold appear as a 
                                                 
6 George Weston, “The European Situation on the Silver Question,” The Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical 
Register 13, no. 6 (December 1878): 439. 
7 One contemporary journal estimated British gold losses of £150 million.  “The Threatened Struggle for 
Gold,” Saturday Review of Politics 51 (February 1881): 176. 
8 John Bright, for example, said this in response to the economic crisis of the 1870s: “As to the present 
depression of trade, we owe some of it to bad harvests.  We owe much of it to the commercial and 
manufacturing distress which has prevailed in almost every country…  These great [economic] changes are 
not within the power of Congresses or Parliaments; they are in the ordering of nature and we must accept 
them.” Quoted in “Mr. Bright on Trade Troubles,” New York Times, 13 July 1879. 
9 Stephen Williamson, “The Discrediting of Silver,” The Contemporary Review 35 (April 1879): 121-131. 
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very real danger to European leaders and more than a simple critique of the gold standard 
made by monetary theorists. 
These economic realities hastened not only a significant shift toward international 
bimetallism but also a reciprocal skepticism about the gold standard itself.  In February 
1881, the Saturday Review, a prominent, gold-standard London journal, exemplified this 
shift, conceding one of the central bimetallic arguments it had previously dismissed: 
“Fears have begun to be entertained by men of business that before long the principal 
commercial nations will be involved in a struggle for gold…  We find that at least 150 
million [in] sterling has been taken away by the United States and Germany within the 
last few years.  And now it is said that Italy too intends to adopt a gold currency… For all 
these reasons it is certainly not improbable that we may have a very great scarcity of gold 
before long, leading to a determined struggle between the chief banks of the more 
advanced nations to preserve their own reserves.”10  These sentiments extended beyond 
public debate to official government circles in Europe.  In Britain, for example, George 
Goschen, the respected Liberal Party financial expert, indicated the increasing skepticism 
for the gold standard, even while deprecating the bimetallic standard: “The theory of a 
universal gold standard is equally utopian and, indeed, involves a false utopia.”11  By 
early 1881, at the highest levels of European finance and government, distinct fissures in 
the consensus favoring the gold standard had emerged. 
                                                 
10 “The Threatened Struggle for Gold,” Saturday Review of Politics 51 (February 1881): 176. 
11 The International Monetary Conference of 1878: Proceedings and Exhibits (Washington: GPO, 1879), 
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The shift toward international bimetallism in Europe also rested on the work of 
American bimetallic advocates.  Between 1878 and 1881, American efforts were 
advanced on two fronts, first in the public campaign for an international bimetallic 
agreement.  This mobilization of opinion, which began within domestic politics as a 
result of the fall of silver, was extended outward to Europe by American editors, 
economists, and politicians.  Second, the United States after 1878 pursued official 
diplomacy toward the European powers regarding an international agreement to end 
monetary instability.  The two efforts were deeply intertwined.  In many cases the leading 
American bimetallic advocates, private experts in monetary affairs from New York, were 
appointed to represent the United States, both at formal monetary conferences and in 
confidential diplomacy with the individual governments of Europe during this period.  
These American experts played a key role in the transformation of European sentiments 
toward international bimetallism, re-exporting and refining the arguments first articulated 
by English and French theorists.   In doing so, they explicitly persuaded Britain and 
Germany into diplomatic participation in the 1881 Conference.  In addition, they also 
strengthened the intellectual lines of transmission that carried forward the bimetallic case 
against the gold standard in the intensifying transnational debate. 
With these developments in mind, this chapter argues that efforts by the United 
States to establish international bimetallism during this period were pursued with far 
more sincerity and with many more positive results than previously understood.  In 
particular, this interpretation suggests that US efforts to establish international 
bimetallism were not merely cynical political maneuvers designed to appease radical 
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monetary expansionists at home.12  US bimetallic diplomacy instead represented a 
genuine and persistent effort to relieve global monetary instability and to remove the 
economic problems these developments imposed on the United States.  As one American 
diplomat said of US interests in international bimetallism, “Suffocation, strangulation are 
words hardly too strong to express the agony of the industrial body when embraced in the 
coils of a contracting money supply.  Against so great a wrong to civilization and to the 
hopes of mankind, the representatives of the United States raise their earnest protest and 
warning.  This is our real interest in the silver question.”13   
One measure of the sincerity with which the United States pursued international 
bimetallism was the proximity to power and the policy-minded reputations of the men 
involved in US efforts.  Francis Amasa Walker of Massachusetts, by then an 
internationally renowned economist and a trusted policy advisor in Republican circles, 
was the leading voice of the US delegation at the 1878 International Monetary 
Conference.  Secretary of State William Evarts was the chief US representative at the 
1881 Conference.  The New York Times noted the significance attached to his 
appointment by European observers: “A dispatch from Paris says that the selection of Mr. 
Evarts as chief delegate is construed there as a sign that the United States attaches great 
                                                 
12 The argument that dismissed international bimetallism as an electoral ploy by the Republican Party 
during the years of silver crisis has been carried forward, in part, in prior interpretations of these events.  
These claims, however, originated among the contemporary advocates of free silver – the remonetization 
and unlimited coinage of silver by the United States alone – in the western United States during the 1870s. 
See, for example, Nichols, “Silver Diplomacy.”  See also, Russell, International Monetary Conferences. 
13 American economist Francis Amasa Walker, representing the United States, expressed these sentiments 
to the delegates of the 1878 Conference.  See, The International Monetary Conference of 1878: 
Proceedings and Exhibits, 78. 
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importance to the conference.”14   Indications of American sincerity such as these also 
ran throughout official US diplomatic instructions during this period.15  With these 
appointments, successive Republican administrations signaled their determined pursuit of 
an international monetary agreement. 
This sincerity can be measured by the seriousness with which these policy 
proposals were received by European counterparts.  Ardent defenders of the gold 
standard, of course, remained suspicious.  As one editorialist remarked, “Bimetallism was 
generally regarded as a wild vagary of French theorists and American demagogues and 
has hardly more strength with the solid business classes than socialism.”16  Despite these 
sentiments, many prominent European officials in finance and government embraced the 
proposals enthusiastically.  This outcome rested, in part, on the fact that bimetallic 
arguments put forward by American advocates originated among European critics within 
the financial sector.  Nevertheless, between 1878 and 1881, the years of persistent formal 
diplomacy by the United States, many more key European institutions and policymakers 
rallied to the banner of international bimetallism.  By spring 1881, two directors of the 
Bank of England and the French Minister of Finance had declared their support for 
international bimetallism.  In advance of the Monetary Conference that summer, rumors 
circulated that Chancellor Bismarck, champion of the German gold standard, had come 
                                                 
14 “The Monetary Conference: Why England Hesitates to Accept the Invitation to Participate,” New York 
Times, 11 March 1881. 
15 See, for example, Evarts to Noyes, 26 July 1879, Instructions 1801-1906, France, Vol. 20, RG59, 
Microfilm No. 77, Roll 60, NA. 
16 “What Will Come of the Silver Conference,” New York Times, 7 August 1878. 
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over to the side of monetary expansion through bimetallic reform.17  This reception in 
Europe suggests that US initiatives represented a sincere response to global monetary 
disturbances; it also underlines the related argument of this chapter that US efforts met 
with much more success than previously understood.   The economic depression and the 
monetary crisis were problems born of the still-emerging system of modern globalized 
trade and investment.  The American campaign to establish an international bimetallic 
monetary agreement represented sincere ambitions to remedy those problems and 
alleviate their effects upon the United States. 
In April 1881, as the delegations of fifteen European nations gathered in Paris for 
the International Monetary Conference, the United States had reason to be optimistic 
about securing a bimetallic agreement.  Recent developments in Europe had unfolded to 
the advantage of those who had long advocated international bimetallism.  By 1881, the 
failure to recover from the commercial depression seemed increasingly linked to the 
monetary scarcity precipitated by the spread of the gold standard.  In 1879 and 1880, crop 
failures in Europe added to the currents of manufacturing and trade distress, especially in 
Germany and Britain.  These painful experiences produced political as well as economic 
outcomes, strengthening the opposition to the gold standard within each nation and 
increasing the receptiveness to American calls for international monetary reform.  
                                                 
17 These rumors emerged apparently from an exchange of views between German financiers and British 
Ambassador at Berlin, Lord Odo Russell.  Bismarck himself had to clarify his position on the floor of the 
Reichstag after news of his bimetallic shift appeared in the London press.  Nevertheless, these rumors 
played a crucial role in setting expectations among observers.  For reports from Berlin, see, for example, 
Andrew D. White to William M. Evarts, 25 June 1879, FRUS 1878 (Washington: GPO, 1879), 385-386.  
For a representative press account, see “Monetary Affairs in Europe,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical 
Register 15, no. 10 (April 1881): 764. 
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For the United States as well, changed circumstances augured well for diplomatic 
success.  The misfortunes of Europe had been the fortune of the American economy, 
hastening the return of domestic economic growth.  The dramatic European demand for 
wheat and corn, in particular, helped ease the burdens of indebted farmers in the 
Midwest.  The payments in gold for those commodities aided the regeneration of the 
American financial system in the Northeast.  Together with the successful resumption of 
specie payments, which placed the public credit of the United States on sound footing, 
these developments provided the United States a position of strength as American 
diplomats approached the latest round of bimetallic negotiations with Europe.  The return 
of prosperity gave Republican policymakers more freedom to maneuver in domestic 
politics.  It also fostered a grudging respect for the US economic power and American 
economic doctrines abroad.  We have witnessed “an entire change in the policy and 
feeling of the chief European governments towards the United States,” noted American 
monetary diplomat George A. Walker.18   
By late spring 1881, prospects seemed to favor international bimetallism , a 
proposal one gold-standard journal had derisively described as “Mr. Evarts’ visionary 
enterprise.”19  Material and rhetorical changes on both sides of the Atlantic had created a 
new playing field for US bimetallic diplomacy.  “The United States now has within its 
grasp a great opportunity, which is not likely to recur under equally favorable 
circumstances…   This country, at one stroke, may settle the silver question… for years, 
                                                 
18 “Consul-General Walker: A Notable Gathering in His Honor,” New York Times, March 10, 1880. 
19 “England and the Monetary Conference,” New York Times, 11 April 1881. 
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perhaps centuries,” read one New York newspaper.20  As Secretary of State William M. 
Evarts arrived in Paris at the head of the US delegation, he could not have hoped for a 
better set of circumstances to reach a diplomatic agreement on the question of 
international bimetallism. 
 
Discrediting Bimetallic Utopias: The Conference of 1878 
 
By 1881, the increasingly positive reception of bimetallic arguments in Europe 
represented a remarkable success for American diplomacy considering the degree to 
which similar US proposals had been dismissed by European leaders only three years 
earlier.   The 1878 International Monetary Conference, convened by the United States 
and held in Paris during August of that year, could not be considered by contemporary 
observers as anything other than a failure.  In advance of the conference, the Hayes 
administration had embraced the proposals for international bimetallism authorized by 
the Bland-Allison Act.  The authorization for the conference had become law despite a 
presidential veto in February 1878.  Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman, 
nevertheless, soon after articulated the changed outlook of the financially conservative 
Hayes administration, confessing, “During the Monetary Conference [of 1867], I was 
strongly in favor of the single standard of gold.  At the time the wisest among us did not 
anticipate the sudden fall of silver or the rise of gold that has occurred…  This 
uncertainty of the relation of the two metals is one of the chief arguments in favor of a 
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monometallic system.  But other arguments, showing the dangerous effect upon industry 
of dropping one of the precious metals from the standard of value outweigh in my mind 
all theoretical objections to the bimetallic system.”21   
This enthusiasm for international bimetallism within the Hayes administration 
emerged, in part, from growing expectations that a diplomatic agreement with Europe 
might easily be reached.  These expectations followed from intelligence regarding 
European attitudes given to the United States Monetary Commission the previous year.  
As Henri Cernuschi, the renowned French bimetallist, testified, “There is at present in 
Europe a great reaction in regard to the mono-metallic doctrine, a reaction almost as 
significant as that which prevails in the United States.”22   The expectations of American 
officials were guided, in particular, by signals from Britain, the leading creditor and 
trading partner of the United States.  “There is now in England a large minority if not a 
majority of opinion in favor of an international bimetallic system,” suggested another 
witness before the Commission.  “I do not think [England] would resist the double 
standard from the selfish instinct of capital.”23   
Other American advocates with a more skeptical view of Britain hoped that a 
bilateral monetary agreement between the United States and the countries of the Latin 
Union led by France, was readily attainable.  As Samuel Dana Horton, the young 
American monetary expert, pointed out, “In the struggle against demonetization, the franc 
                                                 
21 John Sherman to W.S. Groesbeck, 15 July 1878, included as Exhibit C in The International Monetary 
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is the natural ally of the dollar…   [The] free coinage of gold and silver at a ratio of 1 to 
15 ½… would be the inauguration, if not of universal, at least of comparative monetary 
peace throughout the world.”24  Speaking of this bilateral form of bimetallism between 
the United States and France, the North American Review suggested, “It must be obvious 
that if such a powerful combination should agree to make the ratio of silver to gold, say 
15 ½ to 1, all future fluctuations of silver would cease.”25  By March 1878, these 
indicators, taken together, encouraged the United States to pursue an international 
agreement with sincerity and some optimism.  That month the Hayes administration 
issued diplomatic instructions inviting European nations “to join the United States for a 
conference to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver, for the purpose of 
establishing internationally the use of metallic money.”26  By then leading administration 
policymakers John Sherman and William Evarts had hope that an agreement with Europe 
on the question of silver money – even one short of a universal bimetallism – was 
possible. 
The 1878 International Monetary Conference convened in the French capital amid 
the pomp and audacity – the displays of cultural confidence and scientific progress – of 
Republican France at the Paris Universal Exposition.  Despite the spirit of openness and 
cooperation that surrounded the conference that summer, American aims and 
expectations for international bimetallism confronted significant obstacles erected by 
European representatives.  These impediments fell roughly into three categories.  
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Foremost among these was the unaltered defense of the gold standard.  Ardent defenders 
of the single gold valuation rehearsed many of the same arguments that had emerged in 
the transnational debate on silver since 1873.  European opinion-makers and officials 
repeated laissez-faire arguments, which contended that monetary policy changes were not 
central to the economic crisis and that doing nothing except awaiting the return of 
equilibrium remained the best policy.  As one London editor argued, “What is lacking in 
Europe, and is the true cause of the present crisis in manufactures and trade, is not that 
the gold now existing is insufficient; it is confidence.  Men do not feel confidence in the 
stability of institutions.”27  To this line of argument, advocates of the single gold standard 
added increasingly urgent claims linking the use of gold money to progress and 
civilization.  “It is necessary to divide the world between the two metals – to choose gold 
for the advanced nations and leave silver to those countries whose civilization is 
backward or stationary,” said one official during the Paris Conference.28  This 
suggestion, and others like it, revealed the extent to which non-economic arguments in 
defense of the gold standard entered the transnational debate during this period applied.  
Political discourse, in general, was infused with ideas in evolutionary thought, especially 
following the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859.   One 
aspect of evolutionary theory—transmutation from basic forms to more advanced 
forms—was increasingly applied to contemporary human societies.  To hold a policy that 
was backward or stationary was to be a nation-state not evolving to higher, more civilized 
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forms.  In diplomacy and discourse of the currency question, conflating the use of the 
single gold standard with civilization and the use of silver money with backwardness 
remained an oft-repeated theme.  It was a powerful argument in an era when 
contemporaries shared a sense that modern civilization had so recently been brought into 
being by the advances of European scientific, economic, and political innovation.29  
These non-economic arguments were added to the institutionalized economic arguments 
for the gold standard and against US initiatives for international bimetallism. 
At the 1878 Conference, US efforts faced not only the entrenched sentiments 
favoring the gold standard but also a healthy skepticism toward international bimetallism 
and toward the motives of United States.  The US Minister to Britain, even before the 
conference began, outlined British skepticism of the establishment of bimetallism by 
international agreement.  “The opinion is largely prevalent here that it is impossible to fix 
the ratio between silver and gold,” he reported.30  This line of argument anticipated the 
laissez-faire outlook behind European opposition to international bimetallism at the 
conference.  Informed by the classical English economists, bimetallic opponents viewed 
the economy writ large as something that existed in nature, something that by virtue of 
the natural forces of enlightened self-interest would inevitably return to growth.31  Any 
government intervention in the economy, in this view, threatened to disrupt this natural 
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process.  So it was that gold advocates attacked international bimetallism as something 
artificial, unnatural, and uncivilized.   
To this skepticism, gold advocates added suspicions of US motives.  America’s 
most respected representative in Paris, Francis Amasa Walker, later lamented, “The 
United States appeared at the conference at a disadvantage by reason of the belief, quite 
commonly entertained in Europe, that the action of Congress [in seeking an international 
agreement] had been mainly determined by the consideration that the United States are 
largely producers of silver.”32  Such suspicions about a manipulative silver mining lobby 
fit neatly within broader opinions held by many Europeans regarding the corrupting 
commercial influence in American politics and policymaking during the post-Civil War 
era.33  As the conference convened, the American representatives greeted European 
counterparts who, in many cases, seriously questioned both the proposals and motives of 
the United States. 
The pursuit of international bimetallism by the United States at 1878 Conference 
faced further obstacles – ones that moved beyond the relative merits of the gold standard 
or bimetallic standard.  In several cases, progress toward an international agreement was 
forestalled by geopolitical considerations entirely unrelated to the question of monetary 
diplomacy.  In some instances this amounted to a lack of sustained interest that resulted 
from more pressing diplomatic concerns.  The records of the British Foreign Office, for 
example, indicate a preoccupation on the part of the British government with the 
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disposition of southeastern Europe in the balance of power between Russia, Ottoman 
Turkey, and Austria-Hungary – the Eastern Question – which culminated in the Treaty of 
Berlin that same year.34  In other cases, testimony from European delegates at the 
conference indicates that balance of power considerations played some part in the 
reluctance to support US proposals for international bimetallism, even among bimetallic 
countries.  Together with the ideological arguments made against bimetallism, these 
geopolitical considerations posed significant impediments to US aims and expectations 
for the 1878 International Monetary Conference. 
In Paris, as the conference proceeded through seven sessions in August 1878, 
these distinct obstacles were emphasized in varying degrees by each of the European 
countries present.  The strongest resistance emerged, however, from a nation not present 
at all, Germany.  The government of Chancellor Bismarck had refused the US invitation 
to the Monetary Conference on grounds that Germany would not consider any alteration 
to its gold standard currency.35  German steadfastness in defense of the gold standard did 
not derive from the manifest successes of the new currency.  On the contrary, the ongoing 
monetary operations by which Germany was converting its economy from a single silver 
standard currency to the new imperial gold currency could be carried out only at 
considerable expense to the government and to the wider economy.  One financial journal 
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detailed German difficulties based on a report by renowned German economist, Professor 
Adolph Soetbeer.  According to the newspaper account, the findings showed that 
Germany, by the end of 1877, had sold 2.8 million kilograms of silver on the open market 
for 413 million marks.  The coins melted down to produce this quantity of silver, 
however, were valued at 476 million marks, leading to a loss by the German government 
of approximately 63 million marks.36  Problems did not end there.  Germany was not 
only selling silver at a loss to maintain the gold standard but was also forced to defend its 
gold reserves against increasing worldwide demand.  A December 1878 report in the 
financial press highlighted the implications: “Germany has itself suffered more than 
anybody.  The Reichsbank has been obliged to raise its rate to five percent, although, at 
the time, the rate in the open market did not exceed three percent.  Thus the protection of 
the gold reserve is costing two percent to the commerce and industry of Germany.  The 
newspapers and the Chambers of Commerce are already uttering their protests.”37  These 
monetary dilemmas, however, did not move the German government toward participation 
in the International Monetary Conference.   
Germany, even in absence, exerted considerable influence.  The smaller European 
states, especially those closely linked to German trade, admitted in Paris that they could 
not move in favor of international bimetallism without Germany, the largest continental 
economy, moving first.  In the third session, for example, the leading representative of 
the Netherlands conceded many bimetallic arguments but finally confessed, “So long as 
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Germany shall retain the position of the single gold standard, it will remain impossible 
for Holland to adopt another system.”38  As the Conference proceeded, the disposition of 
Germany remained so influential that delegates moved to re-invite the Bismarck 
government.  Having made this official inquiry, the presiding officer of the Conference, 
Leon Say of France, reported at the start of the fourth session that he had received a letter 
from the German Ambassador at Paris regretting “the inability of his country to accede to 
the wish of the Conference.”39  In its repeated refusal, Germany had promoted aspects of 
all three obstacles to US aims in 1878: an unstinting defense of the gold standard, a 
general skepticism toward international bimetallism, and reluctance based on geopolitical 
concerns not directly at stake in monetary diplomacy.  On this last point, Germany, like 
Britain, had been preoccupied with the Eastern Question from the outset of 1878 to the 
completion of its role as mediator during the Congress of Berlin that summer. The 
numerous reports throughout that year from the US Minister at Berlin indicated just how 
concerned Germany was with these developments compared with the question of 
international bimetallism being discussed in Paris.40 
Of the countries in attendance, the smaller gold-standard states with close ties to 
German trade made the most ardent defense of the international gold standard as it 
existed.  In the rhetorical defense of gold monometallism, Norway, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands were joined, to the surprise of American delegates, by the bimetallic 
countries Belgium and Switzerland, who remained part of the Latin Monetary Union.  
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During these debates, Juris Broch, the Postmaster General of Norway, and Charles Feer-
Herzog, former president of the Federal Council of Switzerland, most forcefully 
recapitulated arguments in favor of the gold standard and against a bimetallic standard 
that had emerged in the transnational debate since 1873.  Broch, in particular, portrayed 
the maintenance of the gold standard as a measure of the civilized quality of a nation-
state, contending, “Gold alone responds to the needs of an advanced civilization; it [has] 
become the money of all people who are progressing, while silver remains exclusively 
the money of all peoples which are backward or stationary.”41  Feer-Herzog of 
Switzerland carried the civilization line of argument into a more explicit critique of the 
case for bimetallism, arguing that the recent fall of silver resulted not from monetary 
policy changes but rather from the “progress of civilization.”42  Broch and Feer-Herzog 
also raised suspicions of US motives in convening the Conference.  Speaking to the 
Conference, one US delegate felt obliged to point out “a prejudice, which it appeared had 
found its way into many minds.  It was said that the United States had taken initiative in 
the Conference because [we] were a silver-producing country.  This was incorrect.”43  
Despite US protests, the gold standard advocates of the smaller European countries raised 
rhetorical obstacles that seemed to resonate with the delegates gathered in the halls of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Speaking of the questions raised about the viability of 
international bimetallism, British delegate George J. Goschen later reported, “[These] 
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opponents of the bimetallic system were so vigorous that any further development of the 
question seemed scarcely needed.”44 
French reluctance to accept an international monetary agreement in Paris that 
summer was, perhaps, most surprising to US representatives.  As leader of the only 
international bimetallic monetary union, France appeared to be a natural ally of the 
United States.  By the start of the Conference, the French economy had recovered 
remarkably from a succession of crises, including the Franco-Prussian War, the global 
depression, and the monetary crisis precipitated by the fall of silver after 1873.  One sign 
of French economic resurgence was the industrial progress on display at the Paris 
Exposition just steps from the deliberations of the Conference.  Part of the relative 
economic revival of France could be attributed to swift action in response to the fall of 
silver, at which time France led the Latin Union to limiting and ultimately suspending the 
coinage of silver.  These stop-gap measures halted the outflow of gold reserves and the 
potential influx of demonetized German silver.  Nevertheless, by 1878, France still held 
almost half of its monetary reserves in depreciated silver, notwithstanding French 
currency in circulation.45  This relative economic strength and the considerable quantity 
of silver held as reserves made France, in the minds of American observers, the most 
interested potential partner in a bimetallic agreement.  “The nation in Europe whose 
action is far more important than any other is France,” concluded one American financial 
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journal.46  In addition, France, as a bimetallic nation itself, possessed no institutionalized 
resistance to US proposals for international bimetallism.   
At the 1878 Conference, despite these apparent shared interests, however, France 
consistently refused to move toward proposals presented by the United States.  What 
explains an outcome so contrary to the expectations of the most informed American 
observers?  Behind the signifiers of economic strength and Gallic regeneration present at 
the Universal Exposition, France confronted an interlocking set of economic and 
geopolitical uncertainties.  On the economic front, the monetary crisis precipitated by 
German conversion to the gold standard remained unresolved.  Because Germany had yet 
to sell more than half of its demonetized silver, the bimetallic French currency remained 
under threat of devaluation should France reopen its mints to silver.   The leader of the 
French delegation, Finance Minister Leon Say, conceded this fact to the Conference: 
“The attitude of the French government [is] an expectant one, and it must remain so, until 
Germany has completed the sale of its stock... It is this dark side of the question which at 
the present moment deprives France of her freedom of action.”47  Left unsaid by 
Monsieur Say, however, were the equally important geopolitical dilemmas faced by 
France.  The fall of silver that followed the German conversion to the gold standard, in 
particular, had thrown into confusion the member countries of the Latin Union, pushing 
some toward international bimetallism and others toward the gold standard.  For France, 
this development presented a significant geopolitical problem.  The Latin Union, since its 
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creation by France in 1865, represented more than a policy of economic efficiency alone.  
The Latin Union, not unlike the Marshall Plan during the twentieth century, was an 
economic agreement that fostered an underlying geopolitical solidarity.  In this case, it 
reinforced ties within an anti-German bloc led by France that itself began in response to 
the ascendancy of Prussia, and the Prussian-led German Empire, during the mid-
nineteenth century.48  The divergence of opinion among the Latin Union countries, as 
evidenced by Belgium and Switzerland during the Conference, therefore, threatened one 
of the important institutional linkages that bound the smaller states to France and to its 
interest in maintaining an anti-German coalition.   
This rupture imposed the most immediate constraints on French action at the 
Conference.  It did so because the deliberations of the Conference occurred in advance of 
the vote to renew the Latin Union treaty, which was set for 1879.  For France, the 
appearance of Belgium at the Conference as an ardent proponent of the gold standard 
raised the possibility of Belgium declining to renew the Union and moving closer to the 
orbit of the German economy by virtue of the ease of exchange between gold-standard 
countries. The leading American bimetallist in Paris that summer, Francis Amasa Walker, 
later ascribed French inaction in these terms, concluding, “France herself was, by reason 
of critical relations with her colleagues of the Latin Union, not in a position to exercise 
strong leadership. On financial, political, and even military grounds, Belgium is 
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exceedingly important to France.”49  Elsewhere Walker elaborated on the geopolitical 
concerns that France had over Belgium, in particular.  “Scarcely any object could be 
sufficient to compensate France for the misfortune of having Belgium detach herself from 
the Latin States and ally herself with the monetary system of England and Germany.  The 
geographical and commercial relations of Belgium are such as to make it very desirable 
for France to retain the greatest possible influence over her.”50  France, for both stated 
economic reasons and unstated geopolitical reasons, mounted the biggest obstacles to 
some form of bimetallic agreement in 1878, to the surprise of American observers and 
officials.  In the process, French declarations at the Conference highlighted the extent to 
which progress rested not on the merits of international bimetallism alone but also on 
geopolitical exigencies which limited the action of an otherwise sympathetic ally. 
While France equivocated on US proposals at the 1878 Conference, Great Britain 
took a moderate, at times accommodating, stance toward international bimetallism and its 
American advocates in Paris.  At one point during the Conference, when American 
efforts at persuasion had stalled, the leading English representative went so far as to 
attempt to rescue the deadlocked proceedings: “If there [is] any hope of arriving at a 
practical agreement by prolonging the discussion, the advantage of that agreement would 
be well worth some sacrifice of time.”51  Sentiments like this embodied the British line of 
argument at the Conference.  In 1878, Britain remained a defender of the gold mono-
metallic system that it had carried to prominence.  In Britain, the gold standard not only 
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underpinned the system of credit and currency but it also operated as a powerful signifier 
of national power, affluence, and progress. It had unmatched institutional strength, 
supported equally by both political parties and the leading bankers of London finance.  
Yet there were signs, by the time of the Paris meeting, that rhetorical and political sands 
had begun to shift under the British gold standard.  The moderate line taken by British 
delegates was one measure of that shift.  Earlier that spring, the Tory government led by 
Benjamin Disraeli, by then Lord Beaconsfield, had refused the American invitation to the 
Paris Conference.  Despite the initial reply, the US Minister to Britain continued to lobby 
the Foreign Office, reporting by telegram to Washington: “Had an interview with 
[Foreign Secretary] Salisbury, Northcote, and Cross. Treasury opposed to conference. 
Cabinet not yet prepared to reply.”52 Within two weeks, however, the Foreign Office 
changed course; Lord Salisbury personally accepted the invitation. “While Her Majesty’s 
Government [is] unable to depart from the policy in respect to currency questions she has 
pursued for sixty years, nevertheless, in other parts of Her Majesty’s Dominions other 
[monetary] systems prevail.  In view of this circumstance, Her Majesty’s Government [is] 
quite willing to attend a conference called by the United States.”53   
The most important of these dominions was India, whose interests seemed to play 
a decisive role in the British volte face.  While some Tory cabinet members with 
dismissed international bimetallism as a wild-eyed American proposal, those with closer 
ties to overseas trade and India in particular could not afford to indulge in such 
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sentiments.  The subsequent report of the British delegates at Paris reflected this more 
clear-eyed assessment: “The derangement in mercantile operations due to the position of 
silver at this moment is so great and so universal that all contributions made in the 
direction of clearing up the subject would be invaluable…  Our Indian Empire, where the 
silver standard prevails, gave us the deepest interest in any discussions involving the 
future of silver.”54  In the months after the initial British reply Lord Cranbrook, Secretary 
of State for India in Council, urged the Foreign Office to reverse course.  Speaking of 
bimetallism, he advised Salisbury: “Considering the important bearing of this question on 
the interests of India, the Secretary of State in Council would be glad to hear that Her 
Majesty’s Government had agreed to take part in the proposed conference.”55  The 
interest in restoring the Indian economy and British trade with the East not only pushed 
Britain into the formal monetary diplomacy but also inclined it toward the moderate line 
taken in Paris.  The British delegation was led by leading financial conservatives, 
including Liberal MP and financier George J. Goschen and former Bank of England 
director Henry Hucks Gibbs.  At the Conference, they confidently defended the gold 
standard, and yet their contributions were notable for the degree to which they had come 
to embrace bimetallic arguments.  Only two years earlier, both men had contributed to the 
official government report on the depreciation of silver, which failed to single out 
German demonetization as the cause of global monetary instability.  In Paris, Gibbs had 
moved over to the bimetallic argument. “Mr. Feer-Herzog is a partisan of the single gold 
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standard; so am I,” he said.  “But there is one point on which we are not agreed… He 
attributes the fall of silver to the progress of civilization; whereas, in my judgment, the 
fall of silver is due to the simultaneous action of several accidental causes, and chiefly 
[due] to the demonetization of silver in Germany.”56  These kinds of subtle shifts ran 
throughout British remarks at the Monetary Conference.  In Paris, British delegates had 
moved clearly toward American reasoning, while holding an unchanged position in 
defense of the gold standard. 
At the 1878 International Monetary Conference, European advocates of the gold 
standard—and even some delegates sympathetic to bimetallism—placed significant 
obstacles in front of any hope of an accord.  In the face of these arguments, it was left to 
the members of the United States delegation to make the case for international 
bimetallism.  The American delegation reflected the outlook of the financially 
conservative Northeast.  This group included a number of prominent individuals, 
including former Governor of New York Reuben E. Fenton, the young monetary expert 
Samuel Dana Horton of Ohio, and Yale professor of political economy Francis Amasa 
Walker of Massachusetts.  Governor Fenton was a respected financial conservative and 
the most senior officeholder present.  The young Horton had made his reputation writing 
pamphlets and on the hustings, supporting sound-money Republicans during the height of 
the silver debate in the United States.   
Among them, however, Professor Francis Walker proved to be the most articulate 
and impressive advocate for international bimetallism at the Paris Conference.  Walker, 
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by the time of his appointment, already possessed an impressive resume.57 As a Union 
staff officer and logistical expert during the Civil War, he rose to the rank of Brevet-
General. Part of that success rested on his impressive education, first as the son of 
esteemed economist Amasa Walker and later as a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Amherst 
College.  From his father Walker inherited not only the lines of his economic thinking but 
also the reformist sentiments that defined the educated New England elite in the previous 
generation.  As a reformer, he shared a disdain for the corruption scandals of the 
Republican Party with his friends and colleagues, Henry Adams and Charles Francis 
Adams Jr.58  After the war, however, his talent for numbers and for friendship led to a 
series of appointments in Republican administrations, including director of Indian Affairs 
and director of the Census in 1870.  By the time of the Conference, his reputation as an 
effective administrator and as an economist was increasingly recognized at home and 
abroad.  In the latter case, the publication of his treatise, The Wages Question, in 1875 
drew acclaim in the North American Review and in personal correspondence with 
renowned English economists including Alfred Marshall and H.S. Foxwell of Cambridge.  
In a subsequent letter from England, Foxwell related his appreciation of Walker, saying, 
“I feel, and hundreds here feel, personally indebted to you for the sound science of your 
admirable Wages Question.”59  At home, these accomplishments led President Hayes, 
himself a reform-minded Republican, to appoint Walker both Assistant Commissioner 
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General for the United States to the Paris Exposition and US delegate to the International 
Monetary Conference in summer 1878. 
In the latter role, during the Monetary Conference, Professor Walker put forward 
three essential arguments about the nature of the monetary crisis, the merits of 
international bimetallism, and the link between monetary relations and the wider global 
economic depression.  To defenders of the gold standard, who claimed that the monetary 
crisis represented a natural process that followed from the economic evolution of 
advanced countries, Professor Walker made a simple rejoinder:  
Silver has not ceased to be money as a result of natural causes… 
The rejection of silver has proceeded from actions distinctly 
political, [from] the laws and decrees of governments… We are 
not therefore asking this body to decree the reversal of a law of 
nature in asking the consideration of the expediency of arresting 
and reversing the movement for the demonetization of silver.60   
 
The argument made by gold defenders had been in part a defense of prevailing laissez-
faire preferences, but as importantly it represented an attempt to obscure the role played 
by the gold standard in creating the monetary crisis.  Professor Walker pushed back 
against this line in his second, related argument about the merits of international 
bimetallism.  In it he emphasized the role bimetallism played in maintaining monetary 
equilibrium. “Mr. Goschen concedes to the French law of 1803 [establishing bimetallism 
in France] the virtues attributed to it by his distinguished fellow countrymen, Mr. Jevons, 
and the late Mr. Bagehot,” Walker contended. “The French law served as a connecting 
pipe (to use Mr. Jevons phrase) between the two reservoirs severally of gold and silver, 
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which would otherwise be subjected to independent variations of supply and demand.”61  
International bimetallism as maintained by France and the Latin Union until 1875, in 
other words, had been the only reason the changing supply and demand for gold and 
silver had not produced fluctuations in value over the past six decades of global economic 
expansion.  Walker persuasively made the case that policy changes precipitated the 
monetary crisis and that bimetallism as it had existed before those changes had stabilized 
monetary values.   
While Walker sustained these lines of arguments, his most compelling argument 
was the link between the disruption of bimetallism by the German gold standard and the 
continued lack of recovery from the ongoing economic depression.  “The crusade against 
silver has been undertaken with little or no consideration of the effects upon international 
exchanges… No man so well knows the difficulties as well as Mr. Goschen,” he said, 
referring to the disruption of trade between gold standard Britain and its silver standard 
dependency, India that followed the suspension of bimetallism.62  That suspension not 
only distressed trade but also hampered credit markets, Walker asserted:  
The mischief of a contracting circulation [has] twice befallen 
Europe as the result of the exhaustion of precious metals… It has 
remained for this generation and this decade to see these mischiefs 
brought upon Europe by the deliberate acts of government… 
Suffocation, strangulation are words hardly too strong to express 
the agony of the industrial body when embraced in the coils of a 
contracting money supply.63   
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The aggregate currency in circulation, in other words, had been reduced across the world 
in ways that inhibited lending, production, and consumption.  Reflecting later on the 
linkage between monetary contraction, debt, and economic stagnation, Walker wrote in 
the Princeton Review, “Moralists and economists rightly visit their severe condemnation 
upon all schemes for scaling down debts by means of paper-money inflation.  Is it any 
less reprehensible, morally – is it any less a blunder, economically, to adopt measures 
which must seriously aggravate the pressure of all existing obligations?”64  During the 
sessions of the 1878 Conference in Paris, Professor Walker, through the force of his 
argument and the esteem granted by his reputation as an economist, proved the most 
effect advocate international bimetallism. 
Despite these efforts, the deliberations in Paris concluded without marked signs of 
progress toward an agreement.  The failure of US efforts to secure a bimetallic accord 
rested on several factors.  Foremost of these was the ongoing institutional strength of the 
gold standard position and its inverse, skepticism of the bimetallic standard, among 
European policymakers and monetary diplomats.  In addition, there were economic 
uncertainties.  The instability in the price of silver, in particular, remained unresolved in 
world markets, making agreement on any specific ratio impossible even if all other 
impediments had been resolved.  In this sense, Germany, by not participating in the 
Conference and by not making clear its intentions regarding its outstanding demonetized 
silver, prevented accomplishment of a truly universal bimetallic agreement.  As one 
financial journal later noted, “Two [factors] were especially influential in preventing 
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action at the present time. The first was the existence of the German stock of silver still 
remaining. The delegations from England and France were agreed in attributing to it great 
importance in its bearing on the price of silver… The second cause… was the wide 
divergence between the market rate for silver and the mint rate generally prevailing in 
countries having a bimetallic system.”65   
German intransigence, however, could not explain the failure of something less 
than a universal agreement on silver.  Those closer to the deliberations, including 
Professor Walker, placed the failure of a limited or bilateral bimetallic agreement at the 
feet of France.  Following an interview with the Yale economist on the Conference, the 
New York Times later reported, “Professor Walker regards the motives which controlled 
[French] actions as more political than economical.  The most important consideration in 
the mind of the French cabinet was the fear of alienating Belgium and driving it into 
closer affiliation with England and Germany.  But for this motive, France would have 
agreed to a bimetallic program.”66  For all these reason, the conference concluded 
without result, except for a modest resolution.  On 29 August 1878, the European 
delegates gathered at Paris adopted a resolution recognizing the necessity of maintaining 
the use of silver and gold as currency.67  Beyond this, the only thing both sides seemed to 
agree upon unanimously was the motion to adjourn.  Later in that same session, having 
thanked the United States for organizing the conference, the delegates closed 
                                                 
65 “The International Monetary Conference: Report of the U. S. Delegates,” Bankers’ Magazine and 
Statistical Register 13, no. 7 (January 1879): 557. 
66 “Prof. Walker on the Silver Conferences,” New York Times, 30 January 1879. 
67 The International Monetary Conference of 1878: Proceedings and Exhibits, 163. 
  96 
deliberations, leaving each nation to pursue an independent course in response to the 
global monetary crisis. 
 
A Struggle for Gold and the Return of International Bimetallism 
 
Between 1879 and 1881, the idea of international bimetallism experienced a 
remarkable renaissance.  In a very short period, proposals once viewed as the economic 
heresies of a peripheral nation were transformed into legitimate policy questions 
seriously considered in London, Paris, and Berlin.  The increasing acceptance of 
bimetallic ideas, marked by the conversion of key individuals and institutions in Europe, 
advanced both through the ongoing transnational public debate and through official US 
diplomacy.  This shift in European sentiments, which culminated with great power 
participation in a second bimetallic conference, rested on three interconnected 
developments: the material impact of the global economic depression, the intensification 
of the unresolved monetary crisis, and the success of bimetallic advocates on both sides 
of the Atlantic.   
Among these, the economic depression cast the broadest shadow.  As one 
contemporary economist observed of the era, “1873 occasioned a most curious and 
unprecedented disturbance… of trade, commerce, and industry.  Its most noteworthy 
peculiarity had been its universality; affecting [all] nations.”68  The impact of the 
                                                 
68 David Ames Wells, Recent Economic Changes (New York: Appleton and Company, 1889), 1. 
  97 
depression, however, remained uneven, varying in degree depending on the particular 
circumstances of each European national economy.  
If the economic downturn furthered openness to change, in general, the 
intensification of the monetary crisis helped popularize international bimetallism, in 
particular.  Ongoing decline in silver prices and the increasing demands placed on gold 
reserves provided twin engines of monetary instability.  These two phenomena were 
deeply intertwined.  As one financial journal noted in February 1881, “If nothing should 
be done to re-monetize silver, it is quite clear that gold must tend year by year to become 
more scarce.   A tendency of gold to become scarce means a tendency to become dear; or, 
in other words, a tendency to fall in the gold prices of all other commodities.”69  This 
process added to the deflation of commodity prices and therefore the financial burdens of 
indebted producers – an outcome that united agriculturalists as disparate as aristocratic 
German Junkers and hard-scrabble English yeoman in agitation against the gold standard 
and in favor of government action against the further fall of silver.  These economic and 
monetary dilemmas combined to make European policymakers more attentive to the 
problem of silver and the diplomatic remedy of international bimetallism.  
The new openness among European governments on the question of silver money 
also depended on the success of US diplomacy.  The Hayes administration had come to 
embrace proposals for international bimetallism.  Confronting agitation from the 
agricultural Midwest for the unilateral and unlimited restoration of silver money at home 
and the ongoing fall of silver prices abroad, the Hayes administration had been 
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persuaded, like Congress, by the arguments of bimetallic advocates.  To its supporters, 
international bimetallism provided both a moderate degree of monetary expansion and 
promised to restore levels of trade previously enjoyed between silver standard and gold 
standard nations.  Noting the official enthusiasm generated by such possibilities, the New 
York Times reported in September 1879, “Both the President and Secretary Evarts are 
disposed to agitate the matter.”70  This administration outlook was confirmed 
subsequently in official instructions from the Secretary of State to US diplomats in 
Europe.  As Evarts revealed, “The President has felt that the first and most advantageous 
step which he could take… would be the designation of a suitable person to visit Europe, 
both to communicate our views and to learn those of the European governments on the 
grave subject of the restoration and maintenance of the two precious metals of silver and 
gold as the intrinsic money of the world.”71  Prospects of economic recovery motivated 
these administration efforts and helped explain the progress of US bimetallic diplomacy 
in Europe. 
In the diplomatic initiatives three figures played a decisive role during this period, 
Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman, Secretary of States William Evarts, and business 
executive George A. Walker of New York.  Of these men, Secretary Sherman possessed 
the greatest reputation.  As 1878 closed, Sherman was already being discussed as a 
candidate for the Republican nomination for president in the next election, thanks to his 
skillful management of government finances and the successful resumption of specie 
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payments.  Though Sherman was not involved directly in US monetary diplomacy, this 
reputation as the leading Republican on finance made his public support for international 
bimetallism key to legitimizing these efforts.  
While Sherman provided political legitimacy at home, Secretary of State William 
Evarts managed US efforts abroad.  Evarts, even before the monetary crisis, had 
experiences that inclined him toward international bimetallism.  As an astute Republican 
operative from New York, the Secretary was deeply attuned to the interests of American 
finance.  As an experienced diplomat, he possessed important connections to officials in 
Europe. 
Though these cabinet officers played important roles in Washington, it was left to 
business executive and monetary expert George A. Walker of New York to persuade 
European policymakers in person.  In 1879, he was appointed by the Hayes 
administration as special agent of the United States on the question of international 
bimetallism.72  Given his experiences, George Walker proved to be an ideal candidate for 
a diplomatic mission involving complex macroeconomic policy questions.  Walker, a 
Harvard-trained lawyer and vice president of Western Union Telegraph Company, was 
deeply enmeshed in the web of financial and industrial operations centered in New York.  
At a New York City fête honoring Walker, the press noted his influential acquaintances. 
“The friends of George Walker gathered in the large dining room of the Union League 
Club rooms last night to take part in a complimentary dinner tendered to that gentleman 
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on the eve of his departure for his new post… Thirty-four guests in all sat down, 
including George William Curtis, J. Pierpont Morgan, Horace White, and Whitelaw 
Reid.”73  That evening, George William Curtis, editor of Harper’s Weekly, raised a toast 
to Walker, declaring, “In clearness of intelligence, in alertness of mind, and in all other 
special accomplishments which went to make up the requisites of a diplomatist, [George 
Walker] was everything that could be desired.”74  This combination of ability and 
influence made the New York executive a solid choice for the Hayes administration, as 
Evarts confided, “The President has felt that you will bring to the task both the 
knowledge and the faculties suited to its proper performance.“75  That task was to return 
the European powers to the negotiating table at a second bimetallic conference.  By 
spring 1881 that US aim had become a reality through the efforts of Walker, Evarts, and 
Sherman. 
Within eighteen months of the Walker mission, US bimetallic diplomacy along 
with the ongoing economic and monetary problems facing each nation in the global 
economy combined to bring the major European powers to the 1881 International 
Monetary Conference.  In each country, however, these factors comingled in different 
ways.  In Britain, between 1879 and 1881, the previously unimpeachable position in 
favor of the gold standard increasingly found itself on the defensive.  During this period, 
the arguments for international bimetallism widened their influence, moving from policy 
prescriptions of India Office officials to questions of growing public debate about 
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government action.  The ongoing stagnation of economic activity hastened this shift.  
Disraeli himself in September 1879 acknowledged the effect on agriculture, in particular:  
“There can be no doubt that there is at this moment on the agricultural interests of this 
country a strain which is certainly unprecedented in [our] lives… and which is not easily 
equaled in the records of our history.”76  These economic circumstances produced a deep 
rupture of British confidence in the institutions and economic theories that had been a 
source of national pride.  “Whatever England’s future may be, she is suffering through a 
supreme crisis; she is in the midst of great national troubles,” remarked one London 
journal. “May it not be that the present falling back of English trade, the universal 
distress, the hopelessness in the future, the dishonest practices of our financiers, the 
selfish partisanship of our statesmen are all details in the general aspect of a great nation 
that is suffering its race to decay?”77   
In this anxious environment, distinct fissures in the gold standard consensus that 
defined official Britain began to emerge.  Signs of these divisions had appeared as early 
as the recent Monetary Conference, at which the British delegation had clearly moved 
toward the bimetallic assessment of German demonetization.  Opinion in Britain, in other 
words, was shifting from the advocacy of a true international gold standard to one of a 
gold standard for Britain and silver or bimetallic standards for the rest of the world.  
Further indicators of changing British sentiment emerged with attempts to circumscribe 
the virtues assigned to the gold standard by British national pride.  In an effort to obscure 
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the role of these British sentiments in the switch by Germany to the gold standard, one 
London journal contended, “The preeminence of England in trade and manufactures, and 
the just authority of her political economists, has given prevalence to the idea that her 
monetary system had not only contributed to her prosperity, but that it was as deserving 
of imitation as her political institutions.”78  This line of argument extended to national 
politics, with telling prior comments of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli unearthed to 
stir public debate.  “An opinion has been very prevalent among the statesmen of Europe 
that the commercial prosperity and preponderance of England were to be attributed to her 
gold standard,” declared the Tory leader in 1873.  “But it is the greatest delusion.  Our 
gold standard is not the cause of our commercial prosperity, but the consequence of our 
commercial prosperity.”79  Together, these were signs that discernible cracks in the gold 
standard consensus within Britain emerged during this period. 
This sort of trimming on the subject of the gold standard was matched by 
arguments in favor of bimetallism in Britain.  As one sympathetic report noted, “One of 
our deputies to the Paris Conference found much less aversion [to bimetallism] in the 
City than he imagined.”80  New openness among London financiers rested on growing 
concerns about the impact of gold scarcity on the capital markets.  “For some time back 
the business community has been disturbed by the apprehension of a large export of gold 
to the United States,” said the conservative Saturday Review in September 1880.  “Were 
such an export to take place, it would drain away the reserve of the Bank of England and 
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raise the rates paid for the use of capital.”81  These concerns were not limited to the 
financial class but extended to northern industrialists and merchant barons.  As early as 
March 1879, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce endorsed international bimetallism in 
a memorial transmitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Speaking of the role of 
French bimetallism in English trade with India, it read: “[Before 1875] England, more 
than any, enjoyed the advantages of bimetallism.”82     
As the public debate proceeded in Britain, no development gathered more notice 
than the conversion to international bimetallism made by Bank of England Director 
Henry Hucks Gibbs.  In September 1879, he published the pamphlet Silver and Gold, 
outlining his new bimetallic beliefs.  In Britain, Gibbs was among the most respected 
figures in government on matters of national finance, having served as a stalwart 
defender of the gold standard on the Royal Commission on the Depreciation of Silver and 
at the recent International Monetary Conference, in addition to his role at the Bank of 
England.  The significance of the changed outlook of such a prominent financial 
conservative was not lost on contemporaries.  Speaking of Gibbs’ conversion, one 
London journal called it “striking proof of the impression made on the minds of the 
business community by the depreciation of silver.”83  Although Gibbs did not 
acknowledge the influence of American bimetallic advocates in his pamphlet, one 
newspaper account suggested a causal connection: “Mr. Gibbs’s arguments are by no 
means new.  They are in substance to be found in the memoranda and speeches of the 
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American commissioners at Paris.”84  The conversion of Gibbs – along with the new 
openness in finance and new agitation in trade and industry – marked a distinct shift 
toward bimetallism within Britain following the 1878 Conference.   
By the end of 1879, these fissures in the British gold standard consensus had 
significantly unsettled public debate, suggesting the need for government action.  One 
indication of the concern raised within the Disraeli government was the sustained effort 
of the Foreign Office to collect intelligence on monetary opinion and national finances 
from its representatives in Europe and the United States.   Throughout 1879, reports from 
Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and Washington recorded the monetary status of each nation. 85  In 
September that year, the British Minister to the United States returned one such report to 
the Foreign Office.   “There can be no doubt that the United States government, and 
particularly Mr. Evarts and the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Sherman, are extremely 
anxious to establish an international bimetallic standard in concert with European powers, 
and especially with Great Britain.”86  British policymakers appeared anxious as well 
where the same deflationary pressures on commodity prices added to agricultural distress 
and political discontent sweeping Britain during the late 1870s.  As Oxford economist 
Thorold Rogers warned, “The first cause [of the depression], and in all probability the 
most enduring, is the rapid rise in the value of gold.”87  Though official policy moved no 
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closer toward bimetallism, an increasing sentiment developed that in order to end the 
depression something should be done to restore silver to circulation.88   
For Britain, these difficulties posed not only domestic but also imperial policy 
questions.  The declining price of silver, in particular, threatened British imperial fortunes 
by disrupting British trade with India and by making payments on Indian debt 
increasingly difficult to meet.  Because those debts paid to London were denominated in 
gold sterling and India operated on – and collected revenues in – silver rupees, the fall of 
silver by seventeen percent constituted a proportionate increase in the amount of Indian 
revenue needed to pay those debts.  By December 1879, the imperial aspects of the 
monetary crisis had moved from India Office memoranda to the leading London papers.  
“The position [of silver] is being rendered more serious than some laissez-faire 
monometallists would have us believe,” said one such journal.  “Unfortunately that evil 
attaches more powerfully to the British Empire than to any other country or government 
in the world.  The very fate of India is in question.  How are the Indian deficits to be 
overcome?”89  While these developments did not produce action by the Disraeli 
government, evidence shows that cabinet officials – and especially the India Office and 
Foreign Office – were keenly aware of the dangers to the British Empire posed by the 
monetary crisis. 
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In Germany, during the same period, the gold standard policy of the Bismarck 
government came under similar pressures.  Ongoing economic stagnation spurred 
growing skepticism toward the German gold currency.  German agriculturalists, like their 
British counterparts, faced declining crop prices.  German industry had stalled both from 
the collapse of demand and rise of interest rates under the influence of the gold standard. 
“The years 1873-80,” a respected historian of Germany has noted, represented “an 
unprecedented jolt to the new economic order in Germany… [It] left permanent changes 
in the German economic landscape.”90  Among those changes, agitated by landlords and 
industrialists alike, were calls for protective tariffs, price cartels, and revisions to the 
German gold standard.  By early 1881, the exuberance and pride that accompanied the 
creation of the German Empire a decade earlier appeared, to many, as a distant memory 
when contrasted with the anxieties of the present economic moment.   
In this uncertain environment, distinct fissures in the political consensus 
supporting the German gold standard developed, culminating with the acceptance by 
Germany of the US invitation to a second bimetallic monetary conference.  This official 
volte face reflected growing skepticism toward the gold standard among business leaders 
and, confidentially, in the highest councils of government.   As early as spring 1879, the 
German banking sector opened the debate on the future of the German currency.  “At 
their monthly meeting the directors of the Imperial Bank of Germany passed a resolution 
declaring that an increase of the silver currency of Germany is imperatively necessary,” 
                                                 
90 David Blackbourn, History of Germany 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), 144-145. 
  107 
reported the Pall Mall Gazette from London. 91  The Reichsbank, the central bank of the 
German Empire, was keenly aware of global monetary instability.  As the arbiter of the 
credit system and overseer of the conversion to the gold standard, the Reichsbank faced 
two related dilemmas.  The first was the defense of national gold reserves in the face of 
increasing worldwide demand.  The second was the sale of demonetized German silver 
on the open market, which facilitated German purchases of gold.  With the ongoing fall 
of silver, Germany could only continue these operations at a considerable loss.  These 
losses totaled 92.5 million marks, by 1879, according to one report. 92  Losses to the 
German government were so pronounced that they hastened official action.  On 17 May 
1879, the Bismarck government announced the suspension of government sales of silver.  
This policy change represented an official acknowledgement of the difficulties of 
maintaining the gold standard and contributed more than any prior factor to unsettling the 
gold standard consensus inside Germany.  The importance of that change was measured 
in reactions both from money markets and governments around the world.  In the United 
States “the mere announcement of the intended suspension of silver sales [by Germany] 
sent the price up six percent. That showed what an important influence Germany’s silver 
had upon the market,” according to one report.93  These developments together created 
fissures that called into question the future of the German gold standard. 
The dramatic policy announcement, in addition, set off a brushfire of speculation 
regarding the German currency.  The president of the Reichsbank, Hermann von 
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Dechend, attempted to settle the controversy inside Germany by clarifying the decision-
making process in a speech to the German Parliament:  “Since 1878 the price of silver 
[has] fallen considerably…  No one could have imagined it would be so serious.  Having 
these facts in view I deemed it my duty to urge the Chancellor to suspend selling.”94  This 
public confession, however, did little to slow down the stream of rumor that crossed 
outside of Germany.  In June the US Minister to Berlin reported the controversy to 
Washington.95  The New York Times, in addition, relayed reports from London of 
“rumors that the [German] government intends to interfere with the gold coinage 
standard.”96  In Berlin, public sentiment seemed to move even further toward bimetallism 
in August, when Dechend declared his conversion to bimetallic reform in a series of 
articles published in Berlin.97  Outlining his rationale, Dechend cited the burdens 
imposed on the credit system by the imperatives of the gold standard and the ability of 
the bimetallic standard to alleviate those problems.98  Increased support for bimetallism 
stirred the banking sector more broadly.  As one report to the British Foreign Office 
concluded, “Certain capitalists of Germany are endeavoring to bring about an 
international meeting at Berlin for the purpose of considering the silver question and with 
a view to adopting the bimetallic standard.” 99  By late 1879, the consensus in favor of 
the gold standard inside Germany had been significantly unsettled by painful ongoing 
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economic difficulties and by the portentous halt of silver sales by the Bismarck 
government.   
The changing landscape of public debate in Germany, however, did not mean that 
the Bismarck government was ready to change its gold standard currency or participate in 
a second bimetallic conference.  In June 1879, Chancellor Bismarck had denied that the 
suspension of silver sales indicated any particular course on the monetary question in a 
speech to the Reichstag: “I can assure you that from no quarter, neither the Federal 
Council nor the Prussian Ministry, has there come any proposal to change our 
coinage.”100  Nevertheless, the United States pursued Germany on the question of 
international bimetallism.  Confidential Agent George Walker of the United States 
arrived in Berlin that September determined to influence the Bismarck government.  
German cooperation remained essential to resolving the monetary crisis because the 
ongoing sales of surplus German silver had disturbed the market price so dramatically.  
As one financial expert noted, “It would be indeed a signal service to those vast interests 
which are touched by the depreciation of silver, if the German government could be 
induced to remove so far as possible the mystery which still surrounds the question of 
their disposable stocks [of silver].”101  Germany had done so in May 1879 and as the 
summer turned to autumn the moment seemed ripe to secure an international agreement 
on silver.  Walker had good reason for optimism.  From London, he carried a copy of a 
recent confidential conversation between Bismarck and the US Minister at Berlin 
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Andrew White in which the German Chancellor expressed interest in a second bimetallic 
conference.  “He declared that Germany would unite in such a conference very gladly," 
White reported.102  Despite these hopes, George Walker was not permitted an interview 
with Bismarck that September.  What likely won the American envoy such a cold 
reception in Berlin was the public revelation of these cooperative signals.  On the eve of 
Walker’s arrival, London newspapers had published a series of telegrams detailing the 
German Chancellor’s openness to monetary diplomacy.  Coming so soon after his sharp 
denials of monetary policy adjustment to the Reichstag, this news made it politically 
inopportune to meet with the US monetary diplomat.  Walker later recorded of his 
subsequent correspondence with the Chancellor: “Prince Bismarck declared these 
disclosures had a formidable influence in the subsequent discussion of the silver question 
which I took part in both in England and on the Continent.”103  Despite these 
embarrassments to the German government, the confidential conversation had revealed 
Bismarck’s interest in some diplomatic agreement.  In his final report to Washington, 
Walker recorded that “Prince Bismarck in a later communication stated that he would not 
himself decide so important a matter as the question of monetary [systems]…  If at any 
time the United States government submitted, through its representatives at Berlin, 
definite proposals, the German government would take them into the most serious 
consideration.”104   
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Though Walker returned to the United States in November 1879 without an 
official German commitment, there were increasing signs that Germany was moving 
toward some reconsideration of the gold standard and that the public and private views of 
the German Chancellor were coming into alignment.  In April 1880, the Federal Council 
passed legislation that provided for a moderate increase of the silver currency in 
circulation.  Later that summer, a resolution calling for the establishment of bimetallism 
in Germany was passed by the influential planter aristocrats at the German Agriculturalist 
Congress.105  Speaking of this series of developments, Walker commented, “On the 
Continent, the opinion [is] gaining ground that Germany would never recover her 
financial status until she restored silver to circulation.”106  By February 1881, without 
committing itself to a defined policy, Germany accepted the US invitation to the 
International Monetary Conference.  To observers, it appeared that the Walker mission 
had been influential in securing this outcome.  “It is expected, as a result of the efforts of 
George Walker,” recorded the New York Times “that Germany will consent to participate 
in the proposed international monetary conference.”107  In Germany, economic distress, 
problematic monetary operations, and US diplomacy combined to move the Bismarck 
government toward participation in a second bimetallic conference.   
In France, as in Germany and Britain, developments conspired to move public 
debate and official policy in the direction of international bimetallism and a second 
conference between 1879 and 1881.  Circumstances confronting the the recently 
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established Third Republic under the Grévy government, however, were distinctly 
different than those faced by the gold standard powers.  France, despite the closure of 
mints to new silver coinage, remained on a bimetallic currency and led the Latin 
Monetary Union.  In France, therefore, economic and monetary difficulties threatened the 
establishment position in favor of bimetallism more so than the gold standard.   
The first threat to the rehabilitation of French bimetallic currency emerged at the 
1878 International Monetary Conference.  The fall of silver prices worldwide, by then, 
had driven deep divisions between the member states of the Latin Union. As the official 
British report concluded, “It is to the delicate relations, political and financial, of the 
Latin Union that the failure of the conference to adopt any positive measures is primarily 
to be referred.”108  In Belgium and Switzerland, in particular, new governments favoring 
the gold standard came to power as a result of the economic depression.  Yet the fall of 
silver also threatened bimetallic countries economically in two distinct ways, first by 
draining national gold reserves when capital-holders insisted on exchanging silver for 
gold.  The fall of silver also threatened bimetallic states by pushing the bullion value of 
silver below the value at which silver was minted into currency.  Under current world 
monetary conditions, the five franc silver coin, for example, was no longer worth five 
francs.  These conditions disrupted international transactions more than domestic ones.  
France and the Latin Union countries, in circumstances similar to India, faced a growing 
penalty when domestic silver currency had to be exchanged for the payment of foreign 
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obligations.  In fall 1878, the price of silver fell further still, increasing divisions between 
France and its partners in the Latin Union.  
Under these circumstances, the bimetallic position of France faced its most 
significant threat in November 1878 from the pending renewal of the treaty organizing 
the Latin Union.109  On the question of renewal, opinion on all sides appeared decidedly 
against the proposal.  In France, a Senate committee recommended against renewal in 
spring 1878.  Even staunch bimetallists such as Finance Minister Leon Say conceded that 
under current conditions France suffered from the treaty because she was obligated to 
take in more and more devalued silver from partner countries such as Italy, which 
operated on a paper currency at the time.  Belgium and Switzerland, given their 
inclinations toward the gold standard, also appeared ready to let the treaty expire.  As one 
secondary account observed, “Monetary feeling in all the countries was by this time well 
defined, and all were evidently waiting for 1 January 1880, when they would be freed 
from the obligations entailed by the treaty of 1865.”110  Nevertheless, the member-states, 
after meeting in conference through the last months of 1878, announced the renewal of 
the Latin Union, extending the monetary agreement an additional eight years.   
What explains such an outcome, given the policy divisions and monetary 
difficulties facing member states?  The debates of the Latin Union negotiations revealed 
that the preponderance of foreign silver held by France appeared decisive. 111  The 
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delegates in attendance agreed that France held approximately 500 million francs worth 
of foreign silver coins from member-states.  If the treaty expired, in other words, each of 
the smaller states would be obligated to redeem those coins in gold, which none could 
afford to do, given the losses imposed by the devaluation of silver. 112  Despite 
maintaining current silver currency within the Latin Union, the treaty extended the 
suspension of silver coinage for the following seven years.  To outside advocates of 
international bimetallism, the renewal of the Latin Union Treaty was a clear signal that 
France would not act alone to restore silver.113  However, this development also indicated 
that France under the Grévy government was likely to favor some form of international 
bimetallism between the great powers and the United States.   
Despite the defensive renewal of the Latin Union necessitated by the world 
monetary crisis, France faced additional pressures that helped move policymakers toward 
international bimetallism during this period.  Foremost among these was the increasing 
worldwide demand for gold.  Though France had limited the outflow of gold by 
suspending the coinage of new silver; there were other means by which national gold 
reserves could be diminished, both by increased demand in the money markets and by the 
payment of foreign obligations in gold.  The pressure on French reserves advanced by 
both methods especially after 1878.  The situation appeared dire to observers inside and 
outside of France by early 1881.  In London, the conservative Saturday Review noted, 
“The Bank of France has been rapidly losing its gold; last week there remained of gold 
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only £22.3 million.”114  In Paris, Bank of France President Louis Jules de Normandie 
later highlighted the pressure that ongoing trade deficits, in particular, placed on gold 
reserves under current economic and monetary circumstances:   
If we examine the customs statistics we find that from 1876 to 
1880 the excess of importations [to exportations] is £180,560,000.  
What has been the effect on the movement of precious metals and 
the reserves of the Bank of France?  It is this… The constitution of 
the reserve was modified in the same proportion.  It was 
composed, in 1876, of £61 million in gold and £25.6 million in 
silver.  In 1880, it was £22.5 million in gold and £48.8 million in 
silver...  [This] was true exportation, for the arrivals of gold in the 
United States permit us to follow almost steamer by steamer from 
the other side of the Atlantic the effect of the withdrawals of coin 
from the Bank of France.115            
 
These alarming developments made it clear to the Grévy government that the gold 
standard posed a zero-sum game, a contest between nations for gold, even for bimetallic 
nations.  By late 1880, circumstances pushed France toward a second diplomatic effort to 
establish international bimetallism.  
Renewed interest in international bimetallism among French officials was 
fostered by these material developments, but it was also facilitated by US diplomatic 
efforts – again in the person of American envoy George Walker.  The influential New 
York executive, by 1880, had been appointed Consul-General at Paris for the United 
States by President Hayes.  From that post in the French capital, Walker became the key 
American interlocutor with France regarding monetary issues, discussions which 
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culminated in a joint US-French invitation to a second bimetallic conference.116  Since 
the end of his confidential mission to Europe the previous year, Walker had been in 
frequent contact with Leon Say, former French minister of finance by then serving as the 
president of the senate. 117  In November 1880, Say requested a meeting with Walker, 
which marked the beginning of a series of wide-ranging discussions on the monetary 
question and the possibility of joint action.  Of particular concern to Say was the 
disposition of the president-elect on the issue of international bimetallism.  Walker 
reported, “I told him that General Garfield had always explained himself to me as holding 
views identical to my own.” 118  This likely emboldened Say to reveal the current aims of 
France.  In a subsequent interview, the French official made clear his ultimate interest in 
a bilateral monetary union between France and the United States.  Say laid out the plan in 
a fourteen-page draft treaty, the details of which give us some sense of the seriousness of 
French diplomacy.119  Though the incoming Garfield administration ultimately 
deprecated the bilateral proposal, these negotiations, and Walker in particular, 
contributed to the renewed pursuit of international bimetallism in France.  
By spring of 1881, the fortunes of international bimetallism in Europe had shifted 
considerably in an optimistic direction.  In the principle gold-standard countries, Britain 
and Germany, the previously idealized British monetary system found itself on the 
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defensive from rhetorical assaults launched from prominent institutions and individuals.  
The professional associations of the British merchant class and those of the German 
planter class alike pronounced in favor of bimetallism; renowned Oxford economists and 
well-placed Berlin financiers also found common cause in international bimetallism.  In 
bimetallic France, official interest also moved significantly away from the decisive 
indifference on display at the 1878 Monetary Conference.  These shifts were driven by 
the political instability engendered by ongoing economic stagnation, in general, and the 
impediments to growth posed by the fall of world silver prices, in particular.  Aided by 
these material changes, US bimetallic diplomacy succeeded in drawing the leading 
commercial powers of Europe into a second bimetallic conference. 
The Triumph of the Bimetallic Argument 
 
On 19 April 1881, as the delegates to the International Monetary Conference 
gathered again at Paris, it was clear to observers that much had changed since the 
negotiations of 1878.  Ongoing economic difficulties in Europe and the pursuit of 
international bimetallism by the United States had combined to make the 1881 
Conference the most serious and sustained diplomatic effort to resolve the monetary and 
commercial crises created by the fall of silver.  “The principal countries moving in the 
matter have so much interest in definitely settling the question of currencies, that there is 
on all sides a disposition to come to an agreement,” predicted the Times of London.120  
The conference met in fourteen sessions between April and July 1881 and was marked 
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both by rhetorical retreats and explicit policy concessions on the part of the gold standard 
powers, Britain and Germany.  Another measure of the gravity of the deliberations was 
the prominence of the men representing European interests, including, from Britain, Sir 
Charles Freemantle, Director of the Royal Mint, and Sir Louis Mallet, Undersecretary of 
State for India.  All of these were signs of the seriousness with which Europe considered 
the arguments made by bimetallic advocates of the United States.   
Not only had sentiments regarding bimetallism shifted among the great powers, 
but in many ways so had the relative dispositions of power between those countries in 
attendance.  The intensification of European economic difficulties since 1878 had 
strengthened the American economy in ways that had pulled the United States out of 
recession and toward years of growth.  President Hayes, in his last annual message to 
Congress, noted this progress: “By the favor of Divine Providence, we have been blessed 
this past year with health, with abundant harvests, and with profitably employment for all 
our people…  The present financial situation of the United States is more favorable than 
that of any other country of our time.  All our industries are thriving, the rate of interest is 
low, new railroads are being constructed, [and] a vast immigration is increasing our 
population.”121  These developments signaled not only economic recovery within the 
United States but also the prospect of growing US economic power abroad.  One worried 
European economists, Emile de Laveleye, noted these trends and their implications for 
the new bimetallic conference: 
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Formerly, we [Europeans] owned a great portion of the American 
national debt. Now, however, the money once so invested in 
Europe is crossing the Atlantic to pay our own American debts. 
Very soon the American will be purchasing European [bonds] and 
we shall have fresh remittances to make to them. Besides their 
cotton, their corn, their petroleum, and their meat, we shall have to 
pay them interest on our public funds.  If we accept the monetary 
arrangement America offers us, we could pay [those] debts in 
silver or gold.122 
 
In these ways, the fortunes of the global economy gave the United States more 
freedom to maneuver in bimetallic negotiations and gave European counterparts a 
greater sense of urgency for some coordinated international action on the question 
of silver currency than at any prior moment.   
Given these changed circumstances, US expectations for the conference 
were optimistic.  The joint invitation with France, and the ready acceptance of it 
by Germany and Britain, seemed to confirm the European shift toward 
bimetallism documented by US bimetallic envoy George Walker in recent years.  
In Britain, in particular, though the official acceptance had insisted on the 
maintenance of the British gold standard, there were signals that some 
concessions on silver would be offered. 123  Current Bank of England director 
Henry Riversdale Grenfell had, in recent months, joined his predecessor Henry 
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Gibbs in declaring for international bimetallism.124  In the United States, the 
incoming Garfield administration, acknowledging these positive signals, asked the 
most prominent expert on US bimetallic diplomacy, outgoing Secretary of State 
William M. Evarts, to lead the US delegation in Paris.  The prominence of Evarts 
was matched by the bold language of the invitation.  It abandoned the deferential 
phrases of 1878, which invited the powers to debate the merits of all monetary 
systems.  The recent invitation instead called on the International Monetary 
Conference of 1881 to recommend “a plan for the establishment by means of 
international agreement of the use of gold and silver as bimetallic money.”125  
These factors, taken together, offer an indication of the ambitions and 
expectations with which William Evarts and US representatives arrived at Paris 
that spring.   
Despite these advantages, international bimetallism still faced significant 
obstacles at the conference.  Foremost among these was the preponderant 
influence of Britain—and the British gold standard—upon the continental powers.  
As the leading German delegate admitted, “The attitude of Britain had some 
effect on the resolutions of the German government, for not only had Germany a 
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very considerable direct commerce with England, and highly developed financial 
relations, but she also paid by bill on London a great part of her Asiatic and 
Transatlantic commerce.”126  Because sentiments such as these were shared 
broadly among British trade partners, the disposition of Britain remained the key 
to bimetallic success.   
The proposed system of international bimetallism also confronted 
lingering skepticism among opponents at Paris.  The unaltered defense of the gold 
standard on display in 1878 was almost entirely absent in the 1881 deliberations.  
Nevertheless, concerns about the viability of international bimetallism and the 
risks involved should a monetary treaty breakdown persisted.  Skeptics, led by the 
gold standard advocates of Belgium and Norway, argued that international 
bimetallism violated the principle of laissez-faire non-intervention.  Even if 
bimetallism were established, they argued, no law or treaty could set the relative 
market value of silver to gold.  Belgian delegate Eudore Pirmez exemplified this 
skepticism, arguing: 
Any system which fixed [the] ratio between gold and silver is a 
system formally opposed to all economic laws.  By proposing it, its 
supporters adopt the principle of regulation.  They start from the 
erroneous idea that it is the duty of laws to regulate the internal and 
external commerce of the state.  This procedure has already been 
too much abused – by the regulation of production, and by the laws 
of protection…  This idea is at the bottom of the present proposals 
of the bimetallists.127 
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At Paris, bimetallic advocates were well-prepared to contend with this kind of ardent 
monometallist obstructionism but were less prepared to deal with impediments thrown up 
by their monetary allies.  The ad hoc proposals of bimetallic iconoclast Henri Cernuschi, 
in particular, created problems.  Cernuschi, whose appointment as an official French 
delegate had been initially welcomed by American advocates, soon proved that his 
rhetoric was more suited for print than for diplomacy.  In an early session, deviating from 
the plan of the conference intended by the United States and France, Cernuschi proposed 
a plan to pay Germany 96 million marks for its losses in establishing the gold standard in 
exchange for adopting bimetallism.  Speaking to the delegates gathered at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, he concluded: “One must blot out from history these ten years, and come 
back to the state of things before the monetary war; in short we must pay for the 
disastrous monetary experiment tried by Germany.”128  Neither the countries expected to 
pay Germany nor the representatives of Germany took the proposal seriously and the 
diversion seemed to set back momentum toward a serious agreement.  By early May, it 
was already clear to US advocates that these factors—British influence, skepticism 
toward bimetallism, and the impediments of undisciplined allies—combined to place 
significant obstacles in the path of any diplomatic agreement. 
Despite such obstacles, the cause of international bimetallism pursued by the 
United States garnered a number of notable successes at the 1881 Monetary Conference.  
The clearest of these accomplishments was the rhetorical triumph of bimetallic 
arguments, especially among the leading gold standard powers.  During deliberations at 
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Paris, Britain and Germany repeatedly embraced lines of argument regarding the fall of 
silver and the resulting disruption of global trade and investment first made by bimetallic 
advocates.  From the outset, the chief delegate of Germany, Baron Thielmann, 
acknowledged the German role in the demonetization of silver after 1873: “It is fair to 
admit that [the prospect of] seeing itself burdened with a sum of at least half a milliard of 
marks of German silver, counted for much in the decision the Latin Union took.”129  
Many policymakers in Britain had already come around to such bimetallic ideas about the 
German role in the fall of silver; British delegate George Goschen had made a similar 
point in 1878.  Nevertheless, the British embrace of bimetallic arguments in 1881 also 
appeared to go further than ever before.  Sir Louis Mallet, for example, returned to the 
root bimetallic case against the international gold standard, highlighting the insufficiency 
of a single precious metal:  
When we consider the age in which we live, the immense 
movement, both industrial and intellectual, by which we are 
carried along, [the] new means of communication by land and sea, 
electricity, which converts the whole world into a single market, 
can we doubt that an international standard sufficient in quantity 
and stable in character, as the basis of all our transactions, and all 
the exchanges which multiply day by day under our eyes, is an 
imperious and capital necessity for the civilization and the welfare 
of all the people of the earth?130 
 
The extent to which the representatives of Britain and Germany had come to accept key 
bimetallic arguments was one measure of the success of international bimetallism in 
1881. 
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The success marked by the rhetorical admissions of the gold standard countries 
was matched by the eloquent and assertive defense of international bimetallism made by 
countries supporting the bimetallic system.  In response to condemnations made by arch 
gold defenders such as Belgium and Norway, bimetallic advocates clarified for everyone 
present the sound economic principles which underpinned their proposals.  In these 
efforts, William Evarts of the United States and N.G. Pierson of the Netherlands made 
the largest contribution.  Evarts pushed back against laissez-faire assumptions that 
government policy could not set the ratio of values between silver and gold.131  In doing 
so, Evarts echoed the arguments made previously against the Belgian monometallist 
Eudore Pirmez by a prominent bimetallic opponent:   
It is a fundamental error, says Mr. Pirmez, to suppose that a 
government can decree a value.  Mr. Pirmez is right: no 
government can determine the price of things.  But it can influence 
prices by creating demand or supply…  If the United States, the 
Latin Union, and Germany should resume the coinage of silver, 
this metal would regain its former value because the demand for it 
would then become considerable.132   
 
While Evarts made the case regarding the positive impact an appropriate government 
monetary policy could have, Dutch delegate N.G. Pierson, president of the Bank of the 
Netherlands, provided empirical data that supported the conclusion that government 
policy could not only influence the value of silver but also could provide an equalizing 
mechanism between the values of silver and gold in the face of changing levels of 
production.  Pierson, in particular, pointed to a chart that demonstrated the ability of the 
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French bimetallic law of 1803 to maintain the ratio of values in the 70 years preceding 
demonetization (see Table 2.0, column 4).133  In response to the charges by the Belgian 
gold monometallist that bimetallism was the cause of economic distress, Pierson 
countered, “Read [David] Ricardo; he endeavored to demonstrate in several of his works 
the very opposite of what has just been stated.  If there is a matter on which the law has 
great influence, it is money.”134 
 
Table 2.0 – Stability of Gold to Silver under French Bimetallism*
 
* Reprinted from Official Proceedings of the International Monetary Conference 1881. 
 
After the first month of deliberations, it was clear to participants that bimetallic 
arguments regarding the monetary sources of global economic difficulties and the 
soundness of international bimetallism as a remedy were prevailing at the conference.  
Britain and Germany, at least in rhetorical terms, had practically endorsed international 
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bimetallism, leaving defense of the gold standard to smaller, peripheral countries.  Of this 
increasingly lonely position, Evarts wryly remarked that it was shared only by “those 
nations who, happily for themselves, were not largely involved in the vicissitudes [that] 
attend the vast transactions in which the great nations are involved.”135 
While these accomplishments marked the extent of the shift toward bimetallic 
arguments, the most tangible successes for international bimetallism in 1881 were the 
explicit policy concessions made by Great Britain and Germany.  The most significant of 
these was the German proposal because it substantially altered the course of deliberations 
at Paris and sent a clear signal that at least one of the principle gold standard powers 
appeared willing to negotiate.  In the proposal, Germany offered to eliminate uncertainty 
regarding its sales of silver and increase the use of silver in Germany as a subsidiary coin 
as part of an international agreement establishing bimetallism between the Latin Union 
countries and the United States.  In an early session, Baron Thielmann outlined the 
proposal: 
We acknowledge, without reserve, that the rehabilitation of silver 
is desirable, and that it could be attained by the re-establishment of 
the free coinage of silver in a certain number of the most populous 
states represented at this conference…  Nevertheless, Germany, 
whose monetary reform is already so advanced, does not find itself 
able to concede the free coinage of silver…  The German 
government is on the other hand disposed to help as far as possible 
the efforts of the other powers…  To attain this end, the German 
government will maintain some restrictions on itself…  For a 
period of some years it will agree to abstain from all sales of silver, 
and for another period to sell only a limited quantity yearly…  
Germany could make further concessions; she would give in her 
own [currency] circulation wider sphere to the metal silver (raising 
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amount of subsidiary silver in circulation from two marks to 
five).136 
 
The German proposals excited discussions across subsequent sessions with implications 
for several key nations at the conference.  The delegates of the United States declined to 
accept or reject the offer and instead used the opportunity to press for more.  Samuel 
Dana Horton, again a representative of the United States, pushed Britain, in particular, to 
contribute its own concessions toward the restoration of silver money.  During the recess, 
Sir Alexander Galt of Canada suggested that the British dominion would convert to 
bimetallism if the United States did so as part of an international agreement.137  It was 
clear from sentiments expressed that British delegates were in sympathy with many of the 
proposals discussed thus far, their official instructions, however, prevented them from 
taking any action that deviated from maintenance of the gold standard.  By 19 May 1881, 
momentum was building toward some form of international agreement on silver.  In that 
session, the US and Spanish representatives moved to adjourn the conference so that 
delegates could consult their respective governments regarding the German offer and the 
conference voted in favor.  Chances for bimetallic success seemed more likely than ever. 
The movement toward further concessions progressed during the six-week recess 
of the Monetary Conference, both in public debate and private diplomacy.  In Britain, in 
particular, the public debate surrounding proposed concessions intensified, placing 
pressures on the Liberal Party government of Prime Minister William Gladstone.  These 
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pressures came both from domestic commercial interests and American diplomats.  The 
Gladstone government shared with its Tory predecessor the official consensus in defense 
of the gold standard, but there were signs of wavering.  Gladstone, from the floor of the 
House of Commons, had already indicated openness to any suggestions made by the 
Monetary Conference.138  News from Paris of progress of toward a bimetallic agreement, 
therefore, emboldened advocates and worried ardent defenders of the gold standard in 
British government and finance.  One measure of the extent to which the debate was 
moving in favor of bimetallic advocates was the outrage among financially conservative 
London journals.  The Times, for example, complained, “The heretical idea that 
government ought to take care to keep money abundant… has been repeated ad nauseum 
at the conference, with English delegates not only standing by, but with the most 
prominent of them, Sir Louis Mallet, in the name of India, rather encouraging the 
heresy.”139   
In the public debate that followed, a series of policy options were raised in the 
British press.  The most significant of these proposed that the Bank of England purchase 
and hold silver as one quarter of its capital reserves.  The argument, which appeared as 
early as February 1881, pointed out that the Bank of England, according to its charter 
outlined in the Bank Act of 1844, was legally able to hold this portion of reserves in 
silver.  This meant that the Bank of England could immediately purchase up to £8 million 
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in silver, according to one estimate.140  The British central bank, acting alone, could take 
action to rehabilitate the price of silver and therefore the economy.  A proposal of this 
kind represented an important inflection point in the transformation of central banking 
from a narrow regulator of capital markets to an instrument of national economic 
policymaking.  To sympathetic contemporaries, however, it offered Britain a meaningful 
way to rehabilitate silver short of abandoning the gold standard.  As the Manchester 
Guardian noted, “It appears, therefore, that without joining the ranks of the bimetallist 
countries, we can render them very substantial help.”141   
As the public debate unfolded on British concessions, diplomats of the United 
States pressed the Gladstone government to adopt the same policy of central bank 
intervention.  The effort to persuade Britain in this regard was led by the US Minister to 
Great Britain James Russell Lowell.   Lowell had only recently arrived in London, but 
had already engaged in a series of productive interviews with British Foreign Secretary 
Lord Granville that secured British participation in the Monetary Conference.  Lowell 
had been received warmly both by Granville and at Court thanks in part to his previously-
established notoriety in Britain as author of the satiric Biglow Papers.142  While other US 
representatives, including Evarts, made informal efforts to ascertain the extent of British 
concessions during the recess, Lowell pushed for a more explicit bilateral bargain: British 
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silver purchases and a guarantee that India will remain open to silver in exchange for the 
restoration of bimetallism by the United States and the Latin Union.143  A memorandum 
to the Treasury Office reported the details: “Mr. Lowell stated to the Foreign Office that 
there was prospect of an agreement between the silver-issuing countries, if India would 
continue her present system and the Bank of England would issue notes against silver.”144  
Lowell had made these entreaties not as an ardent bimetallic advocate but in casual reply 
to Lord Granville, who had asked for suggestions on possible British action.  
Nevertheless, whether due to Lowell’s powers of persuasion or because of a sincere 
British interest in seeing some positive result, Granville took these suggestions under 
serious consideration, transferring the details to the Treasury Office and the Bank of 
England Court for review.145 
These efforts resulted in a prompt and affirmative reply from the Bank of 
England.  On 30 June, the Bank’s director, Henry R. Grenfell, wrote a letter confirming 
his authority to issue notes against an expanded reserve of silver and willingness to do so.  
Grenfell, who had by then become a bimetallist himself, not only approved but also 
encouraged the Gladstone government to make these concessions explicitly.  Addressing 
the Cabinet, he said, “The Bank Court see no reason why an assurance should not be 
conveyed to the Monetary Conference at Paris, if their Lordships think it desirable, that 
the Bank of England, agreeable with Act of 1844, will be always open to the purchase of 
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silver under the conditions described above.”146  When news that the American proposal 
had received such a positive reception reached Lowell, he was forced to confess 
apologetically to Granville that his suggestion was not based on any explicit instructions 
from the government of the United States.  Rather than refer the proposal to Washington, 
he instead directed Granville to William Evarts, leader of the US delegation in Paris.147  
There is no record of a subsequent correspondence between the British Foreign Minister 
and Evarts.  The latter would have to await the resumption of the Monetary Conference to 
learn the full extent of British interest in some international agreement on silver.  The 
Lowell-Granville exchange revealed both the extent of US monetary diplomacy during 
the recess and the apparent readiness of Britain to respond to those initiatives.  By July 
1881, the most tangible successes of the bimetallic cause, explicit policy concessions, 
first by Germany and then Great Britain, had come clearly into view through confidential 
diplomacy and public debate.  These concessions, along with the new bimetallic rhetoric 
of the gold standard powers and the assertive defense of the international bimetallism, 
represented a high water mark for an international consensus on the use of silver 
currency. 
Despite these victories, the International Monetary Conference of 1881 failed to 
secure an agreement on the rehabilitation of silver.  As the delegates from fifteen nations 
reconvened at Paris, expectations remained high.  Germany had offered a serious 
proposal to remove the German causes of the monetary crisis.  In the early sessions of the 
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reconvened conference, Britain added its own concessions.  On 2 July 1881, the British 
delegates declared the willingness of the Gladstone government to keep India on an 
unlimited silver standard for a set period in exchange for the restoration of bimetallism in 
the United States and Latin Union countries.148  The delegate from British Canada, Sir 
Alexander Galt, publicly added his proposal to convert Canada to bimetallism as part of 
the same agreement.  The US representatives politely declined the offer, following 
instructions from Secretary of State James G. Blaine not to commit the United States to 
any agreement that placed the country at a monetary disadvantage.149    Speaking of the 
British proposal, US Senator Allen G. Thurman of Ohio responded: “Would such an 
agreement as that proposed be acceptable to the United States?  I am bound, speaking 
frankly, to say that I think it would not…  [The United States] would [however] 
cheerfully become a party to a great bimetallic union which, if formed, would open its 
mints to the free coinage of silver.”150  Worried that sentiments such as these might 
foreclose some form of agreement on silver, the British delegates added to the offer the 
proposal for the Bank of England silver purchases, first suggested to the Foreign Office 
by US Minister Lowell.  In a subsequent session, Sir Charles Freemantle of Britain 
replied: “I have the honor of making the following communication on behalf of my 
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government…  The Bank declares its readiness to exercise the above mentioned 
option.”151  The British announcement produced a series of excited exchanges between 
bimetallic and gold advocates, but the conference nevertheless failed to reach an 
agreement.  The United States again refused the proposals and when in subsequent 
sessions it became clear that no agreement could be reached that summer, the delegates at 
Paris voted to adjourn until the following spring.  
The failure of the 1881 International Monetary Conference rested on a set of 
interlocking economic, political, and intellectual factors.  Concerted action was 
prevented, as in 1878, by the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the price of silver.  For 
policymakers, its depreciation made any suggestion of the unilateral restoration of 
unlimited silver coinage financially suicidal for any national government.  As early as 
1879, English financial expert George J. Goschen had concluded that this economic 
dilemma was at the root of inaction: “At present there was a vicious circle; states were 
afraid of employing silver on account of its depreciation, and the depreciation continued 
because states refused to employ it.”152  There were, however, economic factors that 
distinguished the failure of the 1881 proceedings from its predecessor.  The most 
significant among these was the changed dispositions of economic power among the 
leading commercial nations.  By 1881, the United States had experienced two successive 
years of economic growth and recovery, while most of Europe still languished.  These 
changes from 1878 made the United States no less serious about establishing 
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international bimetallism.  It did, nevertheless, afford the ruling Republican Party much 
more freedom to dismiss any proposals short of an equitable multilateral form of 
international bimetallism.  Secretary of State James G. Blaine provided insight into the 
US outlook, confiding, “This government is not seeking an adjustment to the silver 
question as a favor or concession to our interests…  The gold currents of the world set 
strongly toward us…  Since the Monetary Conference of 1878 we have drawn one 
hundred and sixty million in gold from Europe and have retained the vast products of our 
own gold mines.”153   
While these economic factors prevented action on the concessions offered by the 
gold standard powers, political factors, especially in Britain, played a role in preventing 
an agreement on international bimetallism.  In Britain the gold standard operated as more 
than a monetary program; it remained a vital source of national pride in political debate 
that had accrued generations of ideological attachment during the decades of rising 
British affluence.  It not only signified national wealth but also represented sober and 
efficient financial governance to the political and financial classes.  Together, these 
sentiments underpinned the middle-class politics of the Liberal Party that dominated the 
mid-Victorian era in Britain.154  By 1881, as the limited concessions of the Gladstone 
government indicated, these attachments proved remarkably durable in the face of lasting 
material discontent and intellectual ferment.  By that time, the leading central bankers of 
Britain, Germany, and France—those most familiar with world monetary affairs—had 
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come around to bimetallism even though European policymakers had not.  During 
deliberations, Dutch bimetallist N.G. Pierson, pointed to the inconsistencies in the official 
British position: “If you really believe the double standard system can make the price of 
silver stable, why do you refuse us your cooperation?  Do you realize what this means?  It 
means [the further] fall of silver – your Indian money – and the rise of gold, your home 
money.  It means the entire derangement of prices, monetary confusion, [and] 
commercial chaos.  On you depends whether the evil assumes enormous proportions or is 
entirely removed.”155  Though the some of the most prominent economic individuals and 
interests in Britain had declared for bimetallism and the British delegates themselves had 
adopted bimetallic arguments, the political reluctance toward a universal form of 
international bimetallism remained.   
In addition to economic and political factors, the failure of the 1881 Conference 
rested significantly on the shortcomings of the theoretical framework shared by many 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.  As the public debate and official diplomacy 
surrounding the Paris Conference revealed, by 1881 an intellectual consensus had not yet 
developed regarding the relationship between the money supply and macro-economic 
outcomes; a consensus had not yet emerged regarding the use of monetary policy as an 
instrument of national and global economic governance.  At this moment in the history of 
internationalism and global governance, the bimetallists who argued for coordinated 
international action clearly anticipated the monetary policy consensus that would 
subsequently develop during the mid-twentieth century.  At the same time, defenders of 
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the gold standard, often wedded to the philosophical models of the classical economists, 
insisted that government monetary intervention could only damage an economy that 
existed in nature.  For all these reasons, the 1881 Conference adjourned without result. 
Conclusion 
 
Between 1878 and 1881, the idea of international bimetallism was transformed 
from a radical monetary proposal made by a peripheral power to the object of sustained, 
high-level diplomacy between the leading European powers and the United States.  This 
outcome resulted from a far more sustained and sincere diplomatic effort on the part of 
the United States than accounted for in prior interpretations.  In particular, American 
bimetallic advocates and diplomats played a crucial role in moving Europe toward 
bimetallic arguments both by extending and deepening the ongoing transnational debate 
on the monetary crisis, as well as by securing the participation of the leading gold 
standard powers through official diplomacy.  In the public debate, the leading American 
bimetallists made an increasingly persuasive impression in Europe regarding the links 
between the spread of the international gold standard and the ongoing difficulties in the 
global economy.  By 1881, these were the views articulated by the delegates of both 
Britain and Germany.  During deliberations that year, the concessions offered by both 
gold-standard powers also acknowledged the monetary sources of global economic 
depression put forward by these bimetallic advocates.  Given these outcomes, the US 
campaign to place the monetary crisis at the center of great power diplomacy should not 
be viewed as a complete failure.  Much had changed since 1878 and the direction of that 
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change can be attributed in part to these American efforts.  As Evarts noted on his return 
to Washington, “A great advance [has] been made as compared with the results 
accomplished by the Conference of 1878…  Concurrence of action has not yet been 
secured, but there is a general concurrence of opinion that there should be fixed ratio 
between silver and gold.”156   
Despite such progress, and the optimism it portended to Secretary Evarts for 
renewed negotiations in the spring, the failure to secure an international agreement on the 
rehabilitation of silver did not pass without consequences.    In the short term, the failure 
of the 1881 Conference rattled money markets which, based on positive expectations of 
an agreement in Paris, had increased the price of silver by 6 percent, according to one 
estimate.157  With the end of the conference the price of silver returned to its downward 
trajectory.   
In broader terms, the failure also left in place many of the drivers of ongoing 
worldwide monetary instability, which increasingly fostered great power economic 
rivalry abroad and political unrest at home.  Deflationary pressures, in particular, 
continued to impose the twin burdens of falling prices and rising interest rates on 
indebted producers in all parts of the global economy.  As prominent bimetallist Emile de 
Laveley noted, “When silver was proscribed and gold became scarce, prices fell, 
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manufacturers and agriculturalists began to complain.”158  The political difficulties posed 
by these unchanged monetary policies were not lost on the editors of Blackwood’s:  
Even if capitalists were the sole and unchecked legislators of the 
world, they could not devise any law so purely and exorbitantly for 
their own interests as [the] one for the demonetization of silver – 
for the destruction of one half of the world’s currency and the 
consequent doubling of the value of their own capital.  Such a 
course would produce a social revolution far beyond all the 
preaching of the French communists.159   
 
These conditions that produced debtor politics at home also had significant implications 
for the future of great power rivalry.  In the broadest view, the failure of the 1881 
Conference fostered an intensifying logic in favor of protectionism.  It did so in two 
ways, first by inciting the kinds of calls for protective tariffs by burdened producers such 
as those outlined above.  The logic of higher tariffs, however, was also linked directly to 
concerns within government for maintaining national gold reserves under the 
international gold standard.  As one economist observed, “States have two means of 
preserving in the banks the necessary cash reserves: the raising of the rate of discount, or 
else custom duties to create a favorable balance.”160  In this manner, tariff duties, by 
encouraging a favorable balance of trade, helped stabilize national finances, keeping 
more gold at home than exported abroad and allowing interest rates to remain low.   
Under the conditions imposed by the spread of the international gold standard, the 
contest for gold between nations continued.  In that struggle, decisive advantages accrued 
                                                 
158 Emile De Laveleye, “Bimetallism and Free Trade,” Fortnightly Review 30, no. 175 (July 1881): 108–
25. 
159 Robert Hogarth Patterson, “India and the Silver Question,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 126, no. 
766 (August 1879): 219–34. 
160 De Laveleye, “Bimetallism and Free Trade.” 
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to those nations that could generate wealth and keep that wealth at home.  These 
developments not only fostered a logic in favor of protectionism but also added to a logic 
in favor of imperialism.  Because countries with the largest, most-protected home 
markets, which year-to-year produced net exports, seemed to excel under these 
conditions, nation-states faced with competition from larger rivals were forced to 
consider expanding a protected home market by means of territorial expansion and 
imperial trade preferences as a way to defend national gold reserves.  Of these troubling 
trends toward global economic rivalry, Emile de Laveleye warned, “The irresistible 
consequence of a struggle for gold that we see in progress under our eyes is that all these 
states will feel a desire to takes measures of defense and self-protection.  A new 
continental blockade will be set up not by a tyrant but by the popular instinct of self-
preservation.”161  After 1881, on both sides of the Atlantic, international monetary 
instability continued to shape debtor politics at home and economic nationalism abroad.   
 
  
                                                 
161 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3: Global Depression and the Challenge to the British Gold 
Standard, 1881-1891 
 
The events of the last few years have strikingly shown that there is not enough gold to 
supply the nations which want it to form the basis of their circulating medium. 
Bankers’ Magazine, January 18821 
 
At this moment of almost universal skepticism, when every one of our most cherished 
beliefs is being scattered to the wind, there is one thing, and only one thing, which most 
Englishmen concur in adoring, and that one thing is the English pound sterling. 
H.R. Grenfell, Governor of the Bank of England  
and Founder of the Bimetallic League, May 18822 
Introduction 
 
By late 1881, Great Britain had become the central diplomatic playing field in the 
campaign to establish international bimetallism.  The 1881 Monetary Conference 
demonstrated that there was much more theoretical consensus on the utility of 
international bimetallism among the great powers than previously understood.  
Nevertheless, the conference ended without concerted action.  It did, however, establish 
political markers that led the debate back to Britain and British domestic politics.  
                                                 
1 “The Present Aspect of the Silver Question,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 36, no. 7 
(January 1882): 492. 
2 Henry Riversdale Grenfell served as the Governor of the Bank of England between 1881 and 1883. Henry 
R. Grenfell, “What Is a Standard?” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review 11 (May 1882): 740-752. 
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Foremost, the conference established that Germany, the other major gold standard power, 
would not agree to an international bimetallic standard without British adherence to such 
an agreement.  The deliberations at Paris also made clear that the United States, the 
strongest advocate for international bimetallism, would also act only in concert with 
Great Britain.  Therefore, as the conference adjourned in August 1881, the field of action 
shifted from the level of international politics to that of domestic politics in Britain.   
Changing British opinion and official policy in support of the gold standard became 
the central objective of those interested in international monetary coordination on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Though official US efforts were sidelined for much of the ensuing 
decade, American advocates of international bimetallism, along with their allies in 
Europe, continued their campaign.  Many published pamphlets, made speaking tours of 
Britain, and corresponded with like-minded Britons.  These endeavors contributed to the 
growing popularity of international bimetallism in Britain.   
In the decade after 1881, the idea of international bimetallism gained increasing 
legitimacy in British public discourse and increasingly organized support in British 
politics.3  At the beginning of this period, bimetallic ideas were supported only by a 
handful of prominent British financial and political figures.  That year, Bank of England 
officers H.R. Grenfell and Henry Hucks Gibbs, for example, were practically alone in 
theirsupport of international bimetallism.  By 1891, however, sentiments and politics 
                                                 
3 In British political discourse the idea of international bimetallism was referred to simply as bimetallism 
because a change of British national monetary policy in favor of bimetallism would restore a de facto 
system of international bimetallism as other countries adapted their own national policies or to a formal 
international agreement.  Here, I use the term international bimetallism in the discussion of British 
domestic politics to make it clear that British bimetallists were analogs to American and European 
international bimetallists and not analogs of advocates of free silver in American politics, for example. 
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about British monetary policy had shifted significantly.  Her Majesty’s government had 
appointed several commissions involving the matter, including the Royal Commission on 
the Depression of Trade, and the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver.  In 1890, the 
collapse and government rescue of Baring Brothers and Company, England’s oldest 
merchant bank, demonstrated the fragility of a financial system based on gold reserves 
alone.  By 1891, the Conservative Party government had begun negotiations to join a new 
monetary conference urged again by the United States.  During this decade, the idea of 
international bimetallism was slowly transformed from a proposal deprecated in official 
circles as the embodiment of socialism to one possessing scientific legitimacy and 
favored by an increasingly organized segment in British national politics. 
What explains the surprising shifts in public sentiment and official action 
regarding bimetallism during this period?  As the turbulent decade unfolded, the 
increasing appeal of bimetallic ideas rested on several factors.   Foremost among these 
was the material distress imposed by the enduring economic depression.  While nations 
like the United States had seemingly rebounded from the worldwide downturn after 1879, 
Britain continued to experience the effects of the depression.  An annual index of British 
commodity prices showed, for example, that prices in 1883 had yet to return to levels 
reached thirteen years prior, in 1870.4   Indicators such as these intensified calls for 
government action and the number of dissenters, especially among agricultural producers, 
manufacturers, and merchants in the India trade.   
                                                 
4 These price indexes were calculated and published each year by The Economist as part of its Commercial 
Annual.  The comparative figures covering the period 1866 to 1883 were published in George J. Goschen, 
“On the Probable Results of an Increase in the Purchasing Power of Gold,” Journal of the Institute of 
Bankers (1882-83): 304. 
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While general economic conditions formed the foundation for distress and 
discontent, the distinct boost to international bimetallism between 1881 and 1886 was 
also a response to an added economic development: the enormous gold purchases made 
by European governments—and the resulting periodic increases in the rate of discount set 
by the Bank of England.  The early 1880s were defined by a marked increase in demand 
for gold, especially by France, Germany, Italy, and the United States.  The increased 
demand for gold during this period totaled £200 million sterling, according to some 
contemporary estimates.5  Under these global monetary conditions, the Bank of England 
in many cases found itself forced to raise the bank rate above market interest rates in 
order to retain sufficient gold reserves to operate the gold standard.  This defense of the 
British monetary system, however, came at the expense of economic recovery at home, 
imposing higher borrowing costs during a period of diminished economic activity.  This 
apparent war for gold among nations after 1881 provided the material pressure points that 
aided the ascent of bimetallic ideas into the realm of acceptable political discourse. 
A second factor that aided the rise of bimetallic ideas in Britain was the broader 
challenge to the doctrines of English economics: free trade, laissez-faire government, and 
the gold standard.  For the establishment defenders of English economic theory the 
unprecedented length of the depression posed a serious challenge.  One by one, their 
predictions of a return to equilibrium through liquidation followed by economic recovery 
fell away as the depression endured.  The commercial crisis profoundly unsettled 
                                                 
5 George J. Goschen, “On the Probable Results of an Increase in the Purchasing Power of Gold,” Journal of 
the Institute of Bankers (1882-83): 162 
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heretofore settled axioms in English economic thought.  In public discourse, the 
campaigns against free trade and for imperial federation began in earnest during this 
period.  Sir John Seeley’s, The Expansion of England, which became a foundational text 
for the imperial federation movement, sold more than 80,000 copies in the first two years 
after its 1883 publication.6   
In the academy, the reasoning found in the dictums of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill 
were increasingly challenged by innovations in economic study. The quantification of 
economics led by England’s most distinguished contemporary economist, William 
Stanley Jevons contributed to this challenge.  So too did the increasing availability of 
commercial statistical data that aided quantitative economists and the resurgent historical 
school of political economy.  The historical school, centered in German economic 
thought but with English and American adherents, set itself in opposition to classical 
English economics, both in method and in conclusions.  One ardent critic of established 
economic views in Britain declared that “many of the principles put forward by the 
deductive school of political economy, and accepted by the English public as evident 
truths, are in reality demonstrable errors.”7  It was in this context of unsettled consensus 
that the theories and policy proposals of bimetallism entered public discourse in Britain.  
Fissures in the intellectual consensus behind English doctrines created channels through 
which international bimetallism gained political ground. 
                                                 
6 Richard D. Altick, "Nineteenth-Century English Best-Sellers: A Third List," Studies in Bibliography 39 
(1986): 235-241. 
7 Emile de Laveleye, “Commonplace Fallacies Concerning Money,” The Contemporary Review 40 
(November 1881): 788–806.  
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As we will see in the next chapter, the combined thrust of these material, 
intellectual, and political developments in Britain culminated in signals of new openness 
to monetary diplomacy by the British government after 1891.  These signals in turn 
stimulated the efforts of the new American President, Benjamin Harrison, to again take 
up the question of international bimetallism with the European powers.  
The War for Gold 
 
Shifts in the diplomatic fortunes of international bimetallism had always been 
rooted in the cycles of boom and bust across the emerging global economy.  But the 
decade following 1881 marked a watershed in global economic history in which the 
policies underpinned by the doctrines of English economics were repeatedly challenged, 
if not overturned.  The agricultural depression which had been ongoing in Europe 
intensified with failed harvests between 1879 and 1881, leading to prolonged agitation 
for protectionism—high tariff barriers that protected farm prices and industrial wages 
against the volatility of global markets.  As early as 1879, in the major economies tariffs 
once designed for modest revenue purposes were quickly transformed into protective 
trade barriers.  By 1882, France and Austria-Hungary had already followed Germany in 
the race to increase import duties.  In late 1882, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, 
which represented both the practical and symbolic epitome of free trade theory, was 
defeated in negotiations for its renewal.  These trends continued across the ensuing 
decade with tariff wars between France and Italy, the threat of tariff wars between 
Germany and Austria, as well as the European embargoes of many individual American 
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products.8  Even in Britain, the standard-bearer nation for free trade, steady political 
agitation for protectionism and against free trade began during this period, especially 
after the Reform Act of 1884 significantly expanded the electorate.  These developments 
were aspects of the increasing challenge to free trade.  Protectionist programs were 
popular, partly because they provided easily understood solutions to distressed producers 
exposed to the emerging global economy, but they were also sources of potential danger 
for official policymakers.  Absent reciprocal bilateral trade agreements, protectionist 
programs left countries to rely on the strengths of the domestic economy in order to 
provide sufficient inputs and sufficient consumers to operate rapidly industrializing 
economies.  In other words, rising protectionism insulated domestic producers and 
workers but it also imposed limitations on future economic growth. 
If resurgent protectionism challenged British preferences for free trade, a new 
wave of European imperial conquest challenged the doctrines of economic liberalism that 
underpinned the British world order more broadly.  European imperialism, of course, was 
nothing new, but in the 1880s patterns of imperial conquest and control departed 
significantly from the past, replacing deference to local rule and non-discriminatory trade 
with increasingly militarized occupations of distant colonies organized for the economic 
benefit of the colonizing power.  In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt, establishing military, 
political, and economic control over the restive Ottoman province.  After 1883, France 
                                                 
8 For economic details, see Douglas A. Irwin, Interpreting the Tariff-Growth Correlation of the Late 
Nineteenth Century, NBER Working Paper Series no. 8739 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2002).  Also, in what could have been labeled “The Pork Question” in diplomatic circles, France, 
Germany and other European powers embargoed American meat products on thin accusations of 
contamination.  For a brief discussion, see Henry Blumenthal, France and the United States: Their 
Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 167-179. 
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completed its conquest of Indochina, establishing political control over Annam and 
Tonkin.  In 1884, Germany established disputed imperial claims in West Africa and the 
following year made less disputed claims to parts of East Africa.  The scramble for 
colonies developed at such a rapid pace that the European powers agreed to settle 
disputes cooperatively and to pursue colonization in a “civilized” manner at the 1885 
Berlin Conference.   
While the debate over the motives for this burst of new imperialism remains 
lively and unresolved among historians today, contemporaries of these events, in many 
cases, made clear connections between the ongoing depression of the global economy 
and the wave of colonization pursued by the major industrializing powers.9  They 
observed that rising protectionism, which forced countries to rely almost entirely upon 
their native resources, produced an economic logic in favor of territorial expansion. 
“There are curious parallelisms among European countries at this moment,” reported one 
literary journal of these connections.  “While British troops are winning thankless 
triumphs in the Sudan, the forces of France have at long last taken Lang-Son.  The 
German Reichstag has voted a new protective duty on grain; the French Chamber has the 
same proposal under debate.”10  Political control of distant colonies enlarged the diversity 
and scale of resources that any one imperial power could command.  In response to the 
protective empires being erected by Europe and the United States, one English editor 
lamented that “there is only one remedy. Combination must be met with combination.  
                                                 
9 For a thorough overview of the historiography of new imperialism, see Robert O. Collins et al., eds., 
Historical Problems of Imperial Africa, Topics in World History (Princeton: M. Wiener Publishers, 1994). 
10 “Review of the Month,” Macmillan’s Magazine 51, no. 305 (March 1885): 392–400.  
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This was once denied but now admitted in the struggles between workingmen and 
capitalists for the stock of wealth produced by their joint exertions.  It is time to admit the 
same principle in the struggle between nations.”11   
Sentiments such as these not only inspired imperialists, they also inspired parallel 
campaigns for customs unions in regions where imperialism remained an impractical or 
impolite alternative.  It was popularly understood by most statesmen that the Zollverein—
the customs union that united the German princely states after 1833—had contributed to 
the growing economic power and eventual political unification of Imperial Germany.  
During the mid-1880s, as imperial projects proceeded, a wave of commercial unification 
campaigns began on both sides of the Atlantic.  Germany, under Bismarck, took 
deliberate steps to bring Austria-Hungary into a comprehensive customs union, gaining 
the advantages of its agricultural production without resorting to conquest.  In 1886, 
likewise, the United States renewed its efforts to establish a Pan-American Union that 
would integrate the Americas into a preferential customs union.12  Though these efforts 
failed, they emerged from the same economic logic that favored new imperialism and, 
therefore, should be viewed as like responses to the vagaries of the emerging global 
economy.   
The wave of new imperialism and rising protectionism among the leading 
commercial powers posed a general challenge to the doctrine of free trade that 
underpinned the British world order.  In the years after 1881, this challenge intensified.  
                                                 
11 A.W. Russell, “Low Prices and Hostile Tariffs,” The National Review 6, no. 33 (November 1885): 370–
383. 
12 “Schemes for Extending Our Trade Relations Now Before Congress,” New York Times, 1 April 1886.  
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The drive for protectionism among commercial nations culminated with passage of the 
1890 McKinley Tariff in the United States; it set ad valorum duties on all imported goods 
at an unprecedented 47 percent.  The McKinley Act was followed soon after by the 
Méline Tariff in France, which completed the French rejection of English free trade 
doctrine.  This trend toward economic nationalism was not just national in nature but also 
imperial.  British colonial outposts, which had once operated as hubs of non-
discriminatory global trade from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, were 
increasingly marginalized by protected colonies that served the interests of imperial 
nation-states.   
The First World War is commonly referenced as the historical point at which the 
British world order fractured irrevocably.  Part of that disintegration was the dethroning 
of the long-standing doctrines of English economics; out of the cauldron of war, 
economist John Maynard Keynes and other prominent theorists began to dislodge the 
monetary assumptions of classical English economics.  Keynes, for example, in his 1923 
work, A Tract on Monetary Reform, argued that price stability and the prevention of 
deflation should be central objectives of government economic policy.13  But this was a 
process that had started long before Keynes had reached these conclusions and far in 
advance of August 1914.  The 1880s represented a watershed after which new 
imperialism and rising protectionism steadily undermined the doctrines of English 
economics and the vision of world order it upheld. 
                                                 
13John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan, 1923), 140-162.  
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While the waves of imperial conquests in Africa and Asia—and the rising 
protectionist programs of the leading commercial powers—were the most visible 
responses to the depression of the world economy during the 1880s, the struggle to retain 
domestic gold reserves among the growing number of gold standard countries was 
perhaps the most detrimental to economic recovery in the short term.  The relative level 
of visibility among these international developments are likely responsible for the 
disproportionate amount of analysis devoted to new imperialism and protectionism rather 
than to the international struggle for gold.  Nevertheless, between the early 1880s and the 
mid-1890s, the scarcity of gold continued unabated, generating tremendous debate among 
bankers and financial officials, producing monetary policy changes designed to 
ameliorate the resulting problems, and eventually producing the diplomacy of the final 
International Monetary Conference of the era.   
The increasing worldwide demand for gold also altered the patterns of global 
economic development just as new imperialism and protectionism did.  Foremost among 
these changes was a distinctly new reordering of trade patterns in which the economic 
fortunes of countries using gold currency to settle international payments and those using 
silver increasingly diverged.  While gold using countries struggled to maintain gold 
reserves and provide sufficient currency for their industrializing societies, many silver 
standard countries experienced an expansion of trade with other silver standard countries 
and the associated increases in domestic industry and development.  The foremost 
example of this trend was the remarkable enlargement of exports from British India to 
Japan and China.  Between 1877 and 1887, the total annual export of Indian cotton to the 
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East increased from 28,000 bales to nearly 245,000 bales—a nine-fold increase in 
volume.  The Times of India breathlessly noted the resulting economic changes: “No 
country in the world can point to such remarkable figures as India can in her export trade 
in cotton.  Bombay is the seat of new and prosperous industry.”14  These changes were 
not limited to South Asia.  By 1888, trade between Japan and Mexico had increased to 
such a degree that negotiations had begun to establish a line of regular steamers 
connecting Yokohama to the Pacific ports of Mexico.15  To contemporary observers, the 
expansion of trade among silver using countries illustrated nascent changes in the 
development of the global economy. 
Gold-using countries during the same period also experienced significant changes, 
though of a distinctly detrimental variety.  In these regions the struggle for gold reserves 
among nations occupied the leading financial experts and government officials.  This 
monetary competition took place amidst conditions of economic depression.  Declining 
commercial activity did not coincide in perfect parallel across gold using countries.  The 
United States, for example, experienced an export boom early in the decade only to return 
to depression conditions by 1884.  The annual report of the US Secretary of the Treasury 
that year acknowledged that “the depression now severely felt will continue and may 
become more disastrous.”16  With this downturn, however, the United States rejoined 
Europe in a similar trajectory of steady deflationary pressures on prices.   
                                                 
14 The Times of India, 6 October 1888. 
15 Los Angeles Times, 4 April 1888. 
16 Hugh McCulloch, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Year 1884 (Washington: GPO, 
1884), xxxii-xxxiv. 
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While a spectrum of voices debated the causes of economic depression, the 
bankers and government officials whose work was closely tied to the operation of the 
gold standard focused their concerns on the increasing worldwide demand for gold.  In 
leading financial journals, the alarm was raised over the loss of gold reserves in Europe.  
The competition for gold began in earnest at the end of 1880, when the Bank of France 
reported a 27 percent decline in gold reserves in the course of one year.17  In 1882, the 
editors of L’Economiste Français warned that increasing demand for gold reserves would 
continue if the long-term growth of the US economy continued:  
The monetary crisis will be a chronic malady which lasts for years.  There is a 
country growing more rapidly than any other; this country should naturally draw 
to itself a [greater and greater] part of the metallic money annually produced.  If 
yearly production is insufficient, it should take a portion of specie from the Old 
World.18   
 
By that year, concerns over decreasing gold reserves reached Britain.  The gold reserves 
of the Bank of England had declined to £100 million while guaranteeing transactions 
totaling more than £700 million per year, a ratio of approximately 14 percent reserves to 
circulating bills.19  Under these conditions, the conservative Saturday Review reported 
that “fears have begun to be entertained among men of business that before long that the 
principal commercial nations will be involved in a struggle for gold.”20  During the early 
part of the decade, the monetary operations of the United States and the countries of 
                                                 
17 “Bimetallism and the Bank of France,” New York Times, 13 November 1880.   
18 Quoted in Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, “The Gold Question and the Bank of France,” Bankers’ Magazine and 
Statistical Register 36, no. 8 (February 1882): 576. 
19 Figures quoted in M.G. Mulhall, “Prices and Gold Supply,” The Contemporary Review 48 (August 
1885): 188–99.  
20 “The Threatened Struggle for Gold,” Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art 51, no. 
1319 (February 5, 1881): 176–176. 
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Europe had inaugurated an international competition for gold.  The resulting problems 
were agreed upon, but the origins of and solutions to these problems remained contested. 
The origins of the gold competition of the 1880s rested on both ongoing 
conditions and new economic developments.  Problems under the gold standard had 
begun after 1873, when both Germany and the United States demonetized silver in favor 
of a monometallic gold standard.21  In response, most countries made significant 
adjustments to monetary policy, expanding silver and paper currency in domestic 
circulation and reducing reserve requirements for banks, in many cases.  With 
fundamental monetary regimes left unaltered, these conditions persisted.   
New economic developments of the early 1880s, however, intensified the 
problems posed by the declining supply and increasing demand for gold.  Foremost 
among these developments was the bonanza in American agricultural exports that began 
in 1879.  The new demand for American farm products was sufficient to pull the US 
economy out of depression, creating successive years of positive balances of international 
payments.  The revenue collected from tariffs on those payments filled the US 
government treasury.   What wonderful problems to have if you happened to be among 
the powerful committee chairs in the American Congress!  While the swollen treasury 
created some embarrassments for politicians, especially those intent on maintaining high 
tariffs, it also created new patronage opportunities that the elected professionals of the 
political class were eager to pursue.  A leading financial journal noted how these gold 
                                                 
21 In the United States, the Coinage Act of 1873 authorized the establishment of the gold standard, but gold 
specie payments did not resume until January 1879. 
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flows contributed to a broader national confidence, proudly reporting that “the gold 
countries of Europe [were] very sensitive about losing gold—and the increase in our 
exports.”22  In reality, American fortunes had more to do with the failure of European 
harvests than any US policy change (though financial conservatives often pointed to the 
resumption of specie payments in 1879).   
While Americans basked in their brief success, other developments in Europe 
were contributing to new gold competition of the early 1880s.  First, the monetary 
operations that preceded the resumption of specie payments by Italy in April 1883 placed 
new demands on the worldwide supply of gold, further raising concerns of gold scarcity 
and competition.  Gold for the Italian currency, which totaled $84 million, was purchased 
in the money markets of Europe.  One financial journal dutifully reported how much gold 
had been taken from other nations: $10 million from England, $13 million from France, 
$13 million from Germany, $2 million from Australia, $14.6 million from the United 
States, and so on.23   
Italy was congratulated by prominent European statesmen for its successful return 
to specie payments, yet this development further worried the bankers and government 
officials at the center of the international financial system.  If developments in the United 
States and Italy had fostered the emerging gold competition, the monetary operations of 
France after 1882 escalated the competition into something more serious still.  That year 
former French cabinet member Léon Say announced that gold reserves of the Bank of 
                                                 
22 “Gold, Imports and Exports,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 37, no. 7 (January 1883): 510. 
23 These are rounded numbers quoted in “Italian Resumption,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 
37, no. 11 (May 1883): 826. 
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France had fallen to £24 milllion.24  In response to dwindling gold reserves, the French 
Minister of Finance, J. Pierre Magnin, began a program of accumulating gold in the Bank 
of France through money market purchases and by removing more gold from domestic 
circulation.25  These new monetary operations by France—along with those of Italy and 
the United States during the same period—created a distinct departure from the ongoing 
global monetary conditions that prevailed before 1881.  These changes precipitated a 
recognizable competition for gold reserves among the leading commercial powers that 
lasted long into the following decade. 
The result of the new monetary operations of the early 1880s, according to 
estimates, was an increase of £200 million in demand for gold.26  To defend against 
outflows of gold, many central banks raised discount rates above prevailing market rates, 
further constraining economic recovery at times.  In August 1881, the New York Times 
reported that “the banks of England, France, and Belgium have raised their rates of 
discount and the banks of Germany and Holland are expected to follow.”27  The scale of 
new demand relative to the supply of gold worried observers on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  Writing of the resulting changes in the global economy, one American financial 
expert declared in September 1881 that “a general monetary war is now waging between 
                                                 
24 “M. Leon Say’s Predictions,” Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art 53, no. 1390 
(June 17, 1882): 764–65. 
25 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, “The Flow of Gold into France,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 37, 
no. 2 (August 1882): 90. 
26 George J. Goschen, “On the Probable Results of an Increase in the Purchasing Power of Gold,” Journal 
of the Institute of Bankers 4 (May 1883): 274–90.  The figures introduced by Goschen were initially 
generated by Robert Giffen, President of the Board of Trade in Britain and an opponent of international 
bimetallism.  Some opponents in the gold standard camp took issue with these estimates, though they were 
based on statistical data gathered by official offices. 
27 “The Struggle for Gold,” New York Times, 27 August 1881. 
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the continents and the nations that rally to the standard of gold or of silver.”28  Even in 
Britain, where monetary opinion was articulated in more sober terms, one conservative 
journal acknowledged the negative effects of the international competition for gold: 
“Almost every competent economist, including men like the late Mr. Stanley Jevons, has 
become convinced that the first cause of the [fall of prices] is the scarcity of gold.”29  
These conditions of gold competition remained in place until the gold discoveries 
of the mid-1890s came into monetary circulation in the global economy.  In the 
meantime, nations operating under the gold standard or a de facto gold standard struggled 
to ameliorate the effects of gold competition at home: limited capital investment, price 
deflation, and the extended depression of production and commerce.  “It is not merely 
trade depression, as the English [describe] it,” remarked one monetary expert of 
prevailing conditions.  “It is industrial depression, agricultural depression; it is stagnation 
of enterprise and discouragement of investment, affecting the entire range of production 
and exchange.”30  Sentiments like these, repeated amongst those closest to the workings 
of global finance and government monetary operations, suggest the scale of the 
macroeconomic problems imposed by gold competition; they also hint at the geopolitical 
implications.  Like policies of new imperialism and rising protectionism, operations in 
defense of national gold reserves contributed to a nationalizing of the global economy in 
which the economic strength and the relative power of the state were further 
                                                 
28 Samuel Dana Horton, “Article 3,” North American Review, September 1885. 
29 “Mr. Goschen on the Price of Gold,” The Spectator 56, no. 2852 (February 24, 1883). 
30 Horton, “Article 3.” 
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intertwined—and the competition among these countries was increasingly practiced as a 
zero-sum game.  
The War of the Words 
 
A very interesting movement of ideas is going on among economists of all countries, 
tending to revise the fundamental principles of the science. 
Émile de Laveleye, December 188131 
 
“There is no subject within the whole range of political economy so entangled as money. 
Bonamy Price, January 188232  
 
In rhetoric and policy, the great powers were moving away from the doctrines of 
English economics.  These dramatic changes to the global economy, in turn, flowed back 
into domestic politics and public discourse within Britain, the world’s most globalized 
national economy and the prime defender of liberal economic doctrine.  The economic 
depression did not conform to widely-accepted views of natural business cycles in which 
economic distress was followed by a liquidation of assets, the establishment of a new 
equilibrium, and the return of economic growth.  As one prominent economist remarked, 
“The characteristics of the present crisis are wholly different from [typical] commercial 
                                                 
31 Emile de Laveleye, “New Tendencies of Political Economy in England,” trans. George A. Walker, 
Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 36, no. 6 (December 1881): 422. 
32 Bonamy Price, “How Money Does Its Work: An Answer to M. de Laveleye,” Contemporary Review 41 
(January 1, 1882). 
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and industrial crises whose special features were their acuteness and their short 
duration.”33 Responses to the lasting downturn took many forms.  The depression 
conditions in agriculture inaugurated agitations against free trade and in favor of a system 
of imperial commercial preferences between Britain and her colonies.  While 
protectionism and imperial preference challenged British free trade policy, proposals for 
bimetallism challenged the theoretical underpinnings and the operation of the British gold 
standard.   
Though the public debate over the gold standard might be dismissed as just 
another war of words, this rhetorical war had consequences.  Between 1881 and 1886, the 
constellation of ideas that questioned the gold standard and proposed an international 
bimetallic standard became increasingly accepted in British public discourse.  The 
advance of these ideas was marked by the conversion of prominent financial 
conservatives and the appointment of two important official commissions after 1886.   
The reports of these commissions made important concessions to bimetallic arguments 
made during the war of words about the causes of economic depression, making 
international bimetallism an increasingly plausible alternative to the gold standard.34   
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Among leading policymakers in Britain, however, the findings of these reports 
did little to produce official action.  For many of these key figures, a new openness 
toward changes to the British gold standard did not come until 1890, following the near 
collapse of the commercial bank, Baring Brothers and Company.  The Baring crisis 
demonstrated that, as a central bank under the gold standard, the Bank of England alone 
could not maintain reserves sufficient to act as a lender of last resort given the volume of 
financial sector operations being contracted by City bankers.35  In other words, the scale 
of trade and investment in the global economy had become so large that the gold standard 
institutionalized in the Bank of England could no longer provide specie reserves 
necessary to stabilize the system during financial emergencies.  In the aftermath of the 
Barings crisis, the war of words waged by advocates of international bimetallism took on 
new urgency among financial conservatives.  British government officials subsequently 
expressed openness to international monetary coordination and engaged in discussions 
that ultimately led to the 1892 International Monetary Conference at Brussels.  In these 
ways, the war of words waged forcefully within the realm of British public discourse 
between 1881 and 1886 had important real-world consequences. 
Long before diplomats gathered at Brussels, the rhetorical war against the British 
gold standard was waged in a series of important battles in the leading journals and 
financial newspapers of Britain.  Beginning in 1881, advocates of international 
bimetallism were developing three crucial new lines of argument against the gold 
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standard.  In the prior decade, they had argued principally on the relative merits of the 
gold and bimetallic standard of value.  Monetary experts such as Ernest Seyd, Henri 
Cernuschi, and Francis A. Walker had made the case, for example, that an international 
bimetallic monetary system provided an equalizing mechanism that stabilized exchange 
rates between countries operating different monetary regimes.   
After 1881, however, bimetallic arguments evolved to contend with questions 
raised by the unusual persistence of the economic depression.  Advocates put forward 
three new ideas: first, they connected the economic depression to deflationary pressures 
that followed from gold scarcity under the gold standard; second, they argued that a 
positive balance of payments year-to-year determined the availability of credit and, 
therefore, the economic growth of a country; finally, bimetallic advocates made the case 
that the perpetuation of deflationary pressures under the gold standard threatened the 
most treasured pillar of British economic doctrine: free trade.  Taken together, these lines 
of arguments further linked the gold standard to the economic depression and outlined the 
negative consequences for the British commercial supremacy. 
In late 1881, while many British officials welcomed the failure of international 
negotiations at Paris, a number of prominent editors, economists, and politicians at home 
advanced these new arguments against the gold standard.  This group did not represent 
the fringes of British politics.  On the contrary, they included, among others, one of the 
leading figures of the Liberal Party, George J. Goschen; English writer Moreton Frewen; 
and University of Liege economist, Émile de Laveleye.   
  161 
The writer, Moreton Frewen, was something of an aristocratic gadfly.  Son of a 
Leicestershire landowner and husband to a wealthy American wife from a prominent 
New York banking family, Frewen was in many ways a typical representative of the 
British leisure class.  And yet, at the same time, he occupied a unique position in the gold 
standard debate with personal experience among financial circles on both sides of the 
Atlantic.36  In the British press, he most often appeared as an interpreter of American 
economic and political developments.  
While Frewen reported from his unique transatlantic vantage point, economist 
Émile de Laveleye was an important theorist in the unfolding debate in Britain.  By the 
1880s, Laveleye had made his reputation as a public intellectual across Europe, 
publishing on questions of economics, foreign affairs, and politics.  He was an academic 
by training and served as the chair of political economy at the University of Liege after 
1863.  In his scholarly work he was credited with a number of theoretical innovations, 
later acknowledged in Joseph A. Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis.37  The 
most important of these was an insight demonstrating that the expansion of credit was a 
function of the expansion of the money supply.  As his biographer noted, “As early as 
1860, Laveleye explained that the first effect of a substantial increase in the supply of 
gold is to reduce the discount rate; only later when the volume of credit is expanded… 
does a price rise occur.  Keynes, discovering this argument in a monograph by Alfred 
                                                 
36 For biographical detail on Moreton Frewen, see L. Milton Woods, Moreton Frewen’s Western 
Adventures (Boulder, CO: University of Wyoming, 1986). 
37 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London: Routledge, 1987), 820. 
  162 
Marshall dated 1877, claimed it for his teacher, hailing it as the most important 
contribution to monetary theory published in England since the time of Ricardo.”38   
Despite these accomplishments, Laveleye, as a public man of liberal inclinations, 
always appeared more interested in influencing policy and opinion than in receiving 
credit for scholarly innovations.  An admitted Anglophile, Laveleye travelled often to 
Britain to speak publically on bimetallism and other economic questions.  He had been a 
member of the Cobden Club, the leading free trade association in British politics, since 
1869.  His interest in contemporary policymaking also explains his prolific written 
contributions to the economic debates of the era.  In 1881, his pamphlet, International 
Bimetallism and the Battle of the Standard, was published in London and provided many 
of the theoretical arguments later taken up by British advocates of international 
bimetallism.  Throughout the 1880s he continued to publish frequently in Britain’s 
leading journals on the problems associated with the gold standard. 
The most significant figure in the debate challenging the gold standard, ironically, 
was not an advocate of international bimetallism in any sense.  George J. Goschen, by 
1883, was a stalwart Liberal Party MP who had occupied key cabinet posts relating to 
finance and foreign affairs.  He had also served successfully as special envoy on 
important missions for the government, including to Egypt in 1876 to secure the interests 
of British bondholders in the Egyptian debt crisis and to Constantinople in 1880, where 
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he settled Ottoman frontier disputes that threatened the region.39  Though these 
accomplishments demonstrated his loyalty to the Liberal Party under Gladstone, Goschen 
always retained an aristocratic sensibility that defined the vestigial Whig elements of the 
party and left him at odds with an increasingly reformist Gladstone.  As the new decade 
unfolded, he moved steadily into opposition while the ruling party fractured on questions 
of expanding the franchise and Irish home rule.  After 1886, he sided with Liberal 
Unionists who joined with the Conservative Party to defeat the Gladstone government.  
Though Goschen was not an aristocrat by birth, he was the scion of a wealthy 
banking family.  Goschen was educated at Rugby and Oxford.  He, therefore, had 
adopted the worldview, chauvinisms, and social distinctions of the aristocracy long 
before he entered Parliament as a representative of the City of London in 1863.   In this 
sense, his political defection can be seen as one in which the Liberal Party left him—
becoming more liberal—rather than one in which he left the party.  What remained 
unchanged throughout was his outlook as a financial conservative with professional 
experience in the City of London.  Goschen’s important contribution to the debate over 
the gold standard rested more on this respected position within British political and 
financial circles than on the particulars of his argument. 
Goschen launched the most significant rhetorical battle over the gold standard 
with his May 1883 speech to the Institute of Bankers gathered at Mansion House—
residence of the Lord Mayor of the City of London.  Speaking at the gathering the 
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presiding chairmen remarked, “Never since the Institute has been in existence, and that 
we have met in this hall, have we had any address which opens up so important a 
subject.”40  In his address, Goschen carried forward the first new argument, connecting 
the economic depression to deflationary pressures that followed from gold scarcity under 
the gold standard.  Deflationary pressures on prices resulted from the limited supply of—
and therefore the increased value of gold.  “[The] fall in commodity prices is practically 
synonymous with the increased purchasing power of gold,” he said.41  The cause of the 
increased purchasing power of gold, he argued, was the demand for gold to supply the 
gold standard currencies of the United States, Germany, and Italy.  “What result, if any, 
[will] such a phenomenon produce?  There is scarcely an economist but would answer at 
once [that] such a phenomenon must be followed by a fall in prices of commodities 
generally.”42  Goschen went on to carefully defend his case, deftly admitting that his 
argument did not exclude additional sources of deflationary pressure.  “Supposing these 
to be actual causes, you have to deal with the fact that prices have fallen, and if that is so, 
that is only another way of saying that the purchasing power of gold has increased.”43 In 
closing, the experienced politician was careful not to endorse any remedies, least of all 
international bimetallism.  Nevertheless, his central argument was one made by many 
active advocates of bimetallism prior to 1883.  His speech, in fact, appreciatively cited 
prominent international bimetallists by name, including Émile de Laveleye.  It was not 
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the argument that was novel at Mansion House that day, but the voice making the 
argument—that of an esteemed statesmen and respected financial conservative.   
The Goschen speech left the leading journals and newspapers deeply unsettled on 
the monetary question.  Like the sharp seesaw of a passenger ship battered by storms, the 
speech discomforted and disoriented many.  The editors of the Saturday Review were 
seeming victims of this effect.  Having praised Goschen as the leading authority on 
currency in the weeks before the speech, they argued soon after that he had failed to 
prove the connection between gold scarcity and price deflation.44   
The controversy that followed the Goschen speech lasted years and spanned 
oceans, placing the question of international bimetallism closer to the center of British 
national politics than ever before.  Opponents made three distinct counter-arguments in 
response: first, they argued that deflation was not caused by gold scarcity but by 
speculation-induced overproduction; second, they contended that global integration of 
commodity markets inevitably drove commodity prices downward; finally, they claimed, 
perhaps defensively, that deflation was good for the workingman; finally, the most 
extreme opponents argued that deflation was not occurring. 
Even before the weekly journals had admonished Goschen, opponents in the hall 
at Mansion House that day began to articulate the first counter-argument.  “There is no 
ground for alarm from any appreciation of gold,” said one London banker. “Gold, as a 
metal of circulation, is less required [today]; cheques have come into use a good deal 
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more.”45  In the weeks that followed, several journals added to this line of argument and 
tried to further diminish the linkage between the increased value of gold and price 
deflation.  The Saturday Review contended that deflation resulted only from speculation-
induced overproduction.  “Mr. Goschen has failed to prove [his point].  Inflation is the 
result of speculation…  When the world is blessed with successive good harvests there is 
general prosperity; with prosperity people are inclined to take a hopeful view.  They 
speculate and run up prices.”  Deflation, the editors went on to contend, was the natural 
result of these speculative bubbles.  As late as 1885, opponents were still trying to 
extinguish the idea that monetary contraction influenced economic conditions.  “We may 
assure nervous persons that there is no danger of gold famine—and there is no connection 
between gold supplies and [commodity] prices,” said one stalwart defender of the gold 
standard.46  Conceptions like these represented the broadly-accepted view of the business 
cycle in classical English economics. 
While some opponents to Goschen held fast to doctrinaire explanations, others 
countered his case by pointing to new economic conditions.  The second counter-
argument asserted that the globalization of commodity markets was driving producers 
into greater competition and therefore placing downward pressures on prices.  At 
Mansion House that day, they argued rightly that advances in railroads, steamships, and 
telegraphs were lowering costs and equalizing commodity prices globally.  The Saturday 
Review later made a complementary argument that “there has been a great extension of 
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cultivation outside Europe, [for which] Mr. Goschen did not allow.”  This second 
counter-argument remains the most persuasive.  The increasingly global nature of 
commodity markets and the equalization of prices were especially evident to those 
bankers financing trade operations.  Economic historians today have since confirmed 
these observations, showing the emergence of truly global commodity markets in the 
mid- to late-nineteenth century.47 
The third counter-argument to Goschen acknowledged the presence of 
deflationary pressures, but argued that these were good for the workingman.  As one 
opponent claimed, “Lower prices may cause a passing loss to the tradesman or 
manufacturer… [but] the welfare of mankind is associated with low prices.”48 In other 
words, the appreciation of gold has produced increased purchasing power for wage-
earners.  Supporters of Goschen suggested a different view: “Cheapness is a relative 
expression.  In the present instance nothing is cheapened because all prices, including 
wages, are lower.”49  These contentions sparked a long debate on whether wages were 
falling or remained constant, but neither side could mount conclusive evidence.  What 
was less disputable was that during the economic depression there was less work, 
whether or not the wages for that work remained the same. 
In early 1883, Goschen, with his speech, made a deep impression in the public 
debate over the British gold standard.  His reputation as a leading financial expert and 
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party leader explain the long shockwave of reactions that rippled outward from Mansion 
House that year.  Goschen, the financial conservative, had made the case for the negative 
effects of the increasing value of gold under the gold standard.  Perhaps what explains the 
voluble reaction among banking elites and their political allies was the idea of disturbing 
social consequences implied by Goschen.  If left unchecked, current global monetary 
conditions will increasingly divide creditors from the producers and manufacturers, 
creating new political dangers.  “The fall in prices will affect various classes in society... 
Happy it is for those who have sovereigns; unhappy for those who have commodities not 
sold,” he said.50   
While financial elites grappled with this question—preserving their interests 
versus fostering social and political unrest, the Goschen speech and the debate that 
followed increasingly moved the idea of international bimetallism to the center of 
political debate on both side of the Atlantic.  One measure of its significance was the 
worry it inspired among financial conservatives in the United States.  In June that year, 
the New York Times, warned, “The Honorable George J. Goschen, eminent English 
banker, economist, and statesman, has given occasion for active discussion in economic 
circles of… the appreciation of the value of gold… The discussion has more than a 
purely scientific interest because Mr. Goschen’s high authority is now claimed by 
[advocates of bimetallism in this country].”51 
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Though Goschen had done more to move the question of international 
bimetallism to the center of British politics, economist Emile de Laveleye was most 
responsible for advancing the important theoretical insights which figures like Goschen 
popularized.  As early as 1877, Laveleye outlined his concerns about economic instability 
under the gold standard.   After 1881, following the publication of International 
Bimetallism, Laveleye engaged in a series of rhetorical battles that emphasized the 
second new argument against the gold standard:  under current monetary conditions 
created by the gold standard maintaining a positive annual balance of international 
payments was crucial to the health of any national economy.   
His line of argument countered all prevailing liberal economic doctrine.  Since 
David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage helped overturn the tenets of 
mercantilism early in the century, orthodox English economists had deprecated the 
importance of a positive balance of payments—and the retention of specie reserves—as 
an object of national economic policy.  Instead they contended that, left alone, trade 
across national boundaries fostered a mutually beneficial international division of labor 
regardless of balance of payments concerns.  As Laveleye observed, English economists 
“make gentle fun of the balance of trade and speak of it as an exploded fallacy.”52  In the 
mind of the Belgian economist, however, current international monetary conditions 
showed instead that Ricardo’s theory was the exploded fallacy. 
In this context, the Belgian economist argued that maintaining a positive balance 
of payments was crucial to the availability of credit, which, in turn, partly determined the 
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level of commercial activity of the nation-state.  “In the world of actual affairs, all 
business [is] based on certain prices and on the availability of a certain amount of cash.  
If this amount of cash increased or diminishes the basis of all business transactions 
become necessarily modified.”53  The charged phrase to the ears of contemporaries was 
likely“…in the world of actual affairs.”  It was no doubt a gentle jab at gold defenders as 
out-of-touch adherents to classical English economics.  Laveleye drew this distinction 
throughout his work, associating his own arguments with the growing body of statistical 
data gathered from commercial activity in recent decades.  The Beglian economist put 
himself rhetorically on the side of economic science and his opponents, fairly or unfairly, 
on the side of economics as natural philosophy.   
Layeleye’s argument urging the necessity of a positive balance of payments 
reflected the broader challenges posed to liberal economic doctrines during this period by 
both the increasing quantification of economics and by the revival of the historical school 
of economics, which favored historical examples as a guide to economic policymaking 
rather than the deductive models of liberal economics.  Laveleye inclined toward the 
historical school.  As early as the mid-1870s, he addressed the Cobden Club’s annual 
dinner in, bravely defending the historical school of economics to an audience of liberal 
economic adherents, according to one observer.54  However, what was more important 
about his advocacy of international bimetallism during the 1880s was that it came from 
the viewpoint of financial conservatism associated with commercial interests and not 
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from the viewpoint of economic populism associated with democratic interests.  In other 
words, to his thinking, the gold scarcity of the past decade was bad for business.  As one 
of Laveleye’s fellow advocates explained concisely: “The most immediate effect of any 
reduction of the money supply is to cut into the profits of the employing class…  The 
effect next experienced is the enhancement of all debts and fixed charges, acting as a 
steady drag upon production.”55  The Belgian theorist provided examples in support of 
his argument for the importance of the balance of payments. Speaking for Europe, he 
said: 
We are absolutely forced to take certain products from America—corn, meat, 
petroleum, and cotton…   As industry becomes developed in the United States, 
they have less need of our products [and] we are obliged to pay the difference 
entirely in gold.  Hence, these exports of cash greatly disturb the money 
markets…  The real balance of trade, when all facts are taken into account, is a 
very important point.  It is that which determines the fluctuations in rate of 
exchange…  When a country loses some of its monetary stock, it does not regain 
it without suffering some damage.56 
 
Laveleye repeatedly returned to this argument against monetary contraction under the 
gold standard.  But this was also an argument in favor of international bimetallism; an 
expansion of monetary reserves by the remonetization of silver would reverse these 
conditions, expanding credit and production.  As a prominent public figure, the Belgian 
economist provided many of the theoretical foundations for the increased acceptance for 
bimetallism in Britain generally, and advanced this second argument against the gold 
standard, in particular. 
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As Laveleye advanced his bimetallic arguments, orthodox English economists led 
by Oxford Professor Bonamy Price worked to limit the influence of the Belgian 
economist.  While most counter-arguments challenged Laveleye on substance, some did 
not, focusing instead on his reputation.  Writing in the Contemporary Review, for 
example, Price dismissively introduced Laveleye as “the eminent Belgian writer on 
agriculture and other subjects.”   He did so before taking 19 pages to refute Laveleye’s 
theoretical arguments.57   
Surprisingly, Price and Laveleye shared many points of agreement.  They held in 
common the idea that the relative supply of money had a direct influence on prices, for 
example.  Professor Price admitted that “a heavy increase in the supply of the material of 
money sends down its value; its purchasing power is less; prices rise.”58  Laveleye 
similarly rested his arguments on the quantity theory of money.  Where Price departed 
from his opponent was in the linkage between relative levels of specie reserves and levels 
of commercial activity.  The Oxford professor simply denied the connection, instead 
pointing to an increased circulation of cheques that offset any changes in the availability 
of gold reserves, according to Price.  “Will the cheaper loans granted [because of lower 
interest rates] be counted out in Leadenhall Street in [gold] sovereigns?  Why should 
they?  Borrowers will buy and pay with cheques,” he argued.59  Price neglected to 
mention that these notes regardless of their increased usage were ultimately denominated 
in English sterling which under the gold standard represented a guarantee for payment in 
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gold.  In other words, the circulation of more cheques, which made the entire financial 
system more leveraged than ever, should be viewed as a positive good.   
Taken together, the counter-arguments raised by Professor Price demonstrated the 
difficulties that defenders of the gold standard faced in disputes with informed advocates 
of international bimetallism.  To deny Laveleye’s contention about the linkage between 
gold reserves and the availability of credit was to deny one of the central principles on 
which the gold standard, not to mention the entire international financial system, was 
based.  Price spoke of the balance of payments argument as an exploded fallacy. 
“Nevertheless,” Laveleye noted, “The Economist and other special newspapers follow it 
with the greatest care and attention.” 
In the debate over the importance of the balance of payments, the chief division 
between orthodox economists like Price and revisionists such as Laveleye could be 
reduced to differing attitudes toward inflation and deflation.  Whereas Laveleye and other 
advocates of international bimetallism worried more about the negative effects of 
deflation and saw the positive effects of modest inflation.  Bonomy Price, and other 
defenders of the gold standard, most often disputed the monetary causes of deflation and 
emphasized the dangers of inflation.  With inflation, Price argued, the purchasing power 
of money declined, prices rose, “and the quality of money [was] very much injured, if not 
ruined.”60  Laveleye took the opposite view, arguing that modest inflation was needed 
under current conditions and that a negative balance of payments transmitted deflationary 
pressures into the British economy through the mechanism of the Bank of England 
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discount rate.  While defenders of the gold standard could deny that the ongoing 
economic depression resulted from deflationary pressures under the gold standard, as 
Goschen had argued, they found it harder to contend with the balance of payments linr of 
argument because the respected institutions of the financial press essentially held the 
same position as the advocates of international bimetallism. 
If the first two lines of arguments introduced by bimetallic advocates in the 1880s 
attempted to explain the monetary origins of the depression, the third argument invoked 
the harmful consequences of inaction.  Bimetallic advocates went on the offensive.  The 
third argument against the gold standard invoked the dangers to society in general and to 
the cherished principle of free trade, in particular.  Speaking of the deflationary pressures 
imposed by the gold standard, the aristocratic bimetallist Moreton Frewen appealed to the 
class identity he shared with his opponents, arguing that “prices will fall farther still, 
wages will decrease, strikes will extend…  Such is the connection between currency 
contraction and the increase of socialism.”61  While Frewen had raised the specter of 
social unrest and radical agitation, bimetallic advocates such as Laveleye connected these 
changes directly to the endangerment of free trade: 
The struggle for gold [under the gold standard] is the death-stroke to free trade.  It 
is the general [economic] distress that induces public opinion to incline so 
favorably toward protective measures.  England, by maintaining the single 
standard, wholly extinguishes that noble ideal [of free trade] from which a general 
harmony of interests and the fraternity of nations should spring.62  
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By 1886, arguments like these were not so easily dismissed.  Declining levels of 
economic output meant the closure of factories, the failure of firms to pay outstanding 
debts, and the reduced employment of workers.  “It is useless to describe the miserable 
state of trade in Europe.  The daily papers are filled with details on this subject,” said 
Laveleye.63  His argument about the dangers to free trade was clarifying enough to move 
some reliable opponents.  In response, the editors of one prominent London journal 
admitted, “If we say we are greatly impressed by M. de Laveleye’s article, it does not 
mean that we have become bimetallists…  [But], if these inferences can be established, 
they are of surpassing importance.”64   
In developing this new line of argument both Frewen and Laveleye made appeals 
that evoked sentimental responses among their elite opponents.  They appealed to both 
their class identity and to their British pride in the liberal vision of free trade.  Perhaps 
this partly explains their relative success in the war of words over the gold standard.  In 
May 1886, the same London journal argued that bringing an end to the depression was 
the most important task before the statesmen of Europe.  “According to M. Laveleye, the 
adoption of international bimetallism would [produce] this result.  Other eminent 
economists hold the opposite position—but it is safe to say that they do not hold it quite 
so confidently as they did.”65 
By 1886, it was clear that the prevailing doctrines of English economics were 
under threat.  The great powers were advancing protectionism and imperialism abroad, 
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moving international politics away from free trade and the liberal world order envisioned 
by Adam Smith and Richard Cobden.  At home too, Britain faced increased agitation for 
protective tariffs, labor regulation, and socialist programs.   
The war of words over the gold standard represented just one part of this larger 
challenge to the status quo.  However, the compelling fact to note here is that the appeals 
for monetary change made by advocates of international bimetallism were made from a 
position of financial conservatism shared by defenders of the gold standard.  Frewen, the 
aristocratic gadfly, rested his argument partly on the link between economic conditions 
and the specter of socialism.  Laveleye, the academic theorist, contended that current 
conditions hurt businesses first.  Goschen, though not a bimetallic advocate, highlighted 
the link between monetary contraction and deflation—a condition which made it 
increasingly difficult for debtors to repay his fellow creditors.  The common thread 
among these arguments was the case they made for international bimetallism in terms of 
financial conservatism.  Despite accusations of monetary radicalism made by opponents, 
advocates of international bimetallism in the war of words—and in the longer struggle to 
establish an international monetary agreement—had always represented commercial 
interests and had always been of a conservative cast of mind on matters of finance.   
The public controversy over the gold standard raised by the depression and 
pressed by advocates of international bimetallism was a battle won by those in favor of 
change.  Though they did not overturn the British gold standard in law, they moved the 
question of monetary policy to center of British politics, making it the object of two 
government commissions beginning in 1886.   
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American Advocates of International Bimetallism in the British Debate 
 
As has been demonstrated, the burden of advancing bimetallic ideas in Britain fell 
upon prominent British and European advocates of international bimetallism.  American 
advocates, however, played an important supporting role that illuminates the growing 
transnational network of policy experts working across national boundaries in support of 
policy change.  In the period between 1881 and 1891, they supported the work of the 
main contestants by publishing in London, translating French language pamphlets, and 
travelling overseas to address interests groups associated with international bimetallism.  
In these efforts English bimetallist Moreton Frewen acknowledged the contributions of 
Samuel Dana Horton, in particular.66   
American advocates of international bimetallism, during the same period, also 
fought an important rear-guard action in the United designed to maintain pressure on the 
British government to move toward bimetallism.  Though official US action had been 
mostly sidelined throughout the 1880s, American advocates, in unofficial capacities, 
pursued monetary policy change in Britain through this emerging transnational network. 
The first aspect of American efforts in the British debate was to support the work 
of the main advocates of international bimetallism there.  American George A. Walker, 
then serving as US Consul at Paris, had been an interpreter of European financial affairs 
long before his assignment to Paris in 1881.   In the war of words over the gold standard 
in Britain, Walker helped launch the debate by translating a series of Laveleye’s 
                                                 
66 Frewen, “Gold Scarcity and the Depression of Trade.”  
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published articles in a single English language edition, Bimetallic Money.  Walker 
described the volume as “a clear and vigorous presentation of the argument in favor of 
international bimetallism, it ranks with the productions of M. Henri Cernuschi on the 
subject.”67  Walker helped spread the ideas of international bimetallism in print; from 
Paris, as American Consul, he was also the key figure who kept official Washington 
informed of the shifting politics of international monetary coordination.  In late 1885, he 
wrote Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard to report that “the Parliament of Great Britain 
is a very conservative body, strongly prejudiced in favor of the gold standard…  Nothing 
will so much hasten the adoption [of bimetallism] in Europe as the suspension of silver 
coinage in the United States…  Mr. Goschen [is] in support of this opinion.”68  These 
communication not only demonstrate the ongoing interest in an international monetary 
agreement by the United States, but the ways in which key American international 
bimetallists sought to influence opinion and policy at home and abroad. 
If George A. Walker served behind-the-scenes in advancing international 
bimetallism during this period, fellow American Samuel Dana Horton played to the 
crowd.  An able and experienced political speaker on the campaign trail, Horton was also 
deeply versed in economic theory and monetary issues in particular.  Like his fellow 
American advocates of international bimetallism, he was a financial conservative, except 
when it came to the gold standard.  In 1887, in his role as monetary theorist he published, 
The Silver Pound and England’s Monetary History since the Restoration.  The book 
                                                 
67 Walker made these comments in the translator’s preface to Emile de Laveleye, Bimetallic Money, trans. 
George A. Walker (New York: Banker’s Magazine and Statistical Register, 1877). 
68 Quoted in New York Times, 8 January 1886. 
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demonstrated to English readers that their country had a long and fruitful economic 
history under the silver standard prior to the establishment of the gold standard after 
1816.69   The history ended with the current debate over the gold standard, calling for the 
adoption of bimetallism in Britain based on historical precedent.  In particular, Horton 
argued that, in the war of words during the 1880s, defenders of the gold standard had 
continually retreated in light of bimetallic predictions upheld by ongoing economic 
conditions.  When gold stalwarts in Britain finally conceded that deflation was operative, 
they made new claims that it was only a transitory economic condition.  To this claim, 
Horton replied: “Transitory, unquestionably! But so is cholera transitory; so are battle, 
murder, and sudden death!”70  These remarks highlighted Horton’s wit and rhetorical 
acumen, but they represented only a small portion to his methodical excavation of 
English monetary history.  In the book, he demonstrated the importance of silver to 
monetary operations and, in historical terms, reminded his English readers of the novelty 
of the single gold standard. 
The following year Horton took his show on the road, travelling to Britain to 
speak to audiences on the question of the gold monometallism versus bimetallism.  In 
Britain, his volume had been well-received.  One prominent member of the peerage, the 
                                                 
69 Following the fiat currency regime of the Napoleonic Wars, the Re-Coinage Act of 1816 established the 
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70 Samuel Dana Horton, The Silver Pound and England’s Monetary History since the Restoration (London: 
MacMillan and Company: 1887), 212. 
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Duke of Marlborough, praised the book as “an intricate history on the standard of value 
in Europe… by an eminent authority on the subject.”71   Horton took his message beyond 
London, to regions where the economic depression was more keenly felt.  In January, for 
example, he met with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to discuss the question.72 
“We ask that silver should be restored to its former place; that the nineteenth century 
should treat the two metals in as interchangeable a manner as the eighteenth century did,” 
he said to his English audience.73  Through efforts like these, American advocates of 
international bimetallism furthered the campaign against the British gold standard. 
In the decade after 1881, American advocates of international bimetallism also 
fought an important rear-guard action in domestic politics.  In the wake of the failed 1881 
monetary conference, leading bimetallic advocates—and many more financial 
conservatives—agreed that the most important action that could be taken by the United 
States was the repeal of the provisions in the Bland-Allison Act, which mandated 
monthly government silver purchases.  US Secretary of the Treasury Charles J. Folger 
said publicly that “the most potent means of bringing about any concerted action among 
nations [on international bimetallism] would be for the US to suspend the present coinage 
of silver.”74 
The logic of ending US silver purchases in order to establish international 
bimetallism at first glance appeared counterintuitive.  However, for those who 
                                                 
71 George Spencer-Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, “International Legal Tender,” The Forum Vol. IV, no. 
No. 5 (January 1888): 497. 
72 Manchester Guardian quoted in The Times of India, 5 January 1888.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Quoted in Henry B. Russell, International Monetary Conferences (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1898), 
325. 
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appreciated prevailing global monetary conditions under the gold standard, this proposed 
action was a logical and necessary next step.  Despite the difficulties imposed on the 
Bank of England—and on the British economy, in general—the British government had 
failed to concede the necessity of altering of the gold standard.  For advocates of 
international bimetallism in the United States, repeal of the Bland Act became paramount 
because repeal would further increase US demand for gold, thus, intensifying the 
monetary difficulties faced by Britain.  Their aim was to move Britain away from its 
intransigence on an international monetary agreement.  On his return from the 1881 
monetary conference at Paris, former Secretary of State William Evarts noted the high 
ground the United States occupied in international negotiations that allowed it to pursue 
this strategy: “Our position and resources are such that we can afford to be indifferent, 
but England cannot, as the drain of gold on her leading bank demonstrates.”75  In his 
December message that year, President Chester A. Arthur called for repeal, endorsing the 
recommendations of Secretary Folger who had earlier advocated repeal in pursuit of 
international bimetallism.  In the financial press, where advocates of international 
bimetallism had won over prominent journals in the preceding years, the connections 
were made more clearly: “The recent recommendations of the President, in respect to 
stopping the coinage of silver, have been very generally approved throughout the country 
because such as change of policy will forward the use of both metals.”76   
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American advocates of international bimetallism pursued this campaign for 
monetary policy change at home throughout the 1880s.  If the persuasion campaign were 
limited to party leaders in Washington and leading bankers in New York, the monetary 
history of the late nineteenth century may have been quite different.  Among these elite 
circles, no persuasion was necessary.  Even with the transfer of presidential power to the 
Democratic Party under President Grover Cleveland, there was no change in opinion on 
this issue.  International bimetallists or not, American financial conservatives agreed on 
repeal.  Financial conservatives had a brush with success, when, in March 1885, the 
House of Representatives narrowly defeated a measure to repeal the silver purchase 
provisions of the Bland Act.  The great obstacle to their success, of course, was the 
growing movement for the unilateral restoration of silver money—free silver—being 
organized at the grassroots in American politics.  After the minor successes of the 
Greenback Party during the 1870s, monetary questions had receded into the regular 
channels of party politics until the economic downturn of the mid-1880s again revived 
the issue.  The campaign for free silver in national politics during this period took on 
particular intensity because of the ways in which the idea of free silver moved quickly 
beyond agrarian interests.  Because the economic downturn in the United States was 
associated with the retreat of capital to the banking houses of the Northeast, the cause of 
free silver tended to draw in manufacturers, transportation firms, merchants and other 
commercial interests from all other regions.  It did not rely simply upon the what 
financial conservatives considered agrarian radicals in the West and South.  In national 
politics, this broad spectrum of interests cut across prevailing party coalitions and 
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threatened to break them apart.  Prominent Republicans and Democrats alike, especially 
from the Midwest, increasingly flowed into the free silver camp.  Both major parties 
while occupying the presidency used the powers of patronage to deter or placate leading 
free silver politicians.77  They did so with limited success as the collapse of the 
Republican Party in 1892 and the split of the Democratic Party in 1896 later proved. 
In the great national debate over the money question that intensified after 1884, 
American advocates of international bimetallism made sustained efforts to peel away 
silver sympathizers in the industrial sectors of the economy from the more radical 
agrarian advocates of free silver.  In these efforts, no representative of the cause was 
more energetic than Samuel Dana Horton.  In addition to publishing prolifically on the 
topic, he travelled to annual association meetings of various business groups pushing 
repeal of the silver purchases in the cause of establishing international bimetallism.  As 
early as May 1885, Horton successfully split many in the South from the free silver 
camp.  The National Commercial Convention held at Atlanta that year, for example, 
passed a resolution calling for the suspension of silver purchases and coinage.  Speaking 
of the resolution, one newspaper reported that “it was carried by a majority of Southern 
votes… The proposal [was] introduced and advocated last night by Mr. S. Dana Horton 
of Ohio.”   
Despite notable triumphs, Horton and other advocates of international bimetallism 
enjoyed only limited success.  Like the firebox of a steam locomotive filled with burning 
                                                 
77 The ultimate expression of this strategy was the enactment of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 
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equally during his first administration. See, for a general overview, Russell, International Monetary 
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coal, the idea of free silver was poised to burn long and hot in American politics, carrying 
the money question to the center of national discourse and slowing repeal of the Bland 
Act.  And yet, at the same time, Horton and others did help prevent free silver from 
becoming official US policy—an outcome that would have doomed international 
bimetallism and certainly disrupted the nation’s most important commercial relationship: 
Great Britain.  Nevertheless, American advocates of international bimetallism carried out 
their rear-guard action long enough for the idea of international bimetallism to flower in 
Britain and place increasing pressure on Britain to change monetary policy. 
Conclusion 
 
The years between 1881 and 1891 represented a turbulent decade in world politics 
and in the development of the global economy.  In no country were these changes more 
keenly felt than in Great Britain, the nation most integrated with—and dependent on the 
emerging networks of international trade and investment inside and outside the formal 
British Empire.  New imperialism, rising protectionism, and the struggle for gold reserves 
among the leading commercial powers during the 1880s together represented a distinct 
watershed in world affairs.  Across the commercial world the doctrines of liberal English 
economics—free trade, laissez-faire government, and the gold standard—were 
increasingly challenged both in theory and in practice. 
These changes naturally flowed back into British domestic politics and national 
discourse.  The challenge to the gold standard posed by the struggle for gold reserves 
created particular dilemmas for Her Majesty’s government.  It made the operations of the 
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British gold standard increasingly difficult and made the defense of its theoretical merits 
harder and harder to maintain.  In the war of words that ensued, the proposals for 
international bimetallism moved inside the normative bounds of accepted political 
discourse, becoming objects of debate at the center of national politics.  As has been 
suggested, these advances resulted from many of the material and macroeconomic 
changes that shaped British politics during this period.  But the increasing acceptance and 
advocacy for international bimetallism also rested on the efforts of the advocates of 
international bimetallism on both sides of the Atlantic.  American advocates, in 
particular, made extraordinary and unofficial efforts to place pressure on the gold 
standard policy of Britain.   
While American advocates of international bimetallism and their English 
counterparts could not claim outright success in changing official British monetary 
policy, they could claim a small victory in the changed state of affairs in the British 
debate over the gold standard.  By 1891, this small victory, in part, created the 
opportunity for official action.  The Conservative Party government, which had always 
included the larger number of bimetallic adherents, was responding to official US 
inquiries regarding a new monetary conference that involved international monetary 
coordination among the leading commercial powers.  The significance of the efforts of 
international bimetallists, however, does not rest on this small victory, but rather on the 
extent to which these efforts reveal an increasingly coordinated and intellectually unified 
network of officials and policy experts that were working in a transnational effort to 
effect changes to the British gold standard. 
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Chapter 4: Failing to Save the World: The United States, Britain, and 
Silver, 1889-1893 
 
The present offers a rare conjunction of favoring causes.  The monetary distress in South 
America… and a disquieting attitude of Russia coincide with delicate political situations 
in Berlin, Vienna, and London.1 – Samuel Dana Horton, 1891 
 
From a general feeling in the atmosphere it seems to me that there is a desire to do 
something for America.2 – Alfred Rothschild, 1892 
Introduction 
 
On 22 November 1892, the leading commercial nations gathered at Brussels for 
the opening of the International Monetary Conference.  The object of the conference was 
to find common ground for the increased use of silver currency.  Twenty nations 
attended, including the major economies of Europe—France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and Russia.  The Americas were represented by Mexico and the United States.  Most 
crucially, Great Britain was in attendance.  Britain’s position as the leading gold standard 
power and as the financial core of the nineteenth-century global economy made British 
participation a prerequisite for the success of any international monetary agreement.  One 
conference delegate, with little exaggeration, noted that the fate of the global economy 
                                                 
1 Samuel Dana Horton to James G. Blaine, 18 May 1891, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department 
of State, 15 May to 27 June 1891 (microfilm copy),  reel 114, NARA. 
2 Alfred Rothschild to NMR & Sons, 22 November 1892, series 000, box 442, folder 8, Business Records 
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was, in fact, “in the hands of England.”3  Supporters of an international agreement on 
silver thus saw the involvement of Britain and the continental powers as reason for 
optimism as the conference convened.  
The participation of the leading commercial nations at the Brussels Conference 
was a measure of how much the diplomatic playing field regarding international 
monetary relations had changed since the Paris Conference of 1881.  Beginning in the 
late 1880s, in particular, questions about the viability of the international gold standard 
and proposals for an alternative international bimetallic standard again moved to the 
center of world politics.  For the better part of the 1880s, official action on the question of 
monetary coordination among nations had been limited—first by the falling price of 
silver and, second, by entrenched sentiments favoring the gold standard among leading 
institutions of the global economy.  As delegates gathered at Brussels, however, some 
alteration to the status quo seemed likely in light of recently changed conditions.   
The foremost reason for the renewed interest was the worldwide scarcity of gold 
reserves created by new increases in demand.  Rising demand for gold since the 1870s 
had produced two sharp periods in which gold appreciated in value.  In the second period, 
beginning in 1887, a series of important monetary developments significantly intensified 
demand, pushing many countries toward an international monetary agreement.   The first 
cause of the new gold scarcity was the increase in gold purchases made by European 
governments.  These purchases followed the collapse of the alliance between Russia, 
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Austria-Hungary, and Germany, which had held in check the geopolitical tensions over 
Eastern Europe since 1878.  After the collapse of this alliance in 1887, however, 
governments across Europe began purchasing gold.  By the time of the Brussels 
Conference, Austria-Hungary had established the gold standard, purchasing new gold 
reserves in world capital markets.  Russia, similarly, had purchased more than $400 
million in gold between 1887 and 1892, according to contemporary estimates.4  Many 
observers saw these monetary changes as preparations for war.  As one London journal 
noted in late 1887, “Peace in Eastern Europe hangs by a very frail thread.”5  
The second reason for renewed efforts was a growing awareness among leading 
politicians and financiers of the increasingly leveraged nature of the international 
financial system, especially in Britain and the United States.  Most of the gold acquired 
by European governments during this period was purchased from the Bank of England 
and the United States Treasury.  Speaking of the increased demand for gold in Europe, 
the director of Rothschild Frères in Paris complained that “gold, until now, [has been] 
taken out of circulation and therefore cannot be employed as a medium in international 
markets.  The Bank of England has been the only place where gold can be contracted.”6  
Though Mr. Rothschild left the US Treasury out of his analysis, new gold demand 
created problems for both Britain and the United States.  It sharply decreased the amount 
of specie reserves held against the amount of paper notes in circulation; creating 
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conditions in which a financial panic might foster a run on bank deposits that required 
more reserves than central banks or government treasuries might use to halt such a panic.   
It did not take long to reveal the dangers posed to major financial institutions 
under conditions of intensified gold scarcity.  In late 1890, one the world’s largest 
investment houses, Baring Brothers of London, was caught in a liquidity crisis after the 
price collapse of Argentine securities.  The obligations of Baring Brothers were so 
extensive that the Bank of England alone could not supply enough gold to save the 
private investment bank.  Instead, the Bank of England desperately cobbled together a 
syndicate of lenders, including the Bank of France and N.M. Rothschild and Company, 
among others, to supply the needed reserves to save Baring Brothers and forestall the 
spread of a financial panic.  
Difficulty for the Bank of England functioning in its role as lender of last resort 
was only one problem created by the increased demand for gold.   In the United States, 
the European demand for gold produced a continuous outflow of gold from the US 
Treasury beginning clearly in 1888.  Gold exports from the United States not only 
threatened the continued operation of the de facto gold standard there, it also contributed 
to a negative balance of payments that returned the United States to debtor nation status 
by the early 1890s.  The 1889 Annual Report of the US Treasury gave voice to the 
sentiments these changes produced elicited on Wall Street: “The heavy movement of gold 
from the United States… has created a profound stir in the American commercial 
world…  Europe was compelled to have it.  The movement, therefore, [has been] 
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artificially stimulated by banks in Europe paying a premium for gold.”7  In the United 
States and Britain, these monetary movements resulted in a contraction of circulating 
currency and expanded the political campaign for alternatives to the gold standard pure et 
simple, changing minds at the highest levels of government.   
The change in outlook was particularly recognizable in Britain, where ongoing 
depressed economic conditions and the unofficial efforts of American and European 
advocates had slowly moved the idea of bimetallism within the realm of acceptable 
political discourse.  The debate intensified in Britain partly because so much of the 
British economy was tied to overseas trade and investment inside and outside the British 
Empire.  During these years, many leading public figures declared in favor of 
bimetallism; many more called for the rehabilitation of silver currency short of 
establishing a bimetallic standard.  The most important common denominator among 
these figures was their reputation as financial conservatives in British public life—Lord 
Randolph Churchill, Arthur J. Balfour, Alfred Rothschild, and George J. Goschen, among 
others.  Certainly, they could not be easily dismissed as agrarian agitators or socialist 
trade union leaders.  As one American advocate of international bimetallism observed, in 
Britain “it could no longer be considered bad form to be a bimetallist…  The unanimous 
admission, on the part of the [Gold and Silver] Commission, as to the practical efficiency 
of the [bimetallic] system from 1803 to 1873 largely removed those sentiments of 
suspicion and distrust.”8  These changes in British public opinion had implications 
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beyond Britain and represented a key element to the revival of monetary diplomacy 
among the leading commercial nations.   
Shifting economic conditions and political fortunes in the United States also 
played a key role in the revival of official efforts to establish an international monetary 
agreement.  Renewed diplomatic action in the late 1880s represented a distinct change in 
policy by the United States.  For the better part of the decade following the Conference of 
1881, the United Stated had limited official efforts to bring Europe to the monetary 
negotiating table.  By 1890, however, increasing agitation for free silver and the drain of 
US gold reserves at home as well as signs of new openness to international bimetallism 
abroad moved American policymakers toward new action.   
The return of the presidency to Republican Party control beginning in 1889 
marked the shift.  Since 1878, American proposals for international bimetallism had 
always originated among financial conservatives of the Republican Party.  Republican 
rule under President Benjamin Harrison offered new opportunities for executive action 
and also new lines of attack for Democrats no longer bound to support a president of their 
own party.  The push and pull of both factors led Republicans to again take up 
international bimetallism. 
Harrison’s predecessor, President Grover Cleveland, had made perfunctory efforts 
at pursuing international bimetallism, sending special envoys to Europe in the spring of 
1885 and again in the spring of 1887.  But Cleveland’s efforts met with little success.  
This was partly because his chosen agents had little interest and even less faith in the idea 
of international bimetallism.  Edward Atkinson, Cleveland’s last monetary envoy, 
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expressed his skepticism of the entire diplomatic effort in an interview with the New York 
Times.  “[There is] some idea on the part of the President that it is his duty to advance the 
measure,” he said.9  Cleveland and Democratic Party leaders had always been more 
interested in tariff reduction than in the possibility of altering the international gold 
standard as a remedy for economic problems at home.  Furthermore, his agents abroad 
met with European counterparts that were similarly inclined on economic questions like 
free trade and the gold standard.  Thus, these exchanges had few demonstrable results.10  
When the Republican Benjamin Harrison ascended to the presidency in 1889, the 
necessary conditions for diplomatic success—control over the institutions of official US 
policymaking at home and new signs favoring international action abroad seemed to be 
coalescing.  
Renewed US efforts to rehabilitate silver currency in coordination with other 
nations culminated with the Brussels Conference in November 1892.  As the first chill of 
winter set in, the delegations from twenty countries gathered in the Palais des Academies, 
a neo-classical office building recently constructed to house the burgeoning government 
bureaucracy there. The immense size and studied symmetry of the edifice displayed a 
confidence in progress and reason that remained touchstones of nineteenth-century 
European thought.  The new building and the diplomatic conference, in this sense, were 
parallel reflections of the liberal ideal—an outlook that emphasized the harmony of 
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interests both among nations and among economic classes.  Deliberation and reasoned 
consensus among the financial experts gathered at Brussels, to the liberal imagination, 
would produce a positive, scientifically-informed result to guide international action.   
In reality, however, the Brussels Conference convened at a moment when such 
sentiments were increasingly contested—not only by radicals and revolutionaries, but by 
prominent figures in European and American public life.   The Belgian prime minister, in 
his opening remarks, alluded to these ambiguities.  “The conference in which you are 
called upon to take part has, for its object, the consideration of one of the most serious, 
complex, and arduous problems which is presented to modern society.  Money touches 
all economic and social interests; it affects the commerce of the world.”11  By late 1892, 
every country represented at the Brussels Conference had extensive experience with the 
booms and busts that accompanied the globalization of trade and investment in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  Each country had varying outlooks on the extent to 
which these revolutionary economic changes had been a positive good.  As a geopolitical 
framework, the midcentury liberal vision for world order had facilitated global economic 
changes that created a logic favoring the scramble for territorial empires by Britain and 
its major European rivals.  In some sense, the Brussels Conference  represented one of 
the last attempts to rescue that midcentury liberal world order defined by great power 
cooperation and open commercial intercourse.  Ironically it was the advocates for 
alteration of the international gold standard that fought hardest to maintain this liberal 
vision of world order. 
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Background to US Diplomacy 
 
From the earliest days of his administration, President Benjamin Harrison was 
keenly interested in reviving efforts to establish international bimetallism.  Though his 
public statements remained guarded on the subject, he had been contemplating a new 
international monetary conference as early as December 1888, three months before taking 
office.   
In these formative days of the Harrison administration, Republican Senator 
William Windom of Minnesota, who was already in line to become Secretary of the 
Treasury, was the greatest influence on the policy of the new Republican administration.  
Windom was a financial conservative who pleased Eastern banking interests but, as a 
representative of the Midwest, he also had shown publically his sympathy for the 
rehabilitation of silver currency.  He later testified to Congress, skillfully threading the 
needle of public opinion on the subject: “The ultimate free and unlimited coinage of 
silver is certainly desirable and ought to be attainable.  But with the present attitude of the 
other great commercial nations toward silver, it would be neither safe nor politic for our 
government to make the experiment.”12  His carefully qualified support for silver and his 
Midwestern bona fides made Windom an ideal nominee for Treasury, given the desire 
among party leaders to unite a Republican coalition that had shown signs of fracture over 
the silver question. It was from this position that Windom began to shape administration 
efforts to renew monetary diplomacy with Europe. 
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In February 1889, Windom began his campaign, requesting a confidential report 
on the outlook for international bimetallism in Europe.  He called on Samuel Dana 
Horton, one of the leading American publicists for international bimetallism and a 
veteran of past official US diplomatic efforts.  Horton was instructed to produce a report 
that would offer guidance to the new administration and in March Horton returned a 
confidential memorandum on the prospects of an international agreement to rehabilitate 
silver.13   
The Horton memorandum outlined the factors that contributed to the failures of 
prior US diplomatic efforts to establish international bimetallism and proposed a strategy 
for future endeavors.  Three issues, according to Horton, were responsible for past 
failures.  Principally, the ongoing strength of free silver advocates in American politics.  
To observers in Europe, the near constant attempts by the US House of Representatives 
to establish the free coinage of silver in place of the more moderate silver purchases of 
the Bland-Allison Act of 1878 signaled that US proposals for international bimetallism 
were made from a position of weakness.  Horton claimed that most European officials 
involved in monetary affairs, assumed that the silver agitation in the United States would 
end eventually in the unilateral restoration of silver currency there.14  Horton also 
contended that US efforts had been impeded by the lack of institutional support for 
previous efforts to secure an international monetary agreement.  The State Department 
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and Treasury, at different times, had shown little interest in the subject.15  Finally, Horton 
argued that the breakdown of prior monetary conferences rested on the ill-informed 
economic assumptions then prevailing among European officials and financiers.  “The 
defective principles that the men of England and Germany had trusted for generations 
were mistaken,” he reported to Windom.16  The lack of understanding of the function of 
money, it appeared to Horton, posed the biggest potential impediment to US efforts to 
renew monetary negotiations with Europe.  These were the stumbling blocks that 
impeded the success of previous diplomatic efforts and increased suspicions of new 
American efforts in Europe, according to Horton. 
Given these obstacles, Horton outlined a strategy for future US monetary 
diplomacy that followed from his assessment of prior missteps.  He understood that 
getting the cooperation of more than one European government would turn on the relative 
difficulty of monetary operations each government faced.  He therefore recommended 
consistent contact with these leading economic powers through personal diplomacy.  He 
contended that this would signal a renewed US commitment to international bimetallism, 
which had waned under President Cleveland, and would allow the United States to 
address the individual concerns of each country that may arise before any formal 
conference was convened.17  Horton also recommended that the new Republican 
administration wait for positive signals from Europe regarding an international monetary 
agreement before initiating any official diplomatic action for international bimetallism.  
                                                 
15 Ibid, 26. 
16 Ibid, 33. 
17 Ibid, 10. 
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He reported to Windom that many European officials saw past American proposals as 
self-serving.  Finally—and perhaps most interestingly, Horton suggested that the 
battlefield of public discourse on the question of international bimetallism needed to be 
prepared with a government-supported information campaign in order to change 
European opinion over time.  He proposed financing the circulation of books, pamphlets, 
and white papers that argued for international bimetallism to be circulated among 
officials and financiers in Europe.  In Horton’s view, the most significant obstacle to 
international agreement on silver was not economic; Europe had suffered deflationary 
pressures without making policy changes.  The greatest obstacle was ideological.  The 
gold standard had become a kind of faith among leading European politicians despite 
growing economic scholarship that suggested otherwise.  As an issue of faith, departure 
from the gold standard would require conversion.  Thus the propaganda campaign for 
international bimetallism appeared essential to Horton.  Referring to these allegiances to 
the gold standard, he lamented that “the whole structure of current doctrine, the education 
of the learned, the recognized principles of policy bearing upon these questions have to 
be remodeled from the foundation up.”18  Taken together, these three strategies would 
position the United States to renew monetary diplomacy the moment changing conditions 
presented a new opportunity. 
The Horton memorandum was well received by Secretary Windom and President 
Harrison; it became the basis of official US policy on the matter during the Harrison 
administration.  Less than four months after taking office, Harrison appointed Samuel 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 33. 
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Dana Horton himself as special envoy to Europe on the question of international 
bimetallism.  Sounding out European officials and remaining in constant contact was the 
first part of the strategy Horton had outlined.  With the United States paying his way, 
Horton took up residence in London and began renewing his associations and 
acquaintances in European society.  This was not difficult for the entrepreneurial Horton, 
who had spent as much of his adult life in Europe as he had in his native Ohio.  Like his 
friend Henry James, Horton had developed a great affinity for London society.  He 
returned to the Athenaeum Club, where he met and exchanged letters with prominent 
men of affairs, including Sir Charles Fremantle, Master of the Royal Mint, and William 
Gladstone, then opposition leader in Parliament, among others.19  From this vantage 
point, Horton awaited new signs of European readiness to negotiate on the question of 
silver currency. 
  
                                                 
19 See, for example, William E. Gladstone to Samuel Dana Horton, 22 December 1889, box 1, folder 1, 
Lydiard Horton Papers (hereafter LHP), Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. See also 
Sir Charles Fremantle to Samuel Dana Horton, 24 July 1889, LHP. 
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Toward a New Monetary Conference 
 
[England] sympathized with the South during the Civil War in order to weaken the 
Union.  They are doing the same now with their insistence on the gold standard.20  
– Edwards Pierrepont, 1887 
 
Anti-British sentiments like these were, to be sure, common currency in American 
politics during the late nineteenth century.  While the utterances of Edwards Pierrepont, 
the former Attorney General to Grant, represented a clear example of the idea of Britain 
in the American political imagination, they increasingly differed from the real state of 
affairs emerging on the question of an international monetary agreement.  It was certainly 
true that Great Britain remained the leading financial power in the global economy and 
remained ideologically wedded to the gold standard as a powerful signifier of British 
wealth and supremacy.  This was especially true among Liberal Party elites, who had 
presided over the incredible economic expansion of Britain between 1846 and 1873.   
Yet even before Harrison’s electoral victory in the United States returned 
American advocates of international bimetallism to power, signs of change were 
developing on the other side of the Atlantic.  In Britain, the long depression of 
commercial activity continued and commodity prices continued to decline, destabilizing 
the bipartisan consensus regarding national economic policies on imperial preference, 
                                                 
20 New York Times, 27 December 1887. 
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free trade, and the gold standard.  British manufacturing interests, for example, faced 
diminishing sales and growing indebtedness.  In response, they began campaigning for 
bimetallism as a means of relieving the burden of gold denominated debts.  One leading 
textile magnate argued for bimetallism on just such grounds: “The capitalist class can be 
divided into the fixed investment class and the industrial capitalist,” he said.  “Whereas 
the former gains by every fall in prices, the latter suffers.”21 Agitation also surfaced in the 
imperial polity.  In British India, where the value of the silver rupee declined against 
gold, officials worried about the increasing difficulty of paying gold-denominated debts 
to London. Most British officials in India saw international bimetallism as the best 
solution these monetary problems.  As Sir Guilford Molesworth, delegate from British 
India, remarked: “The only satisfactory solution [to these monetary problems] would be 
international bimetallism in which India would join with the Latin Union and the United 
States.”22  These examples suggest that the breakout of bimetallism in the late 1880s 
represented a deepening struggle between debtor and creditor classes in Britain.23   
British politician Arthur J. Balfour concluded that “Lancashire was in favor of 
[bimetallism] but the City people were against it.”24  While this growing split between 
debtors and creditors was certainly a large part of rising support for bimetallism—that 
support also turned on a distinct division emerging within the creditor class itself. 
                                                 
21 British cotton magnate J.C. Fielden quoted in E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, 
Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914, New edition (London: Routledge, 1996), 
44. 
22 Los Angeles Times, 14 December 1892. 
23 E.H.H. Green emphasizes this point in his interpretation of domestic politics. 
24 Arthur J. Balfour to Robert Todd Lincoln quoted in Lincoln to James G. Blaine, 4 February 1892, series 
1, reel 34, Benjamin Harrison Papers microfilm copy (hereafter, BHP), LOC. 
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The most important changes in Britain were the emerging signs of new openness 
to the rehabilitation of silver currency at the highest official levels.  The return to power 
of the Conservative Party in 1886 set the stage for a potential shift in official policy.  Like 
the Republican Party in the United States, Britain’s Conservative Party had become the 
natural home of bimetallism, representing the country interests and incorporating the 
interests of Liberal Unionists exhausted by the Gladstonian program.  In the new 
Salisbury government, George J. Goschen was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
1887.  Goschen, as discussed in prior chapters, was already sympathetic to the 
rehabilitation of silver currency.  In the early 1880s, he had given the most widely 
discussed public address against the gold standard made in Britain.  His speech outlining 
the increasing difficulty of monetary operations under the gold standard can be viewed in 
political terms—as declaration of opposition to the Gladstone government, which 
remained staunchly in favor of the gold standard.   
Yet it also signaled the beginning of an important split among the investment 
bankers of Lombard Street.  Goschen was himself a banker and a partner at a smaller firm 
in the City of London, a position that provided his entrance into politics.  During the 
1880s, Goschen was joined by a number of eminent financial figures of the City, who 
like Goschen made the argument for the renewed use of silver currency on the grounds 
that it would increase the monetary base that acted as reserves for the largest financial 
institutions and facilitated all exchanges in the economy.  The emerging splits among 
British creditors and the ascendancy of Goschen to a position of policymaking power 
were the most important signs of change to American observers.    
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The first sign that British actions on the question of silver currency might match 
earlier rhetoric came in late 1889.   As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Goschen began 
removing gold half sovereigns from circulation and replacing them with silver coins.25  
By the following year Goschen, having reached the statutory limits of his power, began 
advocating for the replacement of all pound sterling gold coins with paper notes, an idea 
which startled many of the gold standard stalwarts in finance.  Observing the actions of 
the Exchequer, one prominent banker confided: “Whatever Mr. Goschen may have to 
say, this operation [represents] submission to bimetallism.”26  While City bankers were 
divided on the actions of the Exchequer, Americans interested in international 
bimetallism saw these steps as clear evidence of the problems posed by gold scarcity 
under the gold standard and as a sign that the British government may yet be willing to 
embrace a diplomatic agreement on silver currency.   
New signs outside Britain in 1889 also seemed to favor the possibility of a new 
diplomatic opening.  During the Exposition Universelle in Paris that summer, French 
officials spoke on the importance of silver currency to the future health of the global 
economy to a gathering of foreign officials.27  In addition, France had recently renewed 
the Latin Union treaty, which observers viewed as yet another sign of French 
commitment to an international monetary agreement.28  In the United States, the new 
Congress gathered in Washington that December. The Republican Party controlled 
                                                 
25 New York Times, 29 November 1889. 
26 Alphonse de Rothschild to NMR & Sons, 31 January 1891, T File Extracts, box 22, folder 1, Business 
Records, RA. 
27 New York Times, 12 September 1889 
28 See, for details, Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1901). 
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Congress and the White House and had made it clear in the press that some 
accommodation on silver would be part of the upcoming legislative agenda.   
These political and policy developments on both sides of the Atlantic fostered a 
steady increase in the price of silver in world money markets.  As one financial journal 
reported that November, “Since May last the price of silver has risen.  The general 
feeling of the market too is that its advance will continue.”29   This trend marked an 
enormous swing from the near constant decline in the price of silver since the early 
1870s.  According to the report of the US Geological Survey in 1889, silver had fallen 26 
percent before the upswing that began in 1889.30  The improving price of silver against 
gold was likely driven by increased demand for silver in Britain and by the anticipated 
increase in demand for silver in the United States.  Some of the rise may have been 
driven by speculators, but the result, nevertheless, was to push the price of silver in terms 
of gold back toward a ratio that made an international monetary agreement a more likely 
possibility.   
If these signals were positive, they were modest tremors in an economic world 
defined by the British gold standard.  What advocates of international bimetallism needed 
was something on the scale of a tectonic shift—which they got in late 1890 and early 
1891 with the near collapse of Baring Brothers of London.  In the wake of the Baring 
crisis, the case for the expanded use of silver currency and for the bimetallic standard, in 
particular, gained new ground in Britain.  William Lidderdale, Governor of the Bank of 
                                                 
29 New York Times, 29 November 1889. 
30 Annual Report of the United States Geological Survey, 1889 (Washington: GPO, 1889), 55. 
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England during the crisis, became a convert to the bimetallic standard for Britain and for 
international bimetallism.  Exchequer Goschen, without specifying policy changed gave 
public signal of openness to changing official monetary policy in 1891.  In private, 
discussions with US representatives that would lead to British participation in a new 
monetary conference had also begun.31   This process culminated in January 1892, when 
Chancellor Goschen publically communicated British support for a new monetary 
conference sponsored by the United States. 
The Harrison administration moved quickly to take advantage of the new opening 
with Britain, issuing its first instructions on a proposed conference to US Minister to 
Britain, Robert Todd Lincoln, on 11 January 1892.32  In the following months, 
correspondence between Lincoln and Secretary of States James G. Blaine showed the 
extent of the new openness to silver diplomacy on the part of the Salisbury government in 
Britain.  Goschen, as Exchequer, helped shape the language of US invitations to France 
and Germany in ways that allowed the European powers to participate without damaging 
the delicate political position of those governments at home.33  Prime Minister Salisbury 
himself confessed to Lincoln his personal agreement with the idea of bimetallic reform, 
though he remained caution of the political consequences that might follow such a 
dramatic policy change.34  Despite these reservations, Salisbury appointed Goschen, the 
member of his cabinet most supportive of silver currency, to lead the private negotiations 
                                                 
31 Horton reported these details to Washington.  Samuel Dana Horton to James G. Blaine, 18 May 1891, 
RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, 15 May to 27 June 1891 (microfilm copy),  reel 
114, NARA. 
32 Lincoln to Blaine, 4 February 1892, series 1, reel 34, BHP, LOC. 
33 Lincoln to Blaine, 16 February 1892, series 1, reel 34, BHP, LOC. 
34 Related in Lincoln to Blaine, 4 February 1892, series 1, reel 34, BHP, LOC. 
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unfolding between Britain and the United States.  Throughout early 1892, Goschen 
played a key role in advising representatives of the United States.  In February, banker 
August Belmont of New York wrote to N.M. Rothschild of London with news that the 
new US Treasury Secretary, Charles W. Foster, had sailed for England for confidential 
meetings with Goschen.35  Taken together, these developments represent signs not only 
of new British openness on an international monetary agreement but active coordination 
with the United States to bring about a diplomatic conference for that purpose. 
As a result, in May 1892, formal invitations were issued by the United States for a 
new monetary conference.  Britain officially accepted the invitation first.  As the most 
influential monetary power, Britain with its acceptance set in motion a flurry of 
diplomatic communications to bring the other powers to the negotiating table.  US 
Minister to France, Henry Vignaud, reported from Paris that the French government, 
through Finance Minister Rouvier, had expressed a qualified interest in a new conference. 
“Mr. Rouvier plainly indicated that the action of France would be in conformity with that 
of England.”36  This contingent willingness to move on the question of monetary 
coordination by treaty was echoed throughout the correspondence between US Ministers 
across Europe and the State Department during the summer of 1892.  To be sure, 
European powers were feeling the strains of global monetary conditions to differing 
degrees.  Those that held sufficient reserves and whose currency operations at home 
remained stable were certainly less enthusiastic than Britain. Nevertheless, if Britain was 
                                                 
35 Secretary William Windom died in office in January 1891, Foster was appointed the same month.  For 
details of Foster’s departure, see August Belmont to NMR & Sons, 23 February 1892, box 55, folder 3, 
Business Records, RA. 
36 Henry Vignaud to Blaine, 2 June 1892, series 1, reel 35, BHP, LOC. 
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willing to alter its policy, it appeared that much of Europe would follow suit.  By July, 
Brussels had been chosen as the host city for the new conference and invitations were 
accepted by the leading European states. 
Samuel Dana Horton had advised the Harrison administration to await 
developments in Europe before setting forth on a new diplomatic campaign to establish 
international bimetallism.  In 1891 and 1892, that opening emerged, especially in Britain 
following the Baring crisis.  The changing international playing field, however, was not 
the only motive driving the government of the United States to pursue an international 
monetary agreement.  As Harrison entered the presidential campaign year, he touted the 
positive economic conditions that emerged domestically following the landmark 
Republican legislation that increased tariffs and more than doubled government silver 
purchases in 1890.  “It cannot be denied that all the conditions of prosperity and of 
general contentment are present in a larger degree than ever before in our history,” he 
reported to the American people in December 1891.37   
Still, the positive economic statistics outlined in his annual message glossed over 
the structural economic problems beneath the positive totals.  The McKinley Tariff, the 
most protectionist trade legislation in American history to that moment, shielded 
domestic industries from foreign competition and boosted bottom lines, but it also 
seemed to many Americans as the hand-maiden to monopoly power in the American 
economy.  The tariff did protect industrial sectors, but as each sector of industry became 
                                                 
37 Harrison made these comments in his annual message of 1891 See James D. Richardson, ed., Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents,1789-1897, vol. 9 (Washington: GPO, 1899).  
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increasingly monopolized by individual corporations, protectionist trade laws seemed to 
benefit individual industrial magnates.  The Republican Party had become the “tariff-trust 
party” in a “tariff and trust-ridden land,” according to some opponents.38 
The difficulty for President Harrison was that the new tariff law, which seemed to 
give industrialists and investors all they wanted, stood in stark contrast to the Silver 
Purchase Act of 1890, which appeared as a half-measure that failed to provide any relief 
for the agricultural producers of the American Midwest and Far West, who faced falling 
prices and increasing debts.  By the beginning of the campaign year, it was clear that 
Harrison needed something tangible to win back agricultural regions and their 
representatives.  He confidentially discussed the potential benefits of new international 
monetary diplomacy on his electoral chances at home.39  Harrison also turned his focus 
toward the rehabilitation of silver currency by international agreement because the 
continuing drain of gold away from the United States placed pressure on the reserves 
necessary to pay government obligations in gold.  Especially following the sweeping 
Republican defeats in the midterm elections of 1890, which gave control of the Congress 
to the Democratic Party, the diplomatic initiative offered the opportunity to regain 
support in the West and relieve the problems created by the continued export of gold. 
 
  
                                                 
38 J.S. Moore, “Letter to the Editor,” New York Times, 12 March 1888. 
39 Blaine to Harrison, 21 April 1892, series 1, reel 1, BHP, LOC. 
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The Conference Convenes 
 
With all the arrangements made over the course of the summer, delegates to the 
Brussels Conference finally gathered during the last week of November 1892.  President 
Benjamin Harrison had hoped his efforts to secure an international monetary agreement 
might boost his electoral chances at home.  With so many delays, however, the 
conference arrived too late to change his political fortunes in the presidential contest.  
Democrat Grover Cleveland had been elected over Harrison earlier that month, casting 
uncertainty over any initiatives that the Harrison administration pursued in the interim.   
In Brussels, American efforts were made more difficult by the political transition 
at home and changes in the politics and geopolitics of Europe since invitations to the 
conference had been accepted earlier that year.  Though an emerging alignment of US 
and British interests on an international monetary agreement had triggered the 
conference, other factors remained serious obstacles to any potential agreement in 
Brussels, including the intensifying economic nationalism marked by policies of 
protectionism and imperialism, the defeat of the Conservative Party in Britain, and the 
general destabilization of the balance of power in Europe.   
The rise of economic nationalism among the great commercial powers remained a 
significant obstacle to international cooperation on the monetary question.  In the decade 
since the last attempt to establish an international agreement on the use of silver currency, 
Europe economic relations had been marked by real and threatened trade wars, between 
Germany and Austria, France and Italy, and Britain and France, among others.  The 
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passage of the McKinley Tariff in the United States was only the most recent data point 
in a trend toward national self-sufficiency and away from an open international economy.  
This turn toward protectionism—and toward imperialism—rested partly on domestic 
economic hardships and attempts by ruling elites to manage the cyclical nature of laissez-
faire capitalism during a period of rapid globalization.  In many cases, advocates of an 
international agreement on silver currency saw a potential treaty as a means to relieve 
global deflationary pressures and to rescue the commercial world from the path of 
economic nationalism.  Economic conditions imposed by the gold standard, according to 
one contemporary, was extinguishing “that noble ideal from which a harmony of interests 
among nations should spring—free trade.”40 
If economic nationalism presented an obstacle, it was certainly not 
insurmountable.  After all, the expansion of trade which was the promise held out by 
international monetary stability remained a powerful inducement to cooperation.  A more 
immediate source of difficulty came with the unexpected defeat of the Salisbury 
government in Britain and the return to Liberal Party rule in August 1892.  The 
Conservative Party had received a plurality of votes but was unable to form a majority 
and subsequently did not survive a no-confidence vote in Parliament.  The results 
returned Gladstone to power as head of a coalition government.41  The implications for 
the emerging alignment of US and British interests on the silver question were hard to 
overstate.  Goschen, the driver of Britain’s conciliatory policy, was removed from power.  
                                                 
40 Emile de Laveleye, “The Economic Crisis and Its Causes,” Contemporary Review 49 (May 1886): 621–
637. 
41 For details, see Green, The Crisis of Conservatism. 
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Prior to the election, the Salisbury government had appointed British delegates to the 
Brussels Conference with clear sympathies favoring monetary compromise.  The 
Gladstone government added gold standard stalwart Bertram Currie as delegate in the 
weeks before the conference.  The result in Brussels was a British delegation often 
divided against itsekf in the negotiations of the conference. 
Among the multiple interlocking obstacles that faced the United States and others 
interested in an international monetary agreement was the new outlook of France.  
France, as leader of the Latin Monetary Union, held enormous sway over the conference 
because it could influence the votes of fellow Latin Union countries, including Belgium, 
Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Greece.  Therefore, France, more than any other single 
country controlled the fate of the Brussels Conference.  Even before the conference began 
there were signs France, though it maintained a de jure bimetallic standard, was inclined 
toward an international agreement as it had been as recently as 1889.  Part of French 
reluctance at Brussels rested on the changed conditions of domestic monetary operations.  
France had been one of the largest purchasers of gold on the open market in recent years.  
Between 1890 and 1892, the Bank of France increased its holdings in gold from 1.12 
billion francs to 1.71 billion francs, numbers which dwarfed the holdings of the Bank of 
England at the same time.42  Therefore the French government was not under the same 
kind of monetary pressures as Britain and the United States.  Nevertheless, France 
                                                 
42 “Bimetallism in Europe and India,” Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register 47, no. 11, (May 1893): 
849. 
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remained the largest European holder of silver and therefore had evident reason to 
cooperate in Brussels.   
For further motives for the change in the French position, non-economic factors 
should be considered.  Foremost among these was the growing geopolitical tensions 
between France and Britain over the British occupation of Egypt.   The French had been 
the largest holder of Suez Canal shares outside the Egyptian government until Britain 
purchased the Egyptian shares in 1878.  The subsequent Anglo-French commission that 
supervised the refinance of Egyptian debt became a locus of contention between the 
European powers, as influence over Egyptian affairs tilted toward Great Britain.  These 
tensions only increased after 1882, when Britain invaded Egypt in response to the 
nationalist uprisings led by Urabi.  Britain, in the years that followed, sought to extend its 
influence southward beyond Alexandria and Cairo and into the Sudan.43  These military 
campaigns to extend Anglo-Egyptian control threatened French claims in the region and 
the ambitions of French imperialists to unite their East African and West African 
colonies.  Five years before French and British forces clashed at Fashoda over these exact 
concerns, France was already concerned with British expansionism in the region and 
wary of cooperation with Britain elsewhere.  At the Brussels Conference, these factors 
combined to place France in opposition to Britain and the United States. 
 
                                                 
43 For details, see A. G. Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of 
Egypt, 1882,” Journal of African History, 27, (1986): 363-391. 
  212 
The Rothschild Compromise 
 
In reports to the State Department, Senator William B. Allison, the leader of the 
US delegation at Brussels, confessed that proposals for international bimetallism were 
meeting with less enthusiasm than expected.  “Upon our arrival,” he reported, “we found 
a sentiment among the delegates from other countries somewhat opposed to [our] views 
on the subject.”44  The Senator from Iowa, then age 63, was a respected Republican voice 
on financial questions as well as one of the original sponsors of US diplomatic efforts to 
establish international bimetallism in 1878.   Allison, even before his arrival in Brussels, 
understood that true international bimetallism was not possible.  During the first meetings 
of the conference, he therefore sought to probe the European representatives on what they 
would be willing to do for silver currency.   A number of European plans were debated in 
initial meetings.  The conference passed a motion to send these competing plans to a sub-
committee for recommendation to the conference.  In committee, Allison hoped to get 
European votes on the table so that the United States could quickly agree to the most 
popular European plan.  There were clear obstacles to international bimetallism pure et 
simple, yet there were also distinct incentives for cooperation at work in Brussels, given 
the effect of long term trends in the world price of silver.  As one delegate suggested, “If 
silver is absolutely smashed [by the conference], it would practically become unsalable 
and there would be such a panic as never was seen.”45 
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The debate over the use of silver currency did not begin in earnest until the fourth 
session of the Brussels Conference.  Allison had held back the proposals outlined in his 
official instructions, knowing of European reluctance to discuss an international 
bimetallic agreement.  Without a US plan as the basis for discussion, a wide-ranging 
debate over the fall of silver prices and the merits of an international bimetallic standard 
began.  One delegate described these initial talks as a reign of confusion:  “Vacillation on 
the part of the Americans, total ignorance of the question on the part of the accredited 
ministers of the great powers, [and] a wicked desire for some to smash up the conference 
at once.”46  In the fourth session, to avoid further confusion, Russia and Spain motioned 
to send the few plans that had generated some positive discussion to committee for 
recommendation. 
Among the number of plans introduced, the compromise program authored by 
Alfred de Rothschild of Britain was most well-received.  Alfred de Rothschild was well-
regarded among the social and political elites of Britain, both as a financial expert and an 
upholder of British interests.  He was a partner at N.M. Rothschild and Company, the 
London investment bank made famous and wealthy by his grandfather’s efforts in 
financing the British campaign against Napoleon.47  Regarding the monetary question, 
Rothschild remained a supporter of the gold standard.  Yet he was also openly aligned 
with many of the arguments put forward by bimetallists regarding the difficulties posed 
to monetary operations by gold scarcity created by increasing demand for gold.  These 
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positions were likely behind his appointment as a delegate by Goschen, who shared 
similar views.  In Brussels, his proposal emerged in committee as the most discussed and 
most likely to gain traction with the wider conference.  It did so because it represented a 
modest accommodation to silver interests—and because it offered a way to increase the 
price of silver against gold without altering current monetary standards in the various 
countries.  Foremost, the proposal was offered by Britain, which meant that for the first 
time, the most persistent opponent of an international monetary agreement was now on 
the side of reform.   
The details of the Rothschild proposal were very straightforward.  In essence, it 
proposed an international agreement for silver purchases—a kind of global version of the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 enacted in the United States.  Under the terms 
negotiated by the sub-committee, the proposal consisted of three parts: 1) the purchase by 
the European states of 30 million ounces of silver per year, 2) the continuation by United 
States of current purchases of 54 million ounces per year, and 3) the continuation of the 
free coinage of silver in India and Mexico.48  The plan was a compromise scheme that 
balanced the understanding that Britain under the Gladstone government would not alter 
the domestic gold standard with the clear need to rehabilitate the use of silver currency 
worldwide.  As a banker and not a politician, Rothschild understood the economic 
difficulties posed by the gold standard under conditions of increased demand for gold.  
Rothschild confided privately: “The right policy for England to pursue is to be very 
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courteous to the Americans and, whilst opposing [international bimetallism], strain every 
nerve in favor of silver.”49 
In Committee, the Rothschild proposal had supporters and detractors.  Britain, the 
United States, Mexico, Spain, and British India clearly favored the plan.  The alignment 
of the United States and Britain remained intact.  US delegate Henry W. Cannon, 
president of Chase National Bank of New York, supported the Rothschild proposal.  The 
plan drew complaints, however, from both ardent defenders of the gold standard and 
advocates of the bimetallic standard alike.  The Belgian bimetallist Alphonse Allard saw 
the Rothschild plan as a half measure that would not change the declining price of 
silver.50   France, in the end, was the largest opponent of the Rothschild plan, perhaps 
because it was most likely to succeed among the various proposals.  In his notes, 
Rothschild described the actions of France as “hostile” and “obstinate” in committee 
negotiations.51  The official British report on the proceedings later recorded that “Mr. 
Tirard [of France], from the outset, was disposed to criticism rather than cordial 
cooperation.”  Ten days after the conference opened, the sub-committee charged with 
assessing the various proposals voted on whether to recommend the Rothschild plan to 
the conference.  The results showed the power of French intransigence.  “The committee 
declares that the plan of M. de Rothschild is worthy of discussion, but declined on a vote 
of 7 to 6 to recommend the adoption of the plan,” one newspaper reported.52  Four of the 
                                                 
49 Alfred Rothschild to NMR & Sons, 23 November 1892, box 442, folder 8, Business Records, RA. 
50 International Monetary Conference, 94. 
51 Alfred Rothschild to NMR & Sons, 30 November 1892, box 442, folder 8, Business Records, RA. 
52 New York Times, 3 December 1892. 
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votes against recommendation came from countries of the Latin Monetary Union who 
were subject to the influence of France.  The Rothschild proposal returned to the 
conference for discussion but had been irrevocably injured by the compromise vote of the 
committee.  On 8 December, 1892, the Rothschild plan was withdrawn from 
consideration, effectively halting efforts to reach a monetary compromise. 
The vote on the Rothschild proposal for an international silver purchase 
agreement—and the success of the Brussels Conference, as a whole—turned on the 
question of French cooperation.  There was little doubt that Britain was sincere in its 
proposal.  In back channel diplomacy, Alfred Rothschild induced his French cousin 
Alphonse to lobby the French Cabinet as the conference sat in Brussels.53  Sir William 
Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the new Gladstone government, had 
indicated his support for such a compromise in a letter to British delegate Charles 
Fremantle.54  Likewise, Senator Allison of the United States appeared ready to accept the 
outlines of the proposal despite some sentiment among US delegates that Americans were 
asked to bear the larger portion of the burden for rescuing silver.  Allison later 
commented that the US delegation had been “ ready to consider any just plan for the 
enlarged use of silver.”55  French intransigence, in the end, foreclosed any chance that an 
international agreement might emerge from Brussels.  “Mr. Tirard states once and for all 
that France is against bimetallism,” reported Rothschild privately.   
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Why did France, the key ally of the United States in previous efforts to establish 
an international monetary agreement, move into whole-hearted opposition by 1892?  
Previous interpretations have emphasized the changed monetary conditions in 1892.  
Despite the increased demand for gold, France had accumulated substantial gold reserves.  
Journalist Henry B. Russell, at the time, reasoned that these changed conditions were at 
the heart of French obstructionism.  “The most unfortunate circumstance of all was the 
change in gold holdings…  [In 1881,] the United States appeared at the conference as a 
large holder of the coveted metal and Europe had been troubled by low reserves.  [In 
1892,] the situation was reversed.”56  While increased French gold reserves removed 
some of the urgency for international cooperation, guaranteed silver purchases by the 
leading economies as proposed in the Rothschild plan would still provide clear economic 
benefits to France, which remained the largest holder of silver in Europe.  Ongoing 
geopolitical tensions with Britain and the domestic politics related to these tensions, in 
particular, add dimension to the roots of French obstructionism.  Senator Allison himself 
seemed to reach this conclusion.  On returning to the United States, he said that “political 
rather than commercial causes” had contributed to the obstacles confronted at Brussels.57  
This explanation certainly included the problems posed by changed governments in 
London and Washington.  Yet it also included the growing geopolitical tensions between 
France and Great Britain over imperial ambitions in Africa.   
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For France and Britain, there were good reasons to reinforce colonial beachheads 
in Africa.  Speaking of the economic implications, one leading French banker confided 
that “gold, until now, [has been] taken out of circulation and therefore cannot be 
employed in international markets…  The news from Mr. Rhodes regarding the Transvaal 
is most gratifying—the development of gold mines of the Cape [are] a very important 
fact for all of the commercial world. ”58  The riches of Africa seemed ripe for European 
extraction, as the age of new imperialism proceeded the question was whether Africa 
would be united on a North-South axis under British influence or an East-West axis under 
French influence. 
Confronted with French obstruction, Alfred Rothschild withdrew his proposal 
from discussion at Brussels.  Deliberations continued for several days without result.  At 
the tenth session, a motion to adjourn the Brussels Conference until May 1893 was 
passed.  The clear shift toward accommodation by Britain meant little without some 
coordination with France or Germany.  Senator Allison understood that Europe was not 
ready to come around to true international bimetallism.  Nevertheless, he remained 
optimistic that treasury officials and financial experts in the capitals of Europe could 
convince their respective governments before May that something like an international 
silver purchase agreement benefitted them economically and geopolitically.  On 17 
December 1892, the delegates to Brussels Conference departed.  The international 
meeting had been inconclusive.  However, it was far from inconsequential. 
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Conclusion 
 
The news of the failure to of the Brussels Conference to produce an anticipated 
agreement on silver contributed to an ongoing atmosphere of uncertainty in global 
financial markets during early 1893.  Alfred Rothschild predicted that the failure to 
produce a diplomatic agreement for the expanded use of silver would produce “a panic as 
never was seen, especially as regards to the scramble for gold.”59  In May 1893, President 
Cleveland decided against reconvening the conference.  With expectations for increased 
silver demand removed, the price of silver in world markets resumed its downward trend.  
In addition, European governments resumed gold purchases and the Bank of England 
raised its discount rate in response.  Both developments signaled tightening credit 
markets and approaching difficulties for global financial markets to many observers.  In 
his warning to markets, Moreton Frewen, the British economic journalist, emphasized 
increasing debt burdens imposed by ongoing deflation.  “Prices in Egypt [are] lower by 
one-half than they were fifteen years since, [doubling] the burden of Egyptian debt…  In 
Germany, the growth of agrarianism, anti-Semitism, and socialism [resulted] from the 
[same] fall in prices.”60  
The failure to reach an agreement at Brussels had a particularly adverse impact in 
the United States, producing uncertainty on Wall Street.  The recent election had 
transferred the government to the Democratic Party.  President Cleveland had a sterling 
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reputation on the currency question, in the minds of financial conservatives in American 
business.  He had proven less reliable, however, on the question of the tariff.   High 
tariffs had long insulated American firms and their investors from dreaded competition.  
Protectionism was enshrined as Republican Party policy.  The victory of Democratic 
Party, however, meant that downward revisions to US tariffs were likely to be legislated 
in the next Congress, threatening the advantages in the home market enjoyed by 
American firms.   In addition, as in England, the export of gold through foreign purchases 
continued downward pressure on national gold reserves.  By May, American financial 
journals were reporting that “the scarcity [of gold] is an accomplished fact.”61  In June, 
after the government of British India announced the initial steps toward establishing the 
gold standard there, President Cleveland called Congress into special session to repeal the 
laws requiring government silver purchases.  The repeal was passed into law that 
November, though not in time to prevent a financial collapse on Wall Street.  The Panic 
of 1893 resulted in the deepest economic downturn in the United States before the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.  Mass unemployment created untold suffering.  For propertied 
conservatives, it also raised the specter of radicalism and social unrest.  Looking at the 
bleak situation, Frewen concluded: “Had the Brussels Conference last November resulted 
in making silver legal tender [internationally], prices now everywhere collapsing would 
already have rallied and no such catastrophe as the present would have occurred.”62 
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 Between 1889 and 1893 the idea of international bimetallism again moved to the 
center of world politics.  In this process, the United States succeeded finally in moving 
Britain toward some international agreement on silver.  Britain had not only moved on 
the substance of the issue but also used its diplomatic influence to bring the continental 
powers to the negotiating table in Brussels.  These changes resulted from difficulties 
raised by new gold purchases in Europe and also from the official and unofficial efforts 
of bimetallic advocates on both sides of the Atlantic. For champions of international 
bimetallism, there must have been some irony in witnessing the outcome at Brussels.  
Britain had moved toward the United States, offering a modest but realistic plan for a 
coordinated silver purchases.  France, unfortunately, had moved in the opposite direction.  
Evidence suggests that the French position at Brussels emerged more from non-economic 
factors than from economic ones.  France, as the largest holder of silver in Europe, still 
had a clear material interest in raising the price of silver.  In addition, in France there 
were no ideological obstacles toward bimetallism in official circles.  France under the 
Carnot government, at that moment, had little interest in relieving the monetary 
difficulties of its apparent geopolitical rivals.  By 1893, Britain appeared as a growing 
obstacle to French ambitions in Africa.  Germany had become more assertive in its 
foreign policy, raising traditional French security concerns in Europe.  Only 3 months 
prior to the Brussels Conference, France had entered into a mutual defense alliance with 
Russia to address the potential German threat.63  The US effort to reach an international 
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agreement on silver currency, despite some successes, was thus overwhelmed by the 
pressing uncertainties of great power politics unfolding in Europe. 
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Chapter 5: Reunion of Financial Conservatives: International 
Bimetallism and Anglo-American Rapprochement, 1893-1900 
 
Introduction 
 
Immense quantities of British capital are awaiting investment in the United States as 
soon as confidence should be restored in our monetary standard. 
New York Times, 18951   
 
On 4 March 1897, under a cloudless sky in Washington, William McKinley 
addressed the nation as president for the first time.  Though the mood in the capital was 
jubilant, a deeper sense of anxiety rooted in the ongoing economic depression persisted 
across the country.  If the decade of the 1890s represented a watershed of American 
history, as Henry Steele Commager observed, the election of 1896, which elevated 
McKinley to the presidency, was its highest point.2  Financial collapse and recession had 
divided Americans into rival political, economic, and ideological camps more distinctly 
than at any time since the Civil War.  On one side, agricultural producers of the American 
West and South looked to the past, sounding themes of national economic independence 
that in many ways echoed the era of Jackson.  On the other side, the industrial and 
financial forces that would define the future argued not for economic independence but 
rather for the return of national prosperity within the framework of an increasingly global 
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economy.  When the election returns were counted, the cry of prosperity trumped the cry 
of independence.    
The McKinley victory, in policy terms, signaled higher tariffs, trade reciprocity, 
and sound currency.  Yet it also represented the affirmation of historic transatlantic 
commercial and financial relations between the United States and Britain following a 
period of uncertainty.  His election was celebrated with as much enthusiasm in London as 
it was in Republican strongholds in the United States.  British observers tended to see his 
triumph in financial terms.  The London Times described an “exuberant sense of relief” in 
the City.  “The most satisfactory thing is the crushing blow which the result strikes the 
cause of confiscation the world over,” added another London journal.3  They celebrated 
the downfall of McKinley’s opponent, William Jennings Bryan, in particular.  “Mr. 
Bryan assailed the foundations of commerce and the commercial community has given 
him his just reward.”  As these sentiments implied, the election of McKinley signaled not 
only the return of Republican policies at home but also the restoration of transatlantic 
economic relations abroad. 
If the new president shared the deep sense of satisfaction expressed by his British 
admirers he kept his feelings closely guarded.  In his inaugural address, McKinley instead 
displayed a sober and conciliatory temperament while outlining his agenda.  On the 
currency question, which had dominated the recent campaign, he called for sound money 
and not for the establishment of the gold standard, as his British admirers hoped (and his 
                                                 
3 “Foreign Views of the Election,” The Independent, 12 November 1896. 
  225 
domestic opponents feared) he would.4  His speech argued rather for a sound and stable 
currency aided by the establishment of international bimetallism.  Other than the tariff, no 
topic received more prominent attention in his speech.  McKinley, like his Republican 
predecessors, advocated international bimetallism not for political expediency but 
because it promised a broader and more stable currency base while avoiding the dangers 
to transatlantic trade and investment posed by free silver.  “The question of international 
bimetallism will have early and honest attention,” declared the new president.  “It will be 
my constant endeavor to secure it by cooperation with the other great commercial powers 
of the world.”5  As he took office, the plain-spoken and policy-minded McKinley sought 
to keep this promise, working to secure an international monetary agreement that 
provided relief from the deflationary pressures of the gold standard while maintaining a 
US currency that provided the basis for trade and investment.   
The monetary diplomacy of the McKinley administration represented the 
culmination of a period of renewed interest in bimetallism on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Between 1893 and 1897, the idea of international bimetallism experienced a remarkable 
resurrection.  Defenders of the gold standard had celebrated its apparent demise with the 
failure of the Brussels Conference of 1892.  “It is useless to attempt to bring about a 
universal [bimetallic] agreement,” wrote London’s Saturday Review. “Therefore we seem 
justified in assuming that the agitation will now gradually die out.”6  Yet, by early 1897, 
bimetallism again became one of the leading questions of great power diplomacy.  By 
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summer that year, governments in Europe had responded positively to US efforts to 
revive an international agreement.7  France supported the American diplomatic effort 
without reservation.  Germany committed to follow British policy on any proposed 
international agreement.  With these signs of new openness on the monetary question, the 
United States and Britain engaged in diplomatic negotiations at the highest levels in an 
effort to produce a monetary accord. 8   
There were good reasons for supporters of international bimetallism to be 
optimistic of some positive result.  In Britain, the preceding ten years had been marked 
by the transformation of the bimetallic cause from elite policy proposals supported 
mainly by the India Office and merchants tied to Indian trade into a broad political 
movement that included a nascent alliance between industry and agriculture within the 
Conservative Party legitimized by the growing intellectual consensus in favor of 
bimetallism among prominent English economists and central bankers.9  This process of 
transformation culminated with the triumph of the Conservative Party in the 1895 general 
election based in part on bimetallic support.  In March 1896, the new Conservative Party 
majority in Parliament overwhelmingly passed a bimetallic resolution, urging the 
Salisbury government to pursue an international monetary agreement.   
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These developments in Britain, along with the restoration of Republican Party 
rule in the United States, meant that, on both sides of the Atlantic, the parties most 
sympathetic to international bimetallism held more power over policymaking than ever 
before.  As one report noted, “Never since 1873 have the prospects [for international 
bimetallism] been more hopeful.”10  Among policymakers in Europe and the United 
States, the renewed fall of silver and the remedy of international bimetallism again 
became urgent geopolitical questions.   
The revival of international bimetallism in Europe and the United States advanced 
in part because the monetary disturbances set in motion by the spread of the gold 
standard intensified during this period.  As early as 1893, monetary policy changes across 
the world fostered a renewed scarcity of gold reserves.  Austria-Hungary had recently 
committed to establishing the gold standard, Russia in just a few years accumulated more 
than $400 million in new gold reserves, and France between 1890 and spring 1893 had 
restored her depleted gold reserves to over 500 million francs.11   In addition, the recent 
near collapse of the London investment house Baring Brothers from speculative 
Argentine investments provided a worrying lesson about the scarcity of reserves under 
the gold standard and the dangers of under-capitalized institutions.12  These monetary 
developments, along with new geopolitical concerns regarding war between the great 
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powers, hastened the accumulation of gold by respective governments during the early 
1890s.   
Increased demand for monetary gold posed serious challenges to governments and 
capital markets alike, putting pressure on the reserves held by central banks and 
tightening credit.  For the United States, because it still operated without a central bank 
that could defend reserves by raising interest rates, this new demand was felt more 
acutely.  During this period, many allotments of gold were purchased from the United 
States, where, under the provisions of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the US Treasury 
purchased up to 4.5 million ounces of silver per month in exchange for gold.  European 
and American bankers alike took the opportunity to purchase gold from the United States.  
As early as spring 1893, these monetary policy developments worried even the most 
financially conservative observers.  The president of the Canadian Bank of Commerce 
exemplified these concerns: “The last few months has been a period of unusual anxiety 
throughout the financial world…  We are amazed at the slender basis upon which nations 
build enormous structures of credit.”13   
The renewed demands on world gold supplies had implications not only for 
central bankers and the system of international finance but also for producers who 
suffered from long-term deflationary pressures intensified by these monetary changes.  
From London, the Fortnightly Review declared, “With scarcely a single exception, all our 
correspondents speak of a fall in prices greater than that which can be attributed to the 
normal progress of industry…  It is contended that the depression of trade must be 
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ascribed to the appreciation of gold.”14  New demands on the world supply of monetary 
gold intensified ongoing deflationary pressures felt throughout the global economy.15 
Together, these global monetary changes affected all economies involved in 
global markets, but they posed particular problems in regions outside the centers of 
international finance.  In the United States, the increased demand for gold threatened the 
public credit of the government by reducing specie reserves to unprecedentedly low 
levels.  During the second Cleveland administration alone, four distinct bond sales were 
required to keep national gold reserves above $100 million – a level safe enough to 
ensure continued specie payments in gold.  These bond sales notably included the famous 
private bailout of the US Treasury by J.P. Morgan and a syndicate of European and 
American investment houses.16  Gold demand also raised interest rates and contributed to 
a retreat of foreign capital from Wall Street to the banking centers of London, Paris, and 
Berlin.  As early as December 1892, the New York Times noted the results: “The unusual 
efflux of gold from America [has] had a depressing effect on American railway 
[securities].”17   
By May 1893, these economic realities contributed to a new financial collapse on 
Wall Street and a return to depression economics at home and abroad.  “Our business 
interests are so large now,” wrote one banker, “that we cannot watch unconcerned the 
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troubles of other countries… In Italy we have seen an almost total failure of the banking 
system.  In Australia, the collapse has been almost as complete.”18  The return of 
economic depression and renewed gold scarcity focused the minds of interest groups, 
economists, and statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic, hastening a renewed campaign 
for international bimetallism between 1893 and 1897. 
The revival of international bimetallism in Europe during this period also rested 
on US diplomatic efforts and policy changes.  Between 1893 and 1897, the US effort to 
secure an international agreement progressed through the unofficial diplomacy of 
American bimetallic advocates.  The cause of international bimetallism had always been 
a Republican initiative.  With the loss of the White House to the Democratic Party in 
1892, Republican economists and publicists, including Francis A. Walker and Samuel 
Dana Horton, repeatedly traveled to London to speak on behalf of an international 
monetary agreement.  The cause of international bimetallism was also advanced in 
official circles.  Republican Senators led by John Sherman of Ohio and Edward O. 
Wolcott of Colorado kept bimetallic prospects alive.  They did so first by guiding the 
repeal of the 1890 Silver Purchase Act through the Senate, and later by fighting to place 
international bimetallism in the platform of the Republican Party in 1896.  These official 
and unofficial efforts seemed to reinforce one another.  By late 1896, bimetallism had 
reached unprecedented popularity in Britain, while similar association movements had 
organized bimetallists in Germany and France. 
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If economic recession and US initiatives expanded the transnational debate over 
monetary relations, the playing field on which bimetallic diplomacy proceeded was 
narrowed significantly during this period.  For gold-standard defenders and bimetallic 
advocates alike the series of monetary conferences in the two decades prior all failed to 
produce a practical monetary agreement.  Past conferences were routinely deprecated in 
the press as ineffectual debating societies.  There was a sense among US officials and 
advocates that direct negotiations with the leading commercial nation and gold standard 
power remained the only way forward.  “One important fact impressed me in my 
observations,” said one US monetary diplomat.  “The key to the whole situation lies with 
England.”19  Among Continental officials there was also agreement on this point by the 
mid-1890s.  Bimetallic France quickly fell into accord with the US diplomatic initiative 
and gold-standard Germany, in response to domestic bimetallic agitation, agreed to 
follow any steps toward monetary adjustment taken by Great Britain.20  While obstacles 
to an international agreement remained, the diplomatic variables had been considerably 
simplified by these developments. 
However, the potential advantages of simplified, bilateral negotiations were 
complicated by the contentious state of affairs that had emerged between Britain and the 
United States since 1893.  Hard times brought the simmering politics of creditor-debtor 
relations to a boil within the United States in ways that seemed to transcend national 
boundaries.  Debtors of the American West identified their misery not only with the wire-
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pullers on Wall Street but also with those at the center of global capitalism in Britain.21  
US monetary diplomacy was complicated further still by the British advance into 
contested territory between Venezuela and British Guiana and the ensuing Anglo-
American diplomatic crisis between 1894 and 1896.  Here, in the eyes of many 
Americans, was the second pincer of transatlantic subjugation, British imperialism.
 Looking at these developments through the lens of Victorian globalization under 
the international gold standard suggests that American sentiments toward British 
imperialism and toward British financial influence were not entirely unrelated. 22  Reports 
from Venezuela available in the United States at the time, and upon which President 
Cleveland based much of his outlook, indicated that British encroachment into the 
disputed territories had begun in earnest only after the discovery of tremendous gold 
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Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism and Finance, 1887-1938 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
  233 
deposits in the hinterlands surrounding the Orinoco River.23  As Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge observed in the North American Review, “The Practical result of the English 
aggression in Venezuela is plain enough.  They are directed at securing control of the 
Orinoco… and the rich [gold] mining district of the Yururi.”24   
Like Lodge, any astute observer of British foreign policy could see in outline the 
linkages between gold scarcity under the gold standard and British aggrandizement.25  In 
December 1895, the same month President Cleveland set forth his strident response to the 
British threat in Venezuela, British officials of the Cape Colony launched the Jameson 
Raid, a failed attempt to re-annex the Transvaal in Africa.  These actions in Africa, which 
led ultimately to the Second Boer War, were disclaimed by the British government.  
Nevertheless, the circumstances which set these events in motion appeared very similar 
to events unfolding in the Caribbean basin.  Enormous gold discoveries in the Transvaal 
in 1886 had set off a gold rush, drawing in many British colonials as prospectors and 
intensifying talk of re-annexation among the highest officials of Cape Colony.  For those 
contemporaries enmeshed in the currency debates that dominated American politics, one 
did not have to be an economic nationalist like Lodge, or a radical anti-imperialist, to 
readily draw the connection between the policies of creditor Britain and the actions of 
imperial Britain.  During the mid-1890s, these two faces of British power further 
complicated US efforts to establish international bimetallism.  
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Despite these obstacles, by early 1897, US efforts to reach an international 
monetary accord had been renewed.   President McKinley and Republican bimetallic 
advocates had reason for optimism since opinion – and votes – had moved so distinctly in 
the direction of bimetallism in Europe.  The election of the Conservative Party in Britain, 
the lynchpin nation in any monetary accord, was especially encouraging.  Even before the 
presidential inauguration, as early as December 1896, Republicans in Congress 
maneuvered to bring about that international agreement. 
The Revival of International Bimetallism in Britain 
 
In early 1893, the optimism expressed three years later by American bimetallic 
advocates and their British counterparts must have seemed a distant hope.  The Brussels 
Monetary Conference had adjourned without result the previous December, and gold-
standard stalwarts on both sides of the Atlantic celebrated the demise of international 
bimetallism.  What gold advocates failed to perceive, however, was that the defeat of 
bimetallic proposals at Brussels remained rhetorical triumphs alone.  The failure of the 
Brussels Conference, more significantly, left unresolved the ongoing real-world 
economic depression of trade, industry, and agriculture.  As Moreton Frewen wrote in 
London’s Fortnightly Review in June 1893, “Had the Brussels Conference last November 
resulted in making silver legal tender, I believe it is the opinion of every careful student 
of currency conditions, that prices now everywhere collapsing would already have rallied 
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and no such catastrophe as the present would have occurred.”26  Given these 
circumstances, the center of gravity in the bimetallic campaign shifted to Great Britain, 
where most bimetallic reformers agreed that policy change was key to any further 
progress.   
Between 1893 and 1895, to the surprise of many, the idea of international 
bimetallism witnessed an unprecedented burst of popular support and legitimacy in 
Britain.  During this period, it was transformed from proposals of a vocal minority to a 
well-organized, institutionalized political movement with the power to influence elections 
and Parliamentary action.  In the struggle for an international monetary agreement, many 
Britons themselves became intensely focused on modifying the monetary position of the 
British government.  This process of political mobilization culminated in the 1895 
election and formation of a Conservative Party government, with majorities in the 
Cabinet and in the House of Commons in favor of international bimetallism.  This 
reversal of bimetallic fortunes in Britain rested on a number of mutually reinforcing 
developments: the broad and ongoing economic distress felt in most sectors of the 
economy, the works of academic economists whose studies helped legitimize bimetallic 
arguments, and the growth and organization of bimetallic dissent under the Bimetallic 
League. 
Foremost among these was the broad and ongoing economic distress felt in most 
sectors of the economy.  One measure of the of depression in Britain was the number of 
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official inquiries established by Parliament to quell dissent and recommend policy during 
the late-1880s and early-1890s, including the Royal Commission on the Depression of 
Trade and Industry (1885), the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver (1886), the Indian 
Currency Commission (1893), and the Royal Commission on the Depression in 
Agriculture (1893), among others.   
By 1893, as the downturn regained intensity and cycles of boom and bust 
recurred, it became harder to maintain arguments that these were the natural cycles of 
capitalism to be endured without policy action.  As one critic of Liberal Party 
government on the currency question complained, “It is difficult to understand how the 
people who call on government to fix the price of land, to regulate the hours of labor, and 
the conditions of work…  It is very difficult to understand how these same people draw 
the line at the price of silver and the value of gold.”27   These pleas to government, to be 
sure, came from all sectors.  Merchants tied to trade with India complained of the decline 
in commerce within the empire and agitated for imperial federation.  Textile 
manufacturers and other industrialists complained of the decline of exports outside the 
Empire and urged the Foreign Office to press for lower tariffs in Europe and the United 
States.  Agricultural producers, small and large, felt increasingly pressed by rising debts 
and declining prices and petitioned to abandon free trade in favor of protectionism.   
To many contemporary observers, the agricultural crisis seemed especially 
damaging.  As historian G.M. Young, a child of the late-Victorian era, emphasized: 
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“After 1877 [wheat] never touched 50 schillings again, it dipped in 1884 below 40; in 
1894… the harvest of panic sold at 19 [schillings]…  Great wars have been less 
destructive of wealth than the calamity which stretched from 1879… to 1894.”28  The 
agricultural crisis was measured not only in material terms but also in terms of social 
dislocation, hastening the exodus from rural to urban areas of Britain.  The novelist 
Thomas Hardy, observing the outcomes of this process, lamented that “the recent 
supplanting of the class of stationary cottagers, who carried on the local traditions and 
humors, by a population of more or less migratory laborers, has led to a break in 
continuity in local history more fatal than any other thing to the preservation of…  close 
inter-social relations.”29  For these witnesses, signs of economic distress and decline were 
evident in most sectors of the economy, and yet no consensus had emerged to explain 
their relationship.  As royal commissions deliberated and the House of Commons debated 
policy solutions, the economic depression outside the halls of Westminster hastened the 
rapid growth of the bimetallic movement after 1893.   
If general economic distress unsettled the consensus about the economic tenets 
underpinning British policies, the work of academic economists furthered and legitimized 
the case made by bimetallic advocates about the causes of deflation and its relationship to 
systemic economic contraction.  The intensifying transnational debate over the 
depression emerged at a turning point in the history of economic thought marked by the 
ascendancy of quantitative economic studies advanced by the historical school and the 
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declension and rear-guard defenses of classical liberal economic thought.30  These 
developments were the natural result of two related processes: the accumulation and 
increasing accuracy of economic data during the nineteenth century and the 
professionalization of economics as a social science after mid-century.31  In this 
environment, the works of three economists, in particular, made distinct and significant 
contributions to the case for bimetallism: Professor Adolph Soetbeer of the University of 
Gottingen, Professor Francis Walker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
Professor Alfred Marshall of Cambridge.   
Among these prominent economists, Professor Soetbeer made the most empirical 
contribution to the bimetallic case by demonstrating that prices across all sectors of the 
economy had been affected by deflationary pressures over the long term.  His study, 
Materials toward the Elucidation of the Economic Conditions Affecting the Precious 
Metals and the Question of Monetary Standards, first published in 1885 and updated 
through 1891, created a year-to-year index of wholesale prices by sector.  The data, 
which encompassed more than 40 years of price information from the Hamburg Board of 
Trade, showed that prices across all sectors of the economy began to decline in the mid-
1870s, regardless of exposure to foreign competition or protection by tariff policies.  
Though price declines varied in degree by sector, they moved in parallel motion, 
suggesting that some macroeconomic factor other than competition was at work.  For 
bimetallic advocates, the study clearly suggested that these deflationary pressures were 
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the result of a contracting money supply under the gold standard.  As one English 
bimetallist noted in 1894, “Soetbeer [has] certainly proved to the satisfaction of all 
statisticians that gold has appreciated or increased in value by 50 percent.”32  The value 
of Soetbeer’s statistical analysis was also evident to official inquirers into the monetary 
question.  In Britain, his work was included in the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Gold and Silver and in the United States it was translated as part of report on bimetallic 
affairs compiled by the State Department in 1887.33  Soetbeer’s study ended with his 
death in 1892.  Soon after, however, The Economist was producing similar historical 
price indexes regarding the British economy in its annual, Commercial History and 
Review of 1893.  There is some irony in Soetbeer’s contribution to the bimetallic cause, 
given that during the 1860s he had been one of the leading advocates of the adoption of 
the gold standard by Germany.  Nevertheless, by 1894, his work had become an 
empirical weapon in the hands of British bimetallic advocates.   
While Professor Soetbeer revealed the scope of deflationary pressures since the 
1870s, American economist Francis A. Walker was among the most prominent figures to 
make the intellectual argument for the ultimate consequences of these developments on 
business decisions and the wider economy.  Published in 1889, his study, Money, Trade, 
and Industry, presented a detailed case for the linkages between the appreciation of gold 
under the gold standard, price deflation, and changes in economic output.  In the study, 
Walker concluded that “an appreciation of gold constitutes a truly fearful addition to 
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debts, mortgages, and fixed charges of every description.  But even this is hardly the 
worst feature of the situation.  Nothing is so discouraging to the merchant and 
manufacturer as to bring forward goods for a falling market.  Declining prices cut into the 
normal profits of business, check enterprise, and retard the productive investment of 
capital.”34  In other words, Walker made a demand-side argument that ongoing 
deflationary pressures made business decisions about investment, employment, and 
expansion increasingly uncertain because future prices could not be accurately estimated 
and, therefore, furthered depression across the economy.  Walker’s case was embraced by 
leading British advocates of international bimetallism.  Professor H.S. Foxwell of 
Cambridge declared that Walker’s 1889 study was “perhaps the most compact, 
instructive, and satisfactory presentation of bimetallic theory.”35  Walker’s argument, by 
virtue of his esteemed reputation as an economist, was acknowledged even by his 
monetary opponents.  By then Walker was serving as president of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, was the author of the leading text on political economy in use at 
Oxford, and an honorary member of the Royal Statistical Society.  Walker, through his 
scholarship, enhanced the case for international bimetallism by detailing the mechanism 
by which deflation hurt all aspects of economic enterprise. 
Professor Alfred Marshall contributed to the bimetallic cause in a more indirect 
fashion, offering an alternative monetary standard to both gold monometallism and 
bimetallism.  The details of the Marshall proposal, outlined most prominently in his 
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testimony before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, were extensive and 
complex.  In essence, he proposed the issuance of paper notes against a standard of value 
composed of both metals.  Unlike notes issued under a traditional bimetallic monetary 
standard, which could be redeemed in either metal, notes under the Marshall proposal 
would represent equal amounts of silver and gold at a ratio set by law.  The Marshall 
system, in other words, had eliminated the dangerous prospect, in the eyes of gold 
defenders, of governments redeeming notes in devalued silver rather than gold.  Professor 
Francis Walker, his friend and colleague, described the proposal as “one of the most 
important contributions to metallic monetary theory made in [this] great debate.”36  
Despite Walker’s enthusiasm, the most prominent bimetallic advocates involved in the 
transnational monetary debate never rallied to Marshall.  Nevertheless, Professor 
Marshall, by virtue of his reputation as the leading English economists of his era, helped 
legitimize bimetallism by setting forth a plan that acknowledged the flaws in the gold 
standard system.  Marshall never embraced the political movement for bimetallism, 
confessing to a colleague, “I suppose Nature has cursed me with a cross-bench mind.  I 
am a Bimetallist and a Home-Ruler, and yet on many points I should vote against my 
own side.”37  His central concern with bimetallism was the ratio at which it might be 
reintroduced.  Despite these personal reservations, Professor Marshall helped legitimize 
the bimetallic cause in Britain.38 
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If academic studies helped legitimize the case for international bimetallism, the 
growth and development of the Bimetallic League helped transform bimetallic arguments 
against the gold standard into a political force in Britain.  By the mid-1890s, the 
Bimetallic League had become a sophisticated national lobbying organization that 
represented a diversity of interests.  Some historians have associated the League mainly 
with Manchester interests in cotton manufactures and trade.39  While there can be no 
doubt of the key role played by Manchester commercial leaders in the development of the 
Bimetallic League, it is worth noting that the organization had more metropolitan origins 
and was more metropolitan in character by the mid-1890s than has been acknowledged.  
By that year, the League was led by its long-time President Henry H. Gibbs, a former 
Director of the Bank of England.  In addition, 10 of the 35 members of the Executive 
Council represented London, including prominent City figures H.R. Grenfell and Samuel 
Montagu.  The Bimetallic League, by then, also had established offices in London, as 
well as offices in Manchester, Glasgow, and Birmingham, that organized interests, 
distributed information, and lobbied generally in favor of international bimetallism.40   
The origins of the League also were more metropolitan in character, according to 
bimetallic advocate Henry Chaplin, a wealthy Lincolnshire landowner and agricultural 
leader in Parliament.  Speaking to fellow bimetallists in 1894, he contended that 
following the failure of the 1881 International Monetary Conference, officials in the India 
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Office met counterparts in the Foreign Office “to see if something could be done in the 
way of promoting an English Bimetallic Movement.”41  Representatives of India had 
been keenly awareness of global monetary instability since the 1870s, when the fall of 
silver disrupted Anglo-Indian trade.  “We are desirous, as we have always been, of aiding 
in the settlement in the silver question by international agreement,” advised the 
government of India in later correspondence with the Cabinet.42  The deliberations of that 
first meeting led to the creation of the Bimetallic League the following year under the 
leadership of Henry H. Gibbs.   
In Britain, two subsequent milestones helped build the early Bimetallic League 
from advocates of an obscure policy to a significant political force.  The first was the 
publication of the Reports of the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver in 1887 and 1888.  
As one observer noted, “The unanimous admission, on the part of the Commission, as to 
the practical efficiency of the [French bimetallic] system from 1803 to 1873 largely 
removed those sentiments of suspicion and distrust, which had [forestalled] the progress 
of bimetallism… It could no longer be considered bad form to be a bimetallist.”43  The 
second milestone was the Report of the Royal Commission on the Depression in 
Agriculture issued in 1894.  The Report concluded that the adoption of bimetallism 
represented an effective remedy to the agricultural crisis.44  If these milestones 
represented important shifts in monetary attitudes in official circles, they also 
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demonstrated the ways in which the idea of international bimetallism built a coalition of 
diverse interests.  As historian Ewen Green has noted, part of the explanation for this 
broad coalition is that, as a remedy to the economic crisis, bimetallism, unlike 
protectionist policies, proposed to lift all prices and therefore could not be discounted as 
special pleading by one economic interest over another.45  The result, by 1894, was a 
lobbying organization that represented agriculturalists and merchants, industrialists and 
workers, as well as central bank directors preoccupied with the welfare of the entire 
system.  Along with material economic distress, the logic of bimetallism and the official 
sanctions of Royal Commissions helped confer legitimacy on the bimetallic idea, 
expanding the diverse ranks that rallied to the banner of the Bimetallic League.   
Even with these contributing factors bolstering the number of English 
bimetallists, the conversion to the bimetallic standard still faced formidable obstacles in 
Britain: the influence of private banking interests upon the government as well as the 
stalwart defense of the gold standard in the policy actions of the Gladstone government.  
First among these bulwarks to bimetallic advances was the ongoing and considerable 
influence of the financial sector on policymakers in government.  By the 1890s, the 
private investment houses in the City of London had experienced remarkable growth in 
the scale and scope of their operations since mid-century.46  Whereas prior to this period 
the scope of investment largely involved financing government, domestic industries, and 
trade enterprises tied to the major port cities, the period beginning at mid-century was 
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marked by the unprecedented expansion of overseas investment both inside and outside 
the empire.  British capital funded the construction of railroads in India and the American 
West, the building of sophisticated port facilities in South America and other regions in 
which the value of raw materials drew the attention of the English investor classes.  Two 
results of this process were the growth of City investment houses generally and, as 
importantly, the growth of financial sector income as a percentage of the national 
economy.  Between 1870 and 1914, approximately one-third of all British capital was 
invested overseas, with periods of great surges including one between 1886 and 1890.47  
As a percentage of British national income, returns from overseas investments more than 
doubled between 1861 and 1901 and the size of the service sector grew from 7 to 10 
percent of the national economy during the same period.48  The institutional expansion 
and political influence of London investment houses paralleled these distinct changes.  
As the financial sector took on outsized proportions, it became increasingly 
important to government both as underwriter of the national debt and as an instrument of 
foreign policy.  Tory Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s purchase of a controlling 
interest in the Suez Canal Company in the mid-1870s, made possible by close ties to 
London investment houses, represented one early example of this growing relationship.  
Despite the Disraeli coup, City financiers generally aligned with, and channeled influence 
through, the Liberal Party.  As one part of the growing professional classes, bankers 
generally identified with the Liberal Party, whose aspirations for efficient bourgeois 
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government aligned with their own.  The influence of the financial sector rose after mid-
century, paralleling the ascendancy of the Liberal Party under Palmerston and Gladstone.   
The growth and importance of City wealth also introduced significant social 
transformations.  The financiers of the City were never the most middling of the middling 
professions in Victorian Britain, yet the relative growth of their fortunes represented 
something like the rise of a new financial aristocracy.  The dance between the new rich 
and the old rich of the landed aristocracy was characterized less by confrontation and 
more by a sustained fusion of views and interests after mid-century.  Influence moved 
both ways in this social process.  Aristocrats increasingly invested their accumulated 
capital with City men, drawing their economic interests into alignment.  Bankers, with 
their new fortunes, snapped up country estates and married into titled families, adopting 
the social norms and attitudes of the old landed barons.  These patterns were evident 
enough by the mid-1870s that Anthony Trollope could ably satirize these social changes 
to great acclaim in his novel, The Way We Live Now.  The growth of the financial sector 
and the social ascendancy of its leading figures had, by the mid-1890s, produced a 
consensus among the governing elites of both parties that favored the interests of the 
financial sector.  The change was so evident by century’s end that John Hobson and other 
critics argued that government was the instrument of City finance, and not the other way 
around as it had been for Disraeli only a few years prior.49   
By the mid-1890s, as the economic depression called into question the viability of 
the gold standard, the matter of influencing government toward City preferences on the 
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monetary question was not difficult.  For City men, it often involved talking to 
themselves since by then many financiers sat as members of Parliament, served in high 
office, and led most government economic inquiries.  Nevertheless, the growing support 
for bimetallism after 1893 challenged these patterns of influence and placed stalwart 
defenders of City interests on the defensive.  In response to bimetallic successes in 1895, 
prominent financiers formed the Gold Standard Defence Association, a lobbying 
organization that hoped to match the Bimetallic League.  Unlike the Bimetallic League, 
however, the Gold Standard Defence Association represented the singular interests of 
City finance, creditors of Britain and the world.  The City’s influence on government 
policy had increased markedly since mid-century and now the movement for 
international bimetallism inside Britain would put that power to the test. 
While City of London bankers made use of their government ties to halt the 
bimetallic campaign, the actions of the Liberal Party government between 1892 and 1895 
gave official form to those efforts.  Foremost among these efforts were the rhetorical 
defense of the gold standard led by leading Liberal Party figures, the limitations placed 
on British delegates to the Brussels Monetary Conference, and finally the decision in 
1893 to close the mints of India to silver coinage in preparation for the establishing an 
Indian gold standard.   
During this period, leading Liberals, including Prime Minister Gladstone, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt, and former Board of Trade president 
Sir Thomas Farrer, mounted a stout rhetorical defense of gold-standard principles.  In 
Parliament, Gladstone readily defended the gold standard in terms of British creditors.  
  248 
The old Liberal leader, by then 83 and the oldest serving Prime Minister, was less a tool 
of City interests than a utopian relic of mid-century liberalism.  In the 1850s, at the apex 
of British economic affluence and prestige, it was hard not to imagine, as he did, that the 
world would progress forward toward higher and higher stages of civilization under the 
influence of liberal economic principles championed by Britain: laissez-faire 
government, free trade, and the gold standard.  What remained harder to see was the 
extent to which private business enterprises and financial institutions would grow to such 
unprecedented sizes in the next half-century; to sizes that rivaled and influenced 
government at home and abroad.  In early 1893, while blocking a measure in the 
Commons to reconvene the Brussels Monetary Conference, the Prime Minister “made an 
elaborate exposition of the benefits of monometallism and the dangers of bimetallism.”50  
Remarking on this speech, Professor Walker observed: “The monometallists [have] long 
been accustomed to urge, as an argument for their case, the large premiums [current 
monetary conditions] enabled England to collect…  In his speech to the House of 
Commons, Mr. Gladstone offered this as a leading argument against the restoration of 
bimetallism.”51  If defenses of the gold standard by Gladstone, such as these, owed little 
to City influence, the arguments put forward nevertheless mirrored the case made by the 
Gold Standard Defence Association.  Bimetallic policies, as one Association pamphlet 
argued, were “tools edged with repudiation.”52  The appreciation of gold was not a 
violation of the creditor-debtor relationship, in Association eyes, though the depreciation 
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of gold that might follow monetary expansion under a bimetallic system represented 
nothing less than the severe alteration of legal contracts.  If we allow bimetallism, said 
another gold stalwart, “what difference is there in principle between a contract in [our 
country] and a contract in some South American republic?”53   
This rhetorical defense of the gold standard by the Liberal Party was matched by 
policy decisions in the same direction.  The two most important decisions of the 
Gladstone government, in this regard, were the limitations placed on British delegates to 
the Brussels Conference in 1892 and the decision to close the mints of India to silver in 
1893.  In 1892, the conference had been convened by the United States in coordination 
with the Conservative Party government that preceded the Gladstone ministry, but did not 
take place until after the new Liberal Party government had formed.  As detailed in the 
previous chapter, the choice of gold-stalwarts as delegates and the limits placed upon 
those delegates to find a compromise agreement likely doomed the efforts at Brussels 
even before deliberations began.54  In June the following year, after declining to 
reconvene the Brussels Conference in light of deepening global economic problems, the 
Gladstone government closed the Indian mints to the public coinage of silver in 
preparation for the eventual establishment of an Indian gold standard.  They did so upon 
the recommendation of the Indian Currency Commission, an inquiry authorized by 
Parliament and led by Lord Herschell, a London politician who had loyally served 
Gladstone in past administrations and by then served as Lord Chancellor.  Yet the Liberal 
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Party government took these steps in the face of repeated pleas from inside and outside 
government to reach an international agreement on silver money.  Taken together, Liberal 
Party actions placed significant obstacles in the way of the policy changes contemplated 
by British bimetallic advocates. 
Despite the entrenched sentiments favoring the gold standard inside and outside 
government, the ranks of those calling for bimetallism in Britain seemed to increase 
unchecked during the early 1890s.  Certainly some of this growth can be counted as 
reactions to Liberal Party actions just outlined.  Often times in political debate nothing 
radicalizes minority opinion more than the deprecating intransigence of the majority.  
Allowing for the importance of these dynamics, there are, nevertheless, significant 
accomplishments toward international bimetallism that should be attributed to the work 
of bimetallic advocates.  These include the conversion of key financial conservatives to 
the cause of international bimetallism, the worldwide interest in the International 
Bimetallic Conference of 1894 held in London, as well as the role bimetallism played in 
the electoral victories of the Conservative Party in late-1895. 
Declarations of allegiance to international bimetallism by a series of prominent 
financial conservatives aided the bimetallic campaign, drawing press attention and 
legitimizing bimetallic ideas in the eyes of the British public.  During this period, three 
such conversions from gold standard conservatism to bimetallic advocacy stood above 
the rest: Leonard Courtney, William Lidderdale, and Arthur James Balfour.  The 
conversion to bimetallism of Courtney, a Liberal Unionist MP and former professor of 
political economy at University College London, was notable because he had signed the 
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majority report issued by the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver in defense of the 
gold standard in 1887.  Courtney’s shift by early 1893 meant that a majority of 
Commission members now endorsed the recommendations of the Commission’s minority 
report favoring international bimetallism.55   
The most significant conversion, in terms of influencing City opinion on the 
monetary question, was that of William Lidderdale, former Governor of the Bank of 
England.  Lidderdale possessed a reputation of heroic proportions among City bankers 
for rescuing Baring Brothers and Company in 1890 and preventing a wider financial 
panic that year.  The seeds of his bimetallic conversion may have been planted in the 
crisis itself during which the insufficiency of Bank of England gold reserves forced the 
Governor to arrange the Barings rescue with a combination of funds from London, Paris, 
and New York.  The lesson for central bankers such as Lidderdale likely seemed obvious: 
the scale of investment operations compared with the amount of specie reserves held by 
the Bank of England were making the system of international finance increasingly 
difficult to manage safely.  In May 1895, Lidderdale chaired a panel on international 
bimetallism and by June of that year he was one of the signatories of the Bimetallic 
League petition urging the government to renew bimetallic diplomacy.  Speaking of the 
gold standard, Lidderdale argued that the increasing problems of debtors were also the 
problem of creditors: “It is strange that England, which had advanced so much capital to 
foreign countries, and to her own colonies, all dependent on the value of their products 
for the means by which they can pay their debts, should still so persistently, and 
                                                 
55 International Bimetallic Conference. ... , London, 71-85. 
  252 
apparently so blindly, support a financial policy calculated to render it difficult for her 
debtors to keep faith.”56  If his conversion to bimetallism shifted opinion in London, it 
drew less favorable attention from gold stalwarts as far away as New York.  There, one 
editor asked, “Can you, my readers, imagine any language more atrocious than these 
words from that wild-eyed anarchist, Mr. Lidderdale?”57   
While the conversion of so prominent a central banker bolstered the case for 
bimetallism in financial circles, the transfer of monetary allegiance by Arthur James 
Balfour, leader of the Conservative Party opposition in Parliament, popularized the 
bimetallic cause in the broader political debate more than any other single development 
during this period.  By 1893, Balfour had advanced his career in parallel with the 
Conservative Party ascendancy beginning under Benjamin Disraeli and continuing under 
Balfour’s uncle, Lord Salisbury.  Balfour had served on the Royal Commission on Gold 
and Silver, siding with the minority in 1887, and as First Lord of the Treasury.  It was not 
until late 1893, however, that Balfour joined the political fray on the side of international 
bimetallism.  In August 1893, speaking to a City of London audience gathered at the 
Lord Mayor’s official residence, Balfour declared for a change in government policy.   
Balfour’s speech made a deep impression on the transnational monetary debate 
both by virtue of his reputation and for the substance of his arguments in favor of 
international bimetallism.  From New York, one gold-standard journal conceded: “The 
advocacy of bimetallism of so eminent a man as Mr. Balfour, and one whose reputation 
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as a thinker is justly so high, [may] give a regrettable impulse toward what we are 
convinced is an illusory scheme.”58  The power of the speech, however, also rested on the 
plain and persuasive arguments for international bimetallism made by a savvy and 
experienced politician.  While other bimetallic advocates often argued the merits in 
economic jargon, Balfour repeatedly emphasized the urgency of the monetary crisis and 
the common sense which underpinned the case for bimetallism.  “I had felt – as many 
other people now feel – whatever their views on this question may be, that we are 
brought face to face with currency problems in a manner which we cannot avoid.”59  On 
substance Balfour rehearsed bimetallic arguments for the greater stability under the 
bimetallic system: “What is it we ask of legal tender?  We ask, in the first place, that it 
should be a stable measure of value…  Stability is the ideal.”  He continued, contending 
that reliance on a single metal under the gold standard led to greater monetary instability 
in value.  Balfour cited three sources of pressure on gold currency: changing levels of 
gold production, increased demands on currency based on increases in economic growth, 
and changing legislation governing the currency of each nation.  Arguing for the way 
bimetallism improves upon a single gold standard, he said: “If you have a double 
standard.  If, in other words, you can count for your standard of value not merely upon 
the gold supply of the world, but on the gold supply plus the silver supply – it is evident 
that any single cause of [instability] is diminished because it is spread over a wider area.”  
While arguments such as these were common in the rhetoric of bimetallism, Balfour 
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made a unique appeal for bimetallism on grounds of geopolitical security.  Speaking in 
terms likely influenced by the gold shortages of the Baring Crisis, Balfour warned that 
the gold standard could be held hostage by enemies of Britain:  
What I want to call your attention to is this system of a single reserve, a 
gold reserve, does absolutely require that at any moment the Bank of 
England should be able to get what gold it wants [in order to make specie 
payments]... Now, are you sure that under all circumstances – all 
circumstances of international feeling – that it would be easy or even 
possible for the gold reserve to be increased?  Is it not true at the present 
moment those that have command over the great gold reserves of the 
Continent are the governments of the Continent?  We in this country are 
not accustomed to allow our government to interfere to any great extent in 
our commercial affairs.  But am I not right in saying that at the present 
moment the great military powers of the Continent have [control] over 
their gold reserves? 60 
 
The Balfour case for bimetallism rested, therefore, on its economic logic and on its 
geopolitical logic.  In the Egyptian Hall of the Lord Mayor’s residence the speech was 
greeted with warm applause by a crowd of prominent bankers and statesmen, including 
US Ambassador Thomas F. Bayard and American bimetallist Samuel Dana Horton.  One 
bimetallist declared the speech “the clearest and most telling statement upon the currency 
question that I have met with.”61  Outside the hall, stalwart gold-standard journals such as 
the Saturday Review were less enthusiastic, deprecating Balfour’s “uncompromising 
style” and euphemistically comparing his proposal to the “paper money of Khubla 
Khan.”62  Despite such rhetorical broadsides, the joining of battle by one of the most 
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prominent British statesmen conferred legitimacy on the campaign for international 
bimetallism.   
Balfour’s bimetallic conversion, along with those of other leading bankers and 
politicians, were measures of the progress bimetallic sentiment was making in a monetary 
debate that appeared increasingly crucial to the future prosperity of Britain and her 
Empire.  The International Bimetallic Conference of 1894 organized by the Bimetallic 
League represented another measure of that progress, demonstrating the extent to which 
the idea of bimetallism had moved beyond policy elites to popular politics in Great 
Britain.   
The significance of the International Bimetallic Conference rested less on new 
evidence or rhetorical arguments introduced by delegates and more on the degree of 
interest the proceedings generated among participants inside the hall and opponents 
outside.  Both were measures of the growing bimetallic coalition and the increasing 
organizational strength of the Bimetallic League in Britain.  Delegations to the 
conference held in London that May demonstrated that growth, representing a diversity 
of economic interests and geographic regions.  Among Britons, attendees included trade 
unionists and agricultural leaders, titled estate holders such as the Duke of Norfolk as 
well as City bankers. Delegations traveled from regions near and far, from Adelaid, 
Australia to Vienna, Austria, a sign that the transnational debate on the money question 
had global economic implications.   
Another measure of the growing acceptance of the bimetallic idea was the 
attendance of high office-holders.  From Britain, leaders in Parliament Arthur J. Balfour, 
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Sir William Houldsworth, and Henry Chaplin were accompanied by more than 60 
colleagues.  From the Continent came the Director of the Belgium Mint, the Governor of 
the Bank of the Netherlands, and members of the Prussian assembly, among others.  
Though the United States did not send private or official delegates, Republican Senators, 
including John Sherman, William B. Allison, and Henry Cabot Lodge, signaled their 
support by telegram: “We desire to express our cordial sympathy with the movement to 
promote the restoration of silver by international agreement,” declared their message read 
aloud during the opening of the conference.  Such an agreement, the cable continued, 
“would secure to mankind a sufficient volume of metallic money and, what is hardly less 
important, would secure to the world of trade immunity from violent exchange 
fluctuations.”63  The support from American officials was greeted with loud cheers, 
according to reports.  Similar declarations arrived from the President of the French Senate 
and the Governor of the Bank of France.  Over two days, the delegates heard papers from 
university economists on the feasibility of bimetallism, from Indian officials on effect of 
the appreciation of gold on the debts of that government, as well as speeches from 
bimetallic politicians on the urgency of the matter.64  As the conference concluded, 
London gold-standard journals launched rhetorical broadsides, describing bimetallic 
proposals as absurd or ineffectual.65   
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Though the International Bimetallic Conference  covered little new ground, it did 
have important consequences.  Among opponents in Britain, it hastened the creation of 
the Gold Standard Defence Association, which attributed its own creation to the growing 
power of the Bimetallic League:  
Those who favored the unlimited coinage of silver were at that date full of 
hope they had possessed for many years an active organization in the 
Bimetallic League, they had recently collected a large fund of money, and 
they could reckon many names of distinction among the list of their 
supporters. Hitherto no step had been taken to counteract this movement.66 
 
The conference also had enlivening effects on the bimetallic campaign in Britain and 
abroad.  Continental representatives formed sister organizations, including the Bimetallic 
League of France and the Bimetallic League of Germany.  Within national politics the 
diverse array of bimetallic supporters represented at the conference prefigured the 
growing coalition that would return the Conservative Party government to power in late 
1895.67   
Between 1892 and 1896, the idea of international bimetallism was transformed in 
Great Britain from an idea disdained as economic heresy to the basis for sustained 
pressure in Parliament for an international monetary agreement.  These developments, 
which culminated in March 1896 with the resolution in favor of an international 
agreement passed by the House of Commons, resulted from a confluence of factors: 
ongoing economic distress, the conversion to bimetallism by prominent economists and 
politicians, and the growing organizational strength of the Bimetallic League 
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demonstrated by the 1894 Conference.   The unofficial diplomacy of American bimetallic 
advocates also played a role in the shift.  Economist Francis A. Walker and publicist 
Samuel Dana Horton, for example, both journeyed to England on multiple occasions to 
advocate for international bimetallism.  During this period, both men were confidants to 
British counterparts in the Bimetallic League, who acknowledged the role of American 
efforts.  “The best thanks of the Committee were unanimously passed to you for the very 
great additional service you have rendered to the cause of silver monetization,” wrote 
League General Secretary Henry McNeil to Horton on one occasion.68  By 1896, these 
factors produced a distinct shift toward bimetallism in Britain, giving supporters of 
international bimetallism reasonable hope for future British action.  The entering 
Conservative Party government of Lord Salisbury had so many acknowledged 
bimetallists that one London journal referred to the new government as “the bimetallic 
cabinet.”69  Following these developments in Britain, the diplomacy among nations for an 
international monetary agreement entered a new phase. 
Monetary Relations, Financial Collapse, and the Rise of Anglo-American 
Antagonism 
 
Money is pure science, and politics more or less pure art.  
– Manton Marble to Grover Cleveland, 189370 
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In the early 1890s, Americans faced similar economic developments as did 
Britain.  There, the problems of price deflation and the depression of commerce built a 
broad and growing political coalition behind international bimetallism.  In the United 
States, strangely, similar macroeconomic developments produced very different political 
outcomes.  This divergence, to a large degree, can be attributed to differences in political 
economy.  In Britain, where the prospect of the bimetallic standard did not threaten the 
gold specie payments by the government or divide agricultural producers from 
metropolitan interests seeking to revive international trade, a diversity of interests 
increasingly came together.   
In the United States, however, where credit still depended on overseas capital 
markets, the question of bimetallism divided interests.  In the West, agricultural 
producers distressed by falling prices called for the unilateral restoration of silver 
currency as a means to combat price deflation.  In the East, politicians, monetary experts, 
and many business leaders advocated international bimetallism as a means to relieve the 
monetary constraints imposed on trade and investment by the gold standard.  Both sides 
understood that the United States, despite remarkable growth and industrial expansion, 
remained deeply dependent on British finance during the era of Victorian globalization.  
As one leading American policymaker noted, “We will be wise if we temper our 
confidence in our national strength and resources with the frank concession that even 
these will not permit us to defy with impunity the inexorable laws of finance and trade.”71  
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From the early 1880s into the 1890s, European capital inflows to the United States 
equaled more than $1.7 billion, the percentage of which coming from Britain averaged 
between 74.5 and 80.5 percent year to year.72  One side viewed these economic 
connections as vestigial chains of colonial subjugation, while the other understood these 
ties as crucial to the future prosperity of the United States.  Former bimetallic diplomat 
Edward Atkinson represented the latter view.  In the North American Review, he 
reminded opponents that “sixty percent of our exports, consisting in far by the largest 
measure of farm products, are bought upon a gold basis by Great Britain.”73  These 
economic realities imposed by globalization profoundly shaped the national debate over 
monetary policy that defined the decade in the United States.  By virtue of its position in 
the world economy, Americans became increasingly divided over the question of 
international bimetallism. 
The realities of globalization also made adherence to conservative financial 
principles a sine qua non for national political leadership in the still developing republic.  
So it was, in spring 1893, that an exemplar of financial probity, Democrat Grover 
Cleveland, ascended again to the presidency.  Cleveland, since serving as governor of 
New York, had gained a reputation both as a reformer and as a financial conservative.  
His expressions of “agreement with those who believe that the greatest peril would be 
invited by the adoption of the scheme for the unlimited coinage of silver” had figured 
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strongly in his nomination for president in 1892.74  Sound money sounded good to like-
minded party managers and financiers.  On economic questions in general, Cleveland 
aligned himself with the tenets of mid-century economic liberalism: free trade, laissez-
faire government, and the gold-standard.  As the century progressed, however, these 
same ideas were more often deployed in public debate in defense of big business and big 
finance than in defense of a virtuous circle of self-interested producers envisioned by 
Adam Smith.  These shifts in outlook were embodied in the career choices of the once 
and future president.  Between terms, Cleveland chose to work as a corporate lawyer at a 
prominent New York City firm, where he mixed more frequently with the titans of 
American capitalism than with the small producers of his native Buffalo.  By the 1890s, 
as rapid economic development and industrial growth strained governing institutions and 
divided society into rival economic camps, Cleveland identified increasingly with the 
financial conservatives of American business and finance.  The election of Cleveland in 
1892, therefore, was unsurprisingly met with enthusiasm and relief among men of 
commercial affairs.  “The general effect on business throughout the country will be 
excellent,” declared one prominent New York banker. “Mr. Cleveland will have at his 
side men of the same high standing as those who were with him before.  Wall Street and 
the country know them well.  For these reasons… it is very gratifying that the [electoral] 
decision was what it was.”75  Cleveland, it seemed clear, would protect and defend the 
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principles of financial conservatism that underpinned domestic commerce and 
international trade as he returned to high office. 
By March 1893, however, the new president would confront a complex and 
interrelated set of economic difficulties.  Enthusiastic approbation from Wall Street only 
masked signs of growing instability in the American economy that had emerged as early 
as 1890.   Increasing worldwide demand for monetary gold and the exodus of foreign 
capital threatened Wall Street financial operations essential to capital-intensive railroads 
and industrial firms.  By 1892, American farmers, like their British counterparts, 
confronted falling prices for agricultural commodities.  Despite briefly being buoyed by 
European crop failures, producers faced global competition and monetary policy changes 
that made debt obligations increasingly difficult to meet.  In May 1893, these 
macroeconomic sources of instability combined to undo the American economy, 
unleashing a financial panic that produced a devastating and lengthy economic 
depression.  The Panic of 1893, as the scale and scope of economic distress became clear, 
made President Grover Cleveland perhaps the unluckiest new president since James 
Buchanan.  For that Democratic President, the Dred Scott decision ended all hopes of 
sectional accord in the first weeks of his administration.  For Cleveland, the economic 
crisis that spring similarly promised a term marked by sectional animosities and 
disintegrating political coalitions.   
As difficult as the political environment became for Cleveland, the material losses 
faced by everyday Americans were clearly more distressing.  By the end of May, the 
financial panic on Wall Street had become a run on banks across the country, as 
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depositors tried to withdraw savings, which in many cases no longer existed.  By August, 
44 national banks had failed, leaving over $271 million in liabilities.  The contagion 
spread to the broader economy with the most capital-intensive industries failing first.  In 
1893 alone, 119 railroads declared bankruptcy, including the Erie and the Union Pacific.  
According to one estimate, $836 million in stock values and $1.16 billion in bond values 
were lost as a result of these failures.76   The downward trajectory of the economy 
reached its low in 1894, with the output of the US economy down 20 to 25 percent from 
pre-collapse levels.  The shuttering of industry was attended by the expected social 
upheavals in America’s growing cities: unemployment, hunger, and homelessness.  To 
contemporaries, however, the discontent of the unemployed during this downturn seemed 
unprecedented.  As Henry Adams noted on his return from abroad, “Men died like flies 
under the strain, and Boston grew suddenly old, haggard, and thin.”77  By 1894, such 
discontents were quickly transformed into political actions.  Coxey’s army of the 
unemployed marched on Washington demanding public works programs.  The Pullman 
strike, which for a time halted nearly all railroad traffic in the West, involved 250,000 
workers in 27 states.  These desperate actions and the anxious responses of the propertied 
classes together provided some measure of the emotional disjuncture unleashed by the 
financial collapse and economic depression.  In the North American Review, steel 
magnate Andrew Carnegie estimated the destruction of the panic: “It is doubtful if a more 
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disastrous financial cyclone ever blasted a country to such an extent in so short a time.”78  
During the four-year depression, the material losses were so dramatic that many 
Americans began to question not just the conditions which brought about the financial 
panic but also the conservative financial principles that underpinned these perennial 
cycles of boom and bust. 
Even before the financial panic occurred, the incoming Cleveland administration 
contemplated an array of measures to strengthen the economy.  As early as December 
1892, the president-elect corresponded with prominent economists, editors, and business 
leaders, sounding out proposals to reduce the high duties of the McKinley Tariff and to 
halt the decline of national gold reserves.79  Among these, the most immediate threat to 
economic stability was the continued drain of monetary gold from the US Treasury.  
Since 1890, US gold reserves had been diminishing for a number of reasons, including 
excessive spending by Congress, the further spread of the gold standard to more 
countries, statutory government purchases of silver, and by changes in patterns of 
investment after the near collapse of the London investment house Baring Brothers.  In 
early 1890, the rescue of Barings by the Bank of England led European central banks to 
hoard gold and led European investment houses to increase gold reserves against total 
outstanding loans.  These changes provided a measure of safety to European financial 
institutions but made tenuous the position of investment-hungry regions such as the 
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United States.  Declining national reserves raised the possibility that the United States 
soon would be unable to pay its obligations.  Such an outcome would damage the public 
credit of the United States and impair the ability of the government to borrow, especially 
from the money markets of London.   
Sharing the assessment of Wall Street, President Cleveland focused first on the 
repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.   The Sherman Act, passed by Congress in 
1890 to placate free silver factions in the Republican Party, required the government to 
purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver each month in exchange for gold.  “From my own 
experience,” wrote Andrew Carnegie to the President regarding the consequences of the 
Sherman Act, “I can tell you that foreigners had taken alarm and had begun to withdraw 
their capital in gold.”80  The Sherman Act was not the singular cause of the gold drain 
during this period, but its repeal promised to send a clear signal to capital markets at 
home and abroad that the incoming administration was determined to maintain 
conservative financial principles.  Prominent banker Jacob H. Schiff told Cleveland that 
repeal was “the only measure which will restore confidence at home and abroad.”81  The 
new president needed little encouragement in this line of thinking.  By early 1893, he had 
concluded that the continuance of the Sherman Act “undoubtedly endangers the 
prosperity of the country.”82  Like Schiff, President Cleveland underscored the 
importance of the message such action sent to European capital markets: “I want [our 
currency] to be of such a character that will demonstrate abroad our wisdom and good 
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faith.”83  In his inaugural address, Cleveland again emphasized these sentiments in 
public.  The speech was brief, perhaps made more so because of the damp weather and 
blustering winds that hung over Washington that day.  Nevertheless, it made clear that the 
defense of the public credit of the United States was the first priority of the new president 
because continued borrowing was necessary to maintain specie payments under the gold 
standard. 
Despite the urgency raised by the financial panic and the steady decline of 
national gold reserves, the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act involved a 
prolonged political struggle.  That spring, the sitting Congress failed to act, leaving 
President Cleveland and Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle to maintain specie 
payments of US debts by issuing new government bonds, purchased mainly by 
investment houses in New York and London.  Meanwhile, in the public debate over 
repeal of the Sherman Act, free silver monetary expansionists and sound money financial 
conservatives staked out positions that shared no common ground.  By August, Cleveland 
called Congress into special session and skillfully maneuvered the Repeal Bill through 
both chambers.   Despite internal divisions in the Democratic House and partisan 
obstruction in the Republican Senate, Congress eventually passed the Repeal Bill in late 
October.  Part of Cleveland’s accomplishment can be attributed to his skillful handling of 
internal party politics; he withheld patronage appointments from wayward Congressional 
Democrats until his votes were secured.84  The success of repeal, however, also rested on 
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the growing pressures placed on Republicans in Congress by leading editors, prominent 
businessmen, and advocates of international bimetallism.  Financial conservatives argued 
for repeal as a measure to restore investor confidence.  A canvas of leading bankers by 
the New York Times concluded: “Among financial and business men there is practically 
no dissent from the opinion that Mr. Cleveland’s announcement [urging repeal of the 
Sherman Act] would have a reassuring effect upon business.”85   Republican advocates of 
international bimetallism supported Cleveland because he had adopted one of the central 
bimetallic arguments in the fight for repeal.  Bimetallists such as Francis A. Walker and 
Samuel Dana Horton had long advocated repeal of the Sherman Act on grounds that it 
strengthened the negotiating position of the United States in monetary diplomacy with 
Europe.  Speaking of international bimetallism in his message to Congress, Cleveland 
argued that “the United States will not be in a position to gain a hearing in favor of such 
an arrangement so long as we are willing to attempt to accomplish the [remonetization of 
silver] single-handed.”86  Such declarations assured financial interests in New York and 
across the Atlantic.  In the City of London, financial conservatives and bimetallic 
advocates alike welcomed Cleveland’s words.  The financially conservative Saturday 
Review hailed the president’s message as “one of the most luminous and convincing state 
papers we have seen.”87  Another London journal more sympathetic to the bimetallic 
cause noted that “[Henry] Chaplin’s and [Arthur] Balfour’s arguments [for international 
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bimetallism] are practically answered from the other side of the Atlantic.”88  In the 
United States, support from these parallel interests, along with skillful political 
maneuvering, secured the subsequent victory won by Cleveland with the repeal of the 
Sherman Act.  Repeal returned the United States to the gold standard and improved the 
odds of a future international monetary agreement with Europe.   
Cleveland’s triumph, nevertheless, came with a political price.  While financial 
conservatives proclaimed the resolute president the savior of American capitalism, the 
losers in the struggle over the money question displayed less sympathy.  Agricultural 
interests in the American West became increasingly radicalized, raising the specter of 
political insurgency and jeopardizing the future of the Democratic Party.  The Populist 
Party had already formed around a nucleus of economic grievances in 1892, but between 
1893 and 1896, the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act – along with bond issues 
that profited J.P. Morgan and other leading bankers – seemed to demonstrate the 
complete influence of Wall Street over Washington, elevating the free silver crusade 
from routine depression-era discontent into a larger, more organized movement with a 
decisive role to play in presidential politics.   
The discontent of western agricultural producers, however, represented more than 
a sectional struggle that threatened electoral fortunes in American politics.  Free silver 
adherents in the American West directed their outrage not only at Eastern finance but also 
                                                 
88 “The English Press,” Los Angeles Times (1886-1922), 10 August 1893. 
  269 
at Britain and her global economic influence.89  Indebted westerners constructed the 
campaign for free silver as a struggle for economic independence from the constraints of 
the British commercial system.  “[An] attempt is now being made by Great Britain and 
the monometallic monarchies of Europe to coerce the American continent into financial 
dependency,” warned one free silver speaker from the hustings.90  The affirmative case 
made by free silver advocates contended that the remonetization of silver by the United 
States would provide inflationary relief at home and open new markets for American 
producers in Asia and the Americas, where most countries still maintained a silver 
currency.  Free silver, in this sense, promised to curb the influence of British finance 
within the United States, break American reliance on British markets for exports, and 
help displace Britain in foreign markets.  Leaders of the free silver campaign appealed to 
fellow Americans not only on terms of economic interest but also on more emotional 
grounds, evoking a defiant spirit of American economic nationalism.  In the rhetoric of 
free silver advocates, the frontier regions of the American West were often represented as 
colonial dependencies entangled in Britain’s commercial empire.  The British-led gold 
standard, in particular, chained the United States to the British system; the return of 
unlimited and free coinage of silver would break those chains.  In these ways, the 
dynamics of global monetary relations destabilized domestic politics within the United 
States, creating new coalitions around a predatory conception of creditor Britain. 
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In this fraught environment, American discontent over international monetary 
relations also spilled over into broader Anglo-American relations.  In April 1895, British 
military forces advanced and occupied the port town of Corinto, a disputed territory 
between British Guiana and Venezuela at the mouth of the Orinoco River.  These events 
developed into something more than a routine controversy over colonial boundaries in 
large part because the surrounding region was exceedingly valuable territory both in 
terms of natural resources and as a strategic choke point for trade with three of the largest 
South American republics, which bordered the river.  The British occupation was only 
the latest development in a long-term boundary dispute between the two countries.   
Venezuela, in recent years, had appealed for US assistance after Britain repeatedly 
rebuffed requests for arbitration.  In the United States, the problems of her sister 
American republic had garnered little interest outside foreign policy circles until that 
moment.  The widespread and shared outrage at Britain, however, marked the Corinto 
incident as something different.   
What raised such broad alarm among Americans by 1895 was the way in which 
the incident fit into larger patterns of British aggrandizement connected with foreign 
trade and resources.  The discovery of large gold deposits in the region during the mid-
1880s seemed to signal a shift in British policy regarding the boundary, of which the 
occupation of Corinto was only the latest development.  As one New York journal 
observed, “The British government has steadily supported the encroachments of its 
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colonists onto Venezuelan soil, [which] now includes the valuable gold fields in the 
Venezuelan district of Yururi.”91   
British actions had the remarkable ability to unify the reflexively hostile factions 
in American politics.  In the months following the British advance, Republican leaders, in 
the absence of an official US response, attempted to paint President Cleveland as a silent 
collaborator with long standing British sympathies.   But the strongly worded diplomatic 
note demanding arbitration delivered to Britain in July, and the threat of US unilateral 
action on the boundary question announced in December after the Salisbury government 
rebuffed the US appeal, rallied most Americans to the singular cause of opposing Britain.  
In both the diplomatic note and in the Special Message to Congress requesting the 
creation of a unilateral US boundary commission, the Cleveland administration framed 
British action as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, a foreign policy that insisted on no 
further European territorial expansion in the American hemisphere.  Cleveland’s 
December message, in particular, was greeted with widespread jubilation and talk in 
many quarters of a third war against America’s perennial nemesis.  “A degree of 
excitement that has not been equaled in this city for many years was created by the 
appearance at noon today of a Special Message of the President on the Venezuelan 
question,” reported one paper from Washington.92   
That excitement in the capital and elsewhere across the country, however, was not 
generated by the opportunity to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine, a policy that had been 
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more often upheld in word than in deed since the early nineteenth century.  It was fired 
by the way British actions in Venezuela seemed to fit a pattern of predatory behavior by 
the leading commercial power.  From agricultural Missouri, one academic critic declared 
hotly: “The old-time policy of Great Britain is well known.  We are familiar with it as 
demonstrated in Belize, where an original [concession] for wood was finally extended to 
complete dominion over a large area of Central America…  England’s attitude toward 
Venezuela is so thoroughly in accord with the Belize affair that it may be accepted as an 
announcement of a principle or doctrine of aggression.”93  From financial New York, 
another journal recorded: “It is known that there is a British desire to gain valuable gold 
fields in the territory of Venezuela.”  No voice was more prominent on the issue, 
however, than that of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.  Lodge, a leading 
Republican on foreign policy questions, was a student of history and an admirer the 
British Empire.  Yet he was also a stout nationalist both on economic questions and 
American prerogatives in the western hemisphere.  In a letter to a British friend, Lodge 
explained why recent British actions stirred Americans so powerfully: “This astonishing 
outburst against England here.  The bottom of it, in recent times, is England’s attitude on 
the money question, and the way in which she has snubbed all our efforts to do anything 
for silver.  Do you not see that gold, [for] which you have been fighting, is really at the 
bottom of all this business?”94  Lodge had been a convert to international bimetallism and 
therefore was keenly aware of perennial British obstruction to an international monetary 
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accord.95  But these sentiments were echoed as much by the free silver spokesmen of the 
American West.  “[Venezuela] was only the occasion.  The real cause [of hostile feeling] 
is the deep-seated belief that England by her financial maneuvering… has gained an 
advantage not only over the States but other countries, which will yet lead to trouble.” 96   
Cleveland, in his assertive response to Britain, channeled these sentiments, 
unifying briefly his free silver opponents on the left and his Republican foreign policy 
antagonists on the right of the political spectrum.  In this sense, the jingo cries for war 
against Britain heard following the Venezuelan incident were measures of the anxiety 
generated in all quarters of American politics by ongoing British financial and 
commercial influence. 
The unanimity fostered by a foreign enemy in 1895 and early 1896 was not 
enough to rescue the political fortunes of President Cleveland or to halt the splintering 
political coalitions during the 1896 presidential contest.  The heated diplomatic standoff 
over the Venezuela boundary began to cool as early as January 1896, when the British 
Cabinet led by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain shifted toward conciliating the 
United States.97  Most interpretations of these events emphasize the emerging 
geopolitical threat posed by Germany and the British necessity to clear away unresolved 
questions in order to focus on their response to the rising continental power.  While 
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acknowledging these considerations, the shift toward conciliation was also the result of 
decisions on both sides of the Atlantic – and, as importantly, was a policy shift urged by 
those most interested in maintaining transatlantic financial and commercial relations.  In 
Britain, the Liberal Party was the main source of pressure, arguing against the dismissive 
stand taken toward the United States by the Salisbury government and for the importance 
of the Anglo-American economic relationship.  As one London journal wrote, “Bankers 
and businessmen generally lamented the general distemper and earnestly hoped that the 
common sense of the thinking masses would prevail.”98  In the United States, similarly, 
men of commercial affairs tended toward the side of arbitration and rapprochement.  In 
this cause prominent advocates of international bimetallism played a role.  Speaking of 
the potential damages to trade and investment from an Anglo-American war, financial 
expert and bimetallic diplomat Edward Atkinson warned his Reform Club audience, “The 
war which the jingoes propose [will] destroy the commerce by which a million and a 
quarter of our most energetic men and women get their living.”99  Later in 1896, personal 
diplomacy between US Secretary of State Richard Olney and British Colonial Secretary 
Joseph Chamberlain established the framework for resolution of the boundary question 
and set in motion talks for a broader arbitration treaty to settle all future disputes between 
the two countries.  The treaty came to naught, but the effort made on both sides marked 
the beginning of Anglo-American rapprochement, which emerged over the following 
twenty years and proved invaluable in the foreign policies of both countries throughout 
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the twentieth century.100  Advocates of resolution on both sides helped preserve the 
transatlantic relationship not only on strategic grounds but also because financial and 
commercial connections remained vital to both countries. 
During the war scare over the Venezuelan boundary – and during the economic 
and political upheavals of Cleveland’s second administration in general – Republican 
advocates of international bimetallism made consistent efforts to maintain transatlantic 
relations by advancing the campaign for an international monetary accord.  They did so 
in three important ways: by promoting international bimetallism as a remedy to the 
problems of economic depression, by keeping the United States aligned with the British 
monetary standard, and by offering a middle path between the gold standard and a free 
silver during a tumultuous era in domestic politics.  Between 1893 and 1896, three 
significant accomplishments toward an international agreement stand out: the shift in 
sentiment toward international bimetallism, the repeal of the Sherman Act, which 
returned the United States to the gold standard, and the inclusion of international 
bimetallism in the platform of the Republican Party during the 1896 election.  
In these efforts, political economist Francis A. Walker and Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge made the most sustained contributions.  Walker spoke tirelessly to American and 
British audiences about the monetary stability offered by international bimetallism during 
these years.  “Since 1892, he had felt that it was his duty to do all that he could toward 
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educating public opinion,” reported one observer of Walker’s efforts.101  The failure of 
the Brussels Monetary Conference that year left unresolved the macroeconomic problems 
that contributed to an increasingly brittle international financial system.  In this period 
Professor Walker contributed to the British shift toward international bimetallism that 
culminated in the unanimous vote in Parliament in favor of a new international monetary 
conference in March 1896.  The American shift, though less dramatic, was marked by 
new inquiries regarding international bimetallism in Europe from President Cleveland.102  
Part of Walker’s success in these efforts rested on his rare combination of abilities.  It 
was said of Walker, age 53 when the financial panic of 1893 escalated monetary politics 
in the United States, that “it was impossible to know him without recognizing how the 
vigor and alertness of the man of affairs, the enthusiasm and industry of the student, and 
the frank and sympathetic geniality of a social companion, combined to give him a 
position among economists that [is] unique.”103   
While Walker’s efforts including public speaking, published writings, and private 
diplomacy sought agreement by persuasion, the work of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of 
Massachusetts employed more stick than carrot.  For Lodge, the central obstacle to an 
agreement was the position in favor of the gold standard maintained by Britain.  Like 
Walker, he corresponded with leading British bimetallists, encouraging the Bimetallic 
League and the efforts of its members in Parliament.  During 1894, however, Lodge also 
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attempted more confrontational means of shifting British policy on the monetary 
question.  In the new Wilson-Gorman Tariff Bill that year, Lodge attempted to add 
measures that were extraordinarily punitive toward Britain that would remain in effect 
until the British government agreed to international bimetallism.  Though his 
amendments were ultimately defeated, the effort demonstrates the kind of urgency and 
pressure applied from official positions of power.104   
Together with these efforts, the third most important accomplishment of 
bimetallic advocates during the Cleveland years was the inclusion of international 
bimetallism as part of the Republican Party platform in 1896.  The divide between free 
silver Republicans of the West and arch defenders of the gold standard in the East made 
the debate over the monetary position of the Party the most heated issue of the 
Republican Convention that year.105  Though the exact authorship of the eventual plank 
for sound money and international bimetallism remains unclear, without doubt financial 
conservatives like Senators William B. Allison and Henry Cabot Lodge were influential 
in moving the platform in the direction of international bimetallism.106  While the most 
ardent free silver Republicans dismissed international bimetallism (and walked out of the 
convention to support the likely pro-silver platform of the Democratic Party), the 
moderate pledge for international bimetallism help hold together gold and silver financial 
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conservatives in an election year dominated by the monetary question.  As one journal 
reported of the Republican Party in the 1896 campaign, “Thousands were held firm to 
their party allegiance only by the promises of their leaders to work for international 
bimetallism.”107 
During the period 1893 to 1896, the American political landscape seemed to 
divide along sharper lines than at any moment since the Civil War.  Debtors of the 
American West battled not only Wall Street but also the British financial and commercial 
system of which Wall Street was only a part.  Discontent over the economic depression 
and price deflation resulting from the gold standard, in particular, pushed questions of 
international monetary relations beyond elite diplomacy, shaping the widespread 
American animosity toward British encroachment in Venezuela.  President Grover 
Cleveland, despite winning unified admiration for his policy stand against Britain in that 
crisis, could neither secure another nomination nor hold the Democratic Party together 
during the 1896 election.  By then, his actions – especially the repeal of the Sherman Act 
and the bond issues which profited J.P. Morgan and other Wall Street interests – made 
almost certain the rise of an insurgency around free silver.  By the end of summer 1896 
that insurgency had consumed the Democratic Party and catapulted Nebraska free silver 
spokesman William Jennings Bryan into presidential politics as the nominee of the 
Democratic and Populist parties.  During this period, American advocates of international 
bimetallism struggled mightily to bring about an international monetary accord through 
actions at home and abroad.  The elevation of Bryan, the young and fiery embodiment of 
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western discontent, however, threatened the entire project of conservative financial policy 
at home and the ongoing commercial relationship with Britain abroad. 
International Bimetallism and Anglo-American Rapprochement 
 
At many moments during the presidential campaign that fall it appeared as though 
an admixture of widespread discontent and oratorical talent might lift William Jennings 
Bryan to the presidency.  In October, the conservative Saturday Review reported to 
London readers: “The scale seems to have been turning a little in favor of Bryan.  
Something has been done for him by his own preternatural powers [for] clap-trap 
declamation exercised on very ignorant and highly inflammable audiences.”108  It was 
with great relief, therefore, that financial conservatives at home and abroad greeted the 
triumph of William McKinley and the Republican Party that November.   
By April 1897, only weeks after McKinley’s inauguration, monetary envoys of 
the United States once more sailed for Europe.  For the new administration, the pursuit of 
international bimetallism was among the most important policy objectives of the first 
year in office.  In the president’s inaugural address, the accomplishment of an 
international monetary accord was declared essential to American economic recovery.  
Only the restoration of the protective tariff received more prominent attention in his 
speech.  McKinley, perhaps shrewdly, did not mention the gold standard or discuss US 
currency beyond mentioning that it should be placed on an enduring basis.  “The question 
of international bimetallism,” he stated firmly, however, “will have early and earnest 
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attention.”109  It appears that this was not simply convenient political rhetoric from the 
plain-spoken Ohioan.   
McKinley devoted considerable time and energy to these efforts, according to 
correspondence between Senator Wolcott in London and President McKinley.110  
Another measure of his seriousness regarding international bimetallism was the inclusion 
among the American envoys of respected figures who represented all interests.  The new 
president made news assigning Adlai Stevenson, the former Democratic vice president, to 
the monetary negotiations.  As one Republican bimetallist recorded, “In naming Mr. 
Stevenson, a silver-man and one who supported Bryan, President McKinley has 
convinced everybody that he is an earnest bimetallist.”111   
To lead the diplomatic mission, McKinley appointed Republican Senator Edward 
O. Wolcott of Colorado.  Wolcott, age 49 that year, was charming, voluble, and reputed 
as the greatest orator then serving in the Senate.112  His selection was based both on his 
experience and on his geographic value.  Wolcott had long been a supporter of an 
international agreement, travelling to London with Frances A. Walker as early as 1894 to 
promote action by British policymakers.113  He was part of a Republican Senate cohort 
that pursued informal bimetallic diplomacy during the Cleveland years, supporting the 
British Bimetallic League, proselytizing to fellow Americans, and making international 
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bimetallism Republican Party policy in 1896.  Wolcott was also significant within the 
Republican Party by virtue of his geographic position.  The Colorado senator had 
consistently advocated international bimetallism and sound money while many 
Republican representatives in the American West tilted toward free silver and William 
Jennings Bryan.  The selection of Wolcott, therefore, gave McKinley’s diplomatic 
initiative the added legitimacy of western representation.  With the instructions from the 
new president giving them the authority to negotiate an international agreement, the 
special envoys of the United States set sail to secure a bimetallic agreement with the great 
commercial powers of Europe in spring 1897.114 
Americans hopeful of diplomatic success had several reasons to be optimistic 
about the latest effort toward an international monetary accord.  Much had changed since 
the failures of the American-led Brussels Conference in 1892.  By 1897, commercial and 
imperial competition had intensified among the great powers.  Japan’s victory in the 
Sino-Japanese War had sparked a rush for colonial and commercial concessions in East 
Asia.  German colonial ambitions expanded in the absence of Chancellor Bismarck’s 
prudent restraint, challenging Britain and France in Africa and elsewhere.   In all cases, 
imperial aggrandizement was driven by the combination of geostrategic interests and the 
quest for national prestige.  But as important to the intensification of imperialism were 
the global economic uncertainties that persisted during the era of Victorian globalization.  
Among these, the price of silver, which facilitated trade between silver and gold standard 
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countries, had been destabilized, falling to a new low against gold: 34.5 to 1 by 1897.115  
In Europe, these material problems hastened the diffusion and rising popularity of 
international bimetallism in because it promised to help lift the price of silver and return 
the ratio in value between silver and gold to its historical level, approximately 15.5 to 1.  
In turn, this rising popularity led to official expressions of interest in Europe for an 
international monetary accord, which contributed significantly to renewed American 
efforts.116  Even before the McKinley administration took office, Senator Wolcott in 
coordination with the president elect had travelled to Europe to gather intelligence on the 
matter.  The positive reports by Wolcott likely played a key role in emphasis McKinley 
placed in international bimetallism during his first year in office.117 
Hopeful expectations for success, however, rested foremost on the election of new 
governments in Britain in 1895 and the United States in 1896.  The diplomatic playing 
field had narrowed in the years after 1892, as adherence to the gold standard by Britain’s 
Liberal Party emerged as the central obstacle to American efforts to establish a wider 
international monetary accord.  With the formation of a Conservative Party government 
in Britain and the election of a new Republican administration in the United States, the 
parties most supportive of international bimetallism on both sides of the Atlantic, after 
1896, held power at the same moment.  When news of the Republican victory reached 
London in fall 1896, one English economist reported that “the election of McKinley 
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involves the triumph of international bimetallism over national bimetallism.”118  Henry 
McNeil, General Secretary of the Bimetallic League, sent queries to Francis A. Walker in 
Boston about the likelihood of new action following McKinley’s election.  Professor 
Walker, who tirelessly advocated on behalf of international bimetallism and supported 
McKinley, promptly replied by telegraph: “Prospects never better here.”119   
American optimism extended beyond bimetallic partisans to official circles based 
on signals from the new Salisbury government in London.  Ambassador John Hay, a 
loyal Republican but never a bimetallic supporter, reported to Washington: “The [British] 
government is not so hostile to some solution as is generally supposed.”120  In fact, so 
many high officials of the Conservative Party government, including Lord Salisbury 
himself, were sympathetic to bimetallism that one London journal referred to the new 
government as “the bimetallic cabinet.”121  Taken together, these developments made the 
achievement of an international monetary accord appear more likely than ever before. 
Despite these hopeful signs, the Wolcott mission upon its arrival in Europe faced 
many significant obstacles.  The most personal obstacle to the diplomatic mission was the 
absence of the expert knowledge and personal relationships of Professor Francis A. 
Walker.  Walker had died suddenly of apoplexy in early January.  With emblematic 
Victorian restraint, the New York Times lamented, “It is difficult to think of a man of his 
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intellectual vitality, his personal energy, and love of work dying at fifty-six.”122  
According to reports, Walker had intended to accompany Senator Wolcott on his 
diplomatic mission that spring.123  As a leading monetary theorist and as an active 
diplomatic participant, Walker had been deeply involved in the transnational debate over 
international bimetallism since its inception in the 1870s.  One London journal described 
Walkers as “the ablest exponent of economics in our time… [whose] books on Money 
and The Wages Question are economic classics.”124  His esteem among British 
economists likely would have added gravity to the mission at hand.   
Along with personal tragedy, the Wolcott mission in London faced entrenched 
sentiment in favor of the gold standard and a corollary skepticism of the bimetallic 
standard.  In Britain, despite the growing number of converts to the idea of bimetallism, 
the gold standard still held powerful sway in government and finance.  The influential 
connections between London finance and the British government represented the nucleus 
of the defense of the gold standard.125  Leading central bankers, including William 
Lidderdale and Henry R. Grenfell, had decamped for international bimetallism on 
grounds that it stabilized monetary relations by removing the struggle among countries to 
maintain gold reserves.  The gold stalwarts of the City of London had formed the Gold 
Standard Defence Association in response to the successes of Lidderdale, Grenfell and 
others who had organized the Bimetallic League.  This sense of peril regarding the 
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British gold standard among City bankers highlights the real political progress made by 
bimetallism and also the kind of sensitivity to policy change among powerful elites used 
to setting the terms of business. Despite such success, replacing the British gold standard 
remained a daunting political proposal, given the material interests of creditors and the 
symbolic significance at stake.  In addition, by 1897, a new wave of countries, Russia and 
Japan most significantly, were adopting the gold standard and aligning themselves with 
British trade and investment.  Furthermore, reports of increased gold production 
promised to ease these conversions and the struggle for gold reserves.126  In these ways, 
entrenched sentiments in favor of the gold standard were holding ground, if not gaining 
new territory during this period. 
In Britain, the Wolcott mission also faced a related skepticism of the bimetallic 
standard established by an international agreement.  While objective-minded gold 
stalwarts had conceded most all of the intellectual arguments regarding monetary stability 
under a bimetallic standard, they remained skeptical in other ways.  For some, the 
preservation of the gold standard had something to do with British nationalism – a 
resistance to the interconnections that Victorian globalization created.  For others, 
resistance to international bimetallism centered around the conservative impulse to deny 
any policy adjustment associated with radicalism.  The free silver insurgency in the 
recent American election especially inspired fear among London gold stalwarts.  In the 
financially conservative regions of the London press, Bryanisn was equated with 
socialism, anarchism, and revolution.  Making light of Bryan’s brief resume, the London 
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Times suggested, “To have practiced law and served two terms in the House of 
Representatives at Washington is hardly a career.  But neither [did] St. Just or 
Robespierre [have] great careers before they came to the front of the Revolution.”127   
These charges were easily dismissed as rhetoric; it was more difficult to dismiss 
disputes over the feasibility of bimetallism fostered by the further fall of silver in recent 
years.  Though these new declines conformed to bimetallic arguments regarding the 
spread of the gold standard and the further demonetization of silver, the new reality of 
silver at 34.5 to 1 against gold made it difficult to decide upon a statutory ratio between 
gold and silver, even if all sides agreed to establish bimetallism.  This debate over the 
correct ratio not only was raised by gold defenders, but also divided many bimetallic 
advocates, especially in Britain.128  Though the further fall in silver that year followed 
closely after the adoption of the gold standard by Russia and Japan, it did more to 
damage the chances of the bimetallic standard.  As Wolcott later noted, “Nothing so 
discredited our attempts to restore silver to its old pedestal than this extraordinary 
decline.”129  On both practical and on increasingly ideological grounds, the idea of 
international bimetallism proposed by the United States confronted significant skepticism 
in Britain. 
Perhaps the most daunting obstacle faced by the Wolcott mission, however, was 
the return of positive signals of recovery in the British economy.  By 1896, Britain’s 
adjusted gross domestic product had recovered more than half of the 10 percent decline 
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that began in 1890 and was trending upward year to year.130  US Ambassador John Hay 
noted from London that “England was in a condition of unusual prosperity and that this 
condition would prove the most powerful argument in favor of the maintenance of the 
present financial system.”131  Just as hard times had elevated the cause of bimetallism, the 
beginning of good times diminished the political urgency for reform in Britain.  Taken 
together, economic conditions, ideological allegiances, and personal setbacks presented 
the US monetary envoys with significant challenges to the success of their diplomatic 
mission during the spring and summer of 1897. 
Despite facing these economic and ideological headwinds, the Wolcott mission 
produced a number of significant accomplishments.  Foremost among these was the 
successful effort to bring the full support France behind the US effort to establish 
international bimetallism that summer.  On their arrival in Paris in May, the American 
envoys were feted as guests of honor during an elaborate dinner at the Hotel Continental 
with more than 400 representatives of the French Bimetallic League.132  The warm 
welcome extended beyond bimetallic circles to the highest levels of government.  Within 
a few weeks, Wolcott had secured from France an agreement to jointly restore 
bimetallism with the United States as part of a larger agreement.  Writing to President 
McKinley, the Colorado senator reported that “the Prime Minister has stood by every 
assurance he made” regarding an international agreement.  Speaking of the French 
agreement, Wolcott added, “This will bring us greater concessions from England than we 
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could hope to secure unaided.”133  These diplomatic victories stemmed from American 
efforts and from broader developments within France.  From 1893, the idea of 
bimetallism experienced a remarkable revival based on economic hard times, in general, 
and the ways in which the further fall of silver that year disrupted commerce in a country 
whose currency was composed of both gold and silver, in particular.  As in Britain, a fast-
growing political coalition emerged around international bimetallism.  In late 1893, 
prominent French economist Edmond Théry published a series of studies that supported 
bimetallic arguments regarding the spread of the gold standard beyond Britain and the 
particular problems it posed to France.  Théry concluded that “the exchange troubles – 
which have become so frequent in recent years – are principally caused by the contraction 
of international legal-tender money.”  His publications gave the bimetallic cause the 
imprimatur of objective science.  Soon many national agricultural associations of France 
had adopted his line of argument.  By 1895, Alexandre Ribot, the Prime Minister of 
France, placed monetary policy changes at the root of French distress: “There have been 
during the last twenty years many causes which have contributed to the lower price of 
commodities…  But, for my part, I am convinced that the abandonment of bimetallism 
precipitated this crisis and [has] given it a much more serious character.”134  By June 
1897, though Wolcott negotiated with the Méline government, French sentiments and 
policy interests followed these same lines.  Events moved quickly, before the end of that 
month, the US Ambassador at Paris reported that the terms of the French agreement had 
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been transmitted to the French Ambassador at Washington.135  With added leverage as a 
result of the French agreement, Wolcott turned his attentions to gold standard Britain. 
Distinct from the objectives outlined in official instructions, US bimetallic 
diplomacy that year produced a second significant accomplishment: the advancement of 
Anglo-American rapprochement.  The US engagement with Britain on the monetary 
question offered a policy issue upon which both sides could display conciliation and 
mutual understanding while other ongoing Anglo-American differences over North 
American fisheries and British interests in the Caribbean remained more disputatious.  
The length and frequency of interactions on bimetallism provided the opportunity for 
changes of opinion among high officials on both sides.  Wolcott was in London for most 
of the first ten months of 1897, where he engaged informally with cabinet officials, 
members of Parliament, and prominent City of London figures.136  US Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James, John Hay, spent most of his first months in London on this issue in 
direct consultation with Lord Salisbury.137  In early July, when Wolcott and his fellow 
monetary envoys arrived in London in their official capacity, they were received at Court 
by Queen Victoria herself, invited to lunch at Windsor Castle, and were “the recipients of 
many kind attentions.”138  As Wolcott later reflected, “From the day we reached England 
until we left finally in October, our official treatment was everything that could be 
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desired…  [Our] proposals were treated with full consideration.”139  Part of this 
graciousness rested on the sympathy for bimetallism within the Salisbury government.  
Yet part of the distinct displays of British hospitality were rooted in the triumph of 
McKinley in the recent presidential contest, which to many in England symbolized the 
victory of order, harmony, and civilization over the forces of radicalism and class hatred.  
As Wolcott reported to McKinley, “Everyone here of every shade of political opinion 
rejoices in your election.”140  With the ascendancy of the sound money Republican, 
British officials and opinion makers began to see the United States in a new light – as 
fellow financial conservatives.  They recognized that the new president and his 
representatives in London were sound money adherents like themselves.  Such sentiments 
in the press paralleled the advancement of Anglo-American rapprochement at the 
individual level through personal relationships.   Especially for John Hay, who recorded 
the frank and attentive interactions with Salisbury and the British government, these 
relationships fostered a deeper regard for Britain and her interests, which would shape 
future Anglo-American relations after Hay became Secretary of State in 1898.  With the 
election of McKinley, and the locus of agreement around principles of sound money, US 
bimetallic diplomacy throughout 1897 furthered the trajectory of Anglo-American 
rapprochement and, on both sides, made declarations of transatlantic solidarity something 
more than rhetoric. 
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In addition to these accomplishments, the pursuit of international bimetallism by 
the McKinley administration also produced, for the first time, an extended engagement 
with proposals for an international agreement at the highest levels of the British 
government.  During the preceding twenty years, Britain had agreed to participate in the 
series of International Monetary Conferences only with great reluctance.  Yet in the wake 
of the failed 1892 Conference, economic difficulties began to shift sentiments toward 
reconsideration.  By 1897, the Salisbury government appeared ready to negotiate 
international bimetallism with its longest standing proponent, the United States.   
Even before Senator Wolcott and his fellow monetary envoys arrived in July, the 
groundwork for a positive outcome on a bimetallic agreement had been laid in the 
preceding months.  Long before he embarked for England, Wolcott understood that a 
truly universal form of international bimetallism was not possible because Britain would 
not alter her domestic gold standard.  “When we approached England,” he later recalled, 
“we realized perfectly that, in furtherance of any settlement of the question, English 
mints would not be open to silver.”141  Instead Wolcott was after a grand bargain similar 
to the ultimate proposal that emerged from the 1881 Conference.  In that case, the deal 
offered the restoration of bimetallism jointly by the United States and France in exchange 
for Britain holding one-fifth of the reserves of the Bank of England in silver and keeping 
India open to the free coinage of silver.  By July 1897, with a preliminary French 
agreement in hand, Wolcott arrived in London confident that an accord could be swiftly 
reached.   
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The confidence Wolcott expressed in a positive outcome was not chimerical.  His 
entire mission – and the sustained interest in international bimetallism by the Republican 
Party during the recent campaign – had been based in part on expressions of interest 
made by the British government in March 1896.  After an overwhelming vote in favor of 
an international bimetallic agreement in the House of Commons on 17 March, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks-Beach spoke to the House, conceding the role the 
fall of silver had played in price deflation at home and in the financial difficulties of India 
abroad.  Regarding an international accord, he stated on behalf of the government, “We 
are perfectly ready, as we have always been to join with foreign countries in conference 
as the best way in which those evils may be alleviated…  I have little doubt but that the 
government of India would be prepared to assist by reopening the Indian mints.”142  The 
statement was striking because Hicks-Beach remained one the most ardent gold standard 
advocates and, as Chancellor, the leading voice on questions of national finance in the 
Salisbury government.  Britain, in other words, appeared ready to bargain.   
In the United States, these signals buoyed Republicans who favored a moderate course 
between the financial difficulties under the gold standard and the greater difficulties 
posed by free silver.  There were subsequent signals that only confirmed British openness 
to an agreement.  During his informal mission during January and February 1897, 
Wolcott met with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach and received assurances that the position of 
Britain had not changed.   In May, Ambassador John Hay reported further confirmation 
from Lord Salisbury.  “I asked his Lordship whether I might assure my government that 
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this resolution [of March 1896] still expressed the sentiments of Her Majesty’s 
Government…  He answered without hesitation in the affirmative.”143  As he arrived in 
London that July, Senator Wolcott had good reason to believe in the future success of his 
diplomatic mission. 
By the end of July, however, new impediments emerged.  While the American 
monetary envoys held a series of meetings that month with Lord Salisbury and the British 
cabinet, confidential details of the US proposals reached the City of London through the 
press.  “An outburst of fury fills the London papers,” recorded Ambassador Hay of these 
developments.144  Leading investment bankers and gold standard politicians of the City 
of London were indignant.  “Mr. Wolcott’s proposals, as far as we know them, do most 
seriously impair the value of the gold standard,” charged Lord Farrer, a prominent 
member of the Gold Standard Defence Association.145  City interests, however, held the 
British government in more contempt for contemplating such a bargain.  Conflating their 
private interests with the national interest, Robert Giffen, another gold stalwart, described 
“the angry surprise with which this so-called compromise [had] been received in the 
City...  The City and the public are entitled to see, if they can, that nothing is done by the 
government that is prejudicial to the interests of the country.”146   
Such outrage in financial circles, though dressed in the rhetoric of national 
interest, was largely driven by self-interest.  As Lord Farrer confessed, “If accepted by 
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our government, [these proposals] would pledge us to the principle of bimetallism as 
much as if England herself became bimetallic…  Existing relations between silver and 
gold shall be revolutionized.  Silver shall be raised to more than twice its gold value.  In 
other words, our own gold standard is to have its value reduced by more than one-
half.”147  In defense of the gold standard, his lordship perhaps unwittingly had conceded 
one of the central arguments made by bimetallists: that the value of silver had fallen as 
the spread of the gold standard decreased global demand for silver and that, conversely, 
the value of silver could rise based on the restoration of that demand in the form of US, 
French, and Indian currency.  The City did not complain at all as gold appreciated 
through government action with the adoption of the gold standard beyond Britain after 
1873.  But they did complain mightily about government action that might end this 
beneficial arrangement.  Among contemporaries, one did not have to be a radical to see 
the outlines of a global system in which government was by and for distant financial 
elites.  L.J. Maxse, editor of London’s conservative National Review, pointedly argued 
that “[Lombard] Street claims an absolute veto upon every settlement of the monetary 
question, no matter how satisfactory it may be to other members of the community, no 
matter how much it may be calculated to promote general prosperity…  [The Money 
Power] toils not, neither does it spin, but for its benefit trade is to be arrested and man is 
to be deprived of the fair reward for his labour.”148  Though gold standard arguments 
continued to make an impression in London that summer (Wolcott described them as 
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intemperate, hostile, and somewhat brutal), it is not clear that City sentiments alone 
precluded the successful conclusion of an international agreement. 
Within official circles, the more immediate problem was the disposition of India 
on the monetary bargain proposed by the United States.  “The vital point in all our 
negotiations with Great Britain was, of course, India,” Wolcott later recalled.149  Both the 
American envoy and his British interlocutors understood that the re-opening of the Indian 
mints to the free coinage of silver represented the most consequential concession Britain 
could offer to any international agreement.   
In 1893, the Indian government closed the nation’s mints to silver as an initial 
step toward the establishment of the gold standard in India on the recommendation of the 
Committee on Indian Currency appointed by the Gladstone government.  Following the 
monetary change, India endured considerable economic difficulties and readjustment.  
The silver rupee appreciated approximately 25 percent during this period, raising the 
price of Indian exports relative to the prices of competing exporters like China.  Declines 
in trade, compounded by famines during these years, disrupted the Indian economy.150  
Many observers attributed the difficulties to the monetary change, which also contributed 
to a renewed fall in the value of silver worldwide.151  As economic difficulties developed 
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in India after 1893, opposition leader Arthur J. Balfour, perhaps with some partisanship, 
described the actions of the Gladstone government in India as a “financial crime” and 
“something approaching lunacy.”152   
By 1897, many in Britain, and many more in India, viewed the decision as a 
mistake, including members of the Salisbury government then conferring with Senator 
Wolcott in London.  In the series of three formal meetings held at the Foreign Office that 
July, there were no objections raised regarding the re-opening of the Indian mints by 
British representatives Lord Salisbury, Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, or Secretary 
of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, according to memos.153  The question of the 
Indian mints was raised by Chancellor Hicks-Beach only so far as it could be used as a 
bargaining chip with the Americans and the French on the question of the ratio at which 
they intended to re-establish bimetallism.  Sir Michael suggested that Britain should be 
included as part of this negotiation, since the future value of silver, which the ratio would 
play a role in setting, also affected India.  In response, Wolcott demurred, insisting the 
decision on the ratio be left to the countries adopting bimetallism.  On 16 July, the 
American envoys left the final meeting at the Foreign Office with an impression that the 
re-opening of the Indian mints was not in any way controversial.  As Hay reported of the 
meetings, “Lord Salisbury spoke with an apparent desire to contribute so far as it 
remained consistent with the [British] gold standard.”154  
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Despite a series of affirmative signals from the Salisbury government on the 
Wolcott proposals, Great Britain ultimately refused to join the proposed monetary 
agreement, even as something less than a full participant.  The formal response, not 
transmitted to the US Ambassador until late October 1897, came as a surprise to Senator 
Wolcott, who remained in London.  What factors contributed to the apparent change in 
the British position?  The letter from Salisbury stated that the British decision rested 
entirely upon the recommendation of the government of India.  At the last formal meeting 
in July, Salisbury had requested of Wolcott a memorandum outlining the US-French 
proposals, including the possible British concessions on India.  This document became 
the basis for an extended internal deliberation that involved the Foreign Office, the 
Treasury, and colonial officials in India.  In that process, the proposals were transmitted 
to the government of India for consideration.  From Simla, on September 16, Viceroy 
Lord Elgin and his cabinet replied to London: “Our unanimous and decided opinion is 
that it would be most unwise to re-open the Indian mints as part of the proposed 
arrangements.”155  The reply was a lengthy and often circular explanation of their 
position.  While the colonial officials pointed to potential economic consequences, the 
stronger argument found in the letter was the political argument against re-opening the 
mints:  “India since 1893 has passed through a period of serious tension for and 
embarrassment to trade and to the government alike…  The government of India, as a 
responsible government, could not call upon the commercial public to face another 
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prolonged period of doubt, suspense, agitation, and difficulties.”156  Although Lord Elgin 
had declared his discomfort with any changes that might cast further blame on the 
colonial government of India, there was no constitutional reason why the Salisbury 
government had to defer to their wishes.  The Gladstone government in 1893 had 
implemented the recommendations of the Indian Currency Committee in British India.   
Though Britain’s negative reply to the American proposals cited the arguments 
made by India, there were a series of considerations that likely played a part in the 
decision of the Salisbury government.  First was the disposition of Salisbury himself, 
who consistently remained more concerned with questions of foreign policy than 
questions of finance during his tenure.  Elgin’s letter had framed the proposal as a policy 
with the potential to bruise British rule in India.  For Salisbury, the legitimacy of the 
imperial government there was likely a more urgent concern than an experiment in 
international monetary policy coordination.  Second, City opinion also played some role 
in the ultimate decision.  The uproar created in July continued in the London press in the 
following months, growing especially heated in the week before Salisbury’s formal 
response.  Chancellor Hicks-Beach, in addition, remained a gold standard supporter with 
intimate ties to City interests. During these intervening months, he received memorials 
from the Gold Standard Defence Association and others urging against the Wolcott 
proposals.  Finally, by late 1897, economic conditions in Britain – and around the world – 
had shown signs of steady improvement, dampening the political pressures for monetary 
change.  As one gold stalwart contended, “The power behind bimetallism is discontent 
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with bad trade and low prices.”157  With those conditions then changing for the better, 
monetary policy coordination with France and the United States appeared much less 
urgent.  Senator Wolcott, having received the polite refusal of the Salisbury government 
returned to the United States, sailing for New York in early November.  In press 
interviews upon his return, Wolcott himself singled out role of City interests for the 
British turn away from his monetary proposals.158     
 
Conclusion 
 
We will be wise if we temper our confidence in our national strength and resources 
 with the frank concession that even these will not permit us to defy with impunity the 
inexorable laws of finance and trade. 159 
Grover Cleveland 
 
Between 1893 and 1897, the question of international bimetallism again became a 
leading object of transatlantic diplomacy—a process which culminated in negotiations 
between the United States and Britain at the highest levels.  Despite the ultimate failure 
of US efforts to establish an international monetary agreement, the official and unofficial 
initiatives toward international bimetallism were not without accomplishments.    
American advocates of a diplomatic solution to the crisis of monetary instability 
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remained financial conservatives, pursuing international bimetallism as a means to 
alleviate deflationary pressures imposed by the gold standard while at the same time 
preserving the transatlantic financial relationship essential to growth and development in 
the United States.  In this sense, American protagonists not only contributed to the revival 
of international bimetallism as a question of great power diplomacy but also to the larger 
effort to maintain and restore the Anglo-American commercial relationship.   For 
American leaders, that relationship remained crucial not only for the foreign investment 
and foreign demand that aided the US economy, but also because the public credit of the 
United States still relied on refinancing operations that involved London investment 
houses to a considerable degree.  Despite not reaching an international monetary 
agreement with Britain, the McKinley administration, and prior US administrations since 
1873, did succeed in preserving that transatlantic relationship.   
During the mid-1890s increasing reports of unprecedented new gold discoveries 
in the Transvaal and the Yukon dramatically eased the deflationary constraints on the 
world economy imposed by the gold standard.  The scale of new reserves were so large 
that countries such as Japan, Argentina, and the United States adopted the gold standard 
without imposing distorting demands on the international monetary system.  As the gold 
discoveries had done in the twenty years after the discoveries at Sutter’s Mill, the new 
influx in gold spurred a distinct intensification of investment worldwide, making the 
period between 1897 and 1914 a period of remarkable global economic growth and 
development.    
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In the United States and Britain, the return of prosperity further reified the status 
of the gold standard and the British-led system of international trade and investment, in 
general.  Prosperity also soon made the campaign for international bimetallism seem as 
something of a desperate oddity, born of a desperate period in world economic history.  
Many leading politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, including US Secretary of State 
John Sherman and British Prime Minister Arthur J. Balfour, downplayed their past 
advocacy of international bimetallism in subsequently published memoirs.  Many of the 
leading economists who advocated international bimetallism, passed away before seeing 
their ideas institutionalized in national policies.  The diplomatic campaign to establish 
international bimetallism, nevertheless, represented a sincere and sustained effort at 
international economic policy coordination in the face of global economic distress.  Many 
economists and policymakers have since validated many of the monetary arguments 
made by bimetallic advocates during the struggle over the gold standard between 1873 
and 1897.  The failure of the US effort to reach an international monetary accord, in the 
final analysis, rested more on the accumulated institutional strength of the gold standard, 
especially within British official and financial circles, than on the relative merits of 
bimetallic proposals made by the United States. 
The revival of international bimetallism and the global monetary instability of the 
mid-1890s were notable developments in the course of US foreign policymaking in the 
late nineteenth century.  As the episodes of the second Cleveland administration 
demonstrated, the position of the United States within the British-led global economy 
obligated the United States to reinstate sound-money policies that met British approval 
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despite the deflationary pressures they imposed on American producers.  As the 
testimony of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and others indicated, these ongoing financial 
dependencies created resentments toward Britain that moved beyond the bounds of US 
monetary diplomacy, intensifying American resentments over British aggrandizement in 
Venezuela.  In the wake of the Venezuela boundary affair, the bilateral negotiations 
between Britain and the United States on the monetary question provided an extended 
opportunity for agreement among like-minded officials in both the McKinley and 
Salisbury governments.  Though Senator Wolcott failed to secure an agreement with 
Britain, these efforts—and the election of McKinley more broadly—allowed many 
British officials to see the American government with some kinship as fellow financial 
conservatives for the first time.   
On both sides of the Atlantic, these shared sentiments helped pave the way toward 
broader Anglo-American rapprochement.  Prevailing interpretations explain 
rapprochement mainly as a British decision.  Faced with new security concerns from 
Germany on the continent and from France, Russia, and Japan throughout the empire, 
Britain demonstrated an increasing deference toward US interests in the western 
hemisphere, especially after the Venezuela Crisis.160  Britain welcomed the United States 
as a junior partner in world governance with the advent of US imperialism after the 
Spanish-American War, celebrated famously by British poet Rudyard Kipling’s 
congratulatory verse: “Take up the White Man’s burden – Ye dare not stoop to less.”  Yet 
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the process of rapprochement had already begun in the United States by those keenly 
interested in international bimetallism and the preservation of the transatlantic financial 
and commercial relationship.   
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Conclusion: The Price of Gold 
 
The long-continued fall of prices, due to the changes in the money-supply constitutes one 
of the most distressing conditions under which trade and production can be carried on... 
As Mr. Balfour said, [it] is probably the most deadening and benumbing influence that 
can touch the springs of enterprise.1 – Francis A. Walker, 1896 
 
Deflation, as we have already seen, involves a transference of wealth from the rest of the 
community to the rentier class.  But there is another, more violent disturbance…  Modern 
business, being carried on largely with borrowed money, must necessarily be brought to 
a standstill by such a process.2  – John Maynard Keyes, 1923 
Overview 
 
This study has examined the official diplomacy and transnational discourse 
surrounding the spread of the international gold standard between 1867 and 1900.  The 
sustained nature of these exchanges was driven by global deflationary pressures that 
coincided with dramatic monetary policy changes in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.  As 
such, the diplomatic struggle between states that sought to alter the international gold 
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standard and those that defended the emerging monetary status quo offers a clear window 
into the politics of nineteenth-century globalization.   
Between 1878 and 1897, American monetary experts and officials in the US State 
Department led efforts to modify international monetary relations by replacing the gold 
standard with an international bimetallic standard.  The United States, despite the 
incredible pace of industrialization during this period, remained in many ways an 
emerging economy marked by a decentralized banking system as well as ongoing 
dependencies on European capital and export markets.  US diplomatic initiatives for 
international bimetallism emerged from the twin policy necessities to relieve price 
deflation at home and to maintain the public credit of the US government with European 
lenders.   
The central object of US diplomacy was to change the gold standard policy of 
Britain without jeopardizing the transatlantic economic relationship.  The nineteenth-
century global economy was largely a creation of British policy and historical 
circumstances.  The expansion of British trade after 1846 and especially the dramatic 
increases in overseas lending after 1850 hastened the emergence of global commodity 
markets for cotton, wheat, corn, cattle, and other agricultural products.  To promote 
cultivation on distant agricultural frontiers, British bankers financed the railroads, port 
facilities, and steam lines that expanded the production and transport of these products 
from Asia, Africa, and the Americas.  As a result, during this period, the sterling bill 
established on the British gold standard became the most common instrument for 
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international payments.  A change in British monetary policy, thus, implied a change for 
the entire commercial world linked to Britain, including the United States. 
I have made two central arguments about these diplomatic events.  First, that the 
US campaign for an international bimetallic standard was pursued with far more policy-
minded purpose than previous interpretations allow.  In the United States the push for 
monetary diplomacy emerged from within the reform wing of the Republican Party, 
populated more by policy experts than party bosses and machine politicians.  It is clear 
from the evidence in the public and private writings of those who advocated international 
bimetallism that their position emerged from concerns for the continued success of the 
transatlantic economy from which the US benefited and not from electoral calculation. 
Second, I have shown that the policy proposals embodied in US initiatives 
emerged within a far broader, far lengthier transnational discourse than previous 
interpretations suggest.   My research demonstrates that these monetary ideas and policy 
proposals had a lengthy pedigree among economists and financiers nearest the world-
leading capital markets of London and Paris.  Those who advocated adjustment to the 
international gold standard came from a generation of new quantitative economists and 
financial operators on both sides of the Atlantic.  Many were economic authorities of the 
age, including Alfred Marshall of Cambridge and Francis Walker of Yale.  
New economic research by Alfred Marshall and Irving Fisher, in particular, was 
revising the quantity theory of money postulated by classical English economists in ways 
that more accurately defined money and its functions during the currency controversies of 
the late nineteenth century.  In their work, the quantity theory of money became a general 
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theory of the price level.  They demonstrated that the total stock of money in circulation 
was the prime determinate of prices—and, therefore, of inflationary or deflationary trends 
in prices.  These advances in economic thought not only supported the theory behind 
international bimetallism but also diminished many of the traditional assumptions 
favoring the gold standard.  In particular, this new understanding of money and prices 
implied that a managed money supply was capable of providing better, more stable 
macroeconomic conditions than a money supply tied to gold—an idea that would later 
inform the defining monetary policies of the twentieth century.  There is some irony, 
therefore, that the triumph of the international gold standard over bimetallic alternatives 
in the 1890s was won despite these advances in monetary theory and not because of 
them.3   
Geopolitics, Ideology, and the Fate of International Bimetallism 
 
Persistent US initiatives to alter international monetary relations through 
diplomacy ultimately ended in failure.  The ultimate failure of US efforts to establish 
international bimetallism, as this study has demonstrated, rested more on geopolitical 
priorities and political ideology than on the character of proposals for international 
bimetallism.  A de facto regime of international bimetallism had existed among European 
countries since the establishment of bimetallism in France early in the nineteenth century.  
A formal international monetary union established by treaty in 1865 among France, 
Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy had operated for decades despite the difficulties imposed 
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by worldwide monetary instability after 1873.  Proposals for coordinated international 
use of silver currency, thus, were not untested or exotic policy proposals.  They were 
alternatives in the mainstream of policymaking informed by the latest advances in 
economic theory. 
Though the merits of proposals for international bimetallism had been proven 
sound in the minds of many economists and bankers of the period, they were less clear to 
political classes wedded to the axioms of classical English economics.  In this sense, the 
political ideology of the gold standard proved a more significant reason for the failure of 
international bimetallism than the operational gold standard itself.  Politicians charged 
with managing monetary operations in gold standard countries had repeatedly witnessed 
difficulties in Germany and the United States.  Even in Britain, after the insufficiency of 
central bank reserves revealed by the Baring Crisis, officials had clear evidence of the 
problems posed by the reliance on the single gold standard.  Yet adherence to the gold 
standard remained sine qua non for sound monetary policy, government efficiency, and 
civilized behavior for any modern nation-state.  In Britain, especially, the idea of the gold 
standard was bound up in the chauvinisms and narratives of national identity and national 
greatness.  As historian John Darwin has noted, the policies of an open world economy—
free trade, the gold standard, and laissez-faire government—were adopted in Britain “not 
just as policy but as a total worldview, an ideology promoted with crusading passion.”4 
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The failure of international bimetallism also rested significantly on overriding 
geopolitical tensions marked by the European scramble for empires in Africa and Asia—
and by the increasingly unstable balance of power in continental Europe.  At key 
moments when diplomatic negotiations to establish international bimetallism—or other 
proposals for the expanded use of silver currency—appeared likely to succeed, crucial 
shifts in great power politics seemed to derail these efforts.  In 1881, mutual suspicions 
between Germany and France thwarted coordinated monetary action.  In 1892, when the 
United States had finally moved Britain toward accommodation on a silver currency 
agreement, tensions between France and Britain over Egypt and between France and 
Germany over continental aspirations again halted diplomatic progress on monetary 
questions.   
Without question the economic uncertainty resulting from the deflationary period 
1873 to 1896 hung over all action in international politics, including US efforts to 
establish international bimetallism.  As the gold standard spread beyond Britain after 
1873, the disuse of silver as a monetary standard contributed to a dramatic and ongoing 
decline in the price of silver.  The emergence of the international gold standard, thus, 
coincided with the breakdown of the historic ratio of value between silver and gold, 
which for centuries hovered around 15.5 to 1.  This was indeed an obstacle for those 
seeking to rehabilitate silver prices and the use of silver currency.  However, this same 
fact was also the single strongest argument in favor of internationally coordinated 
monetary policy in the form of international bimetallism or other agreement on the 
expanded use of silver currency.  Monetary policy changes in the1870s had, at a stroke, 
  310 
dramatically decreased demand for silver worldwide and, therefore, decreased its market 
price.  By the 1890s, it was clear that coordinated international action could help reverse 
these trends.  When newspapers and journals reported on the likelihood of an 
international agreement, financial markets responded to the anticipated increases in the 
use of silver currency, driving up the price of silver even before such negotiations had 
become official diplomatic agreements.  Despite the merits of international monetary 
expansion indicated by theorists and by market responses, efforts to establish some form 
of international bimetallism failed because of the entrenched ideology favoring the gold 
standard and the rapidly deteriorating balance of power among the imperial nation-states 
of Europe. 
Innovations and Implications 
 
The most significant innovation of this study has been to more thoroughly embed 
the rise and fall of international bimetallism in the broader global historical context 
marked by rapid globalization, worldwide financial volatility, and the rise of national 
economic responses to these changes—protectionism and imperialism.  Without doubt 
the deflationary pressures felt throughout the global economy after 1873 contributed to 
local economic distress, which in turn intensified political agitation among those 
clamoring for relief through protectionism, imperialism, and monetary expansion.  In 
other words, the changes wrought by nineteenth-century globalization hastened the rise of 
economic nationalism.  With this global economic state of affairs, larger economic areas 
with protected home markets and access to cheap resources seemed more able to 
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maintain a positive balance of trade, offsetting exposure to global conditions.   But the 
gold standard, in particular, strained relations between the great powers in explicit ways.  
The operation of an international gold standard set up a zero-sum game among gold 
standard countries to retain sufficient reserves for successful monetary operations.  The 
gold standard, thus, politicized gold purchases, which were closely watched by financial 
markets and foreign ministries alike in late nineteenth-century Europe.  In addition, the 
popular awareness of gold scarcity shaped disputes over territories with significant gold 
discoveries.  In South Africa, the geopolitics of gold heightened tensions between Great 
Britain and Germany during the Boer War; in Venezuela and the Yukon, such disputes 
led to local violence, war scares, and eventually arbitration between Britain and the 
United States.  In multiple ways, therefore, the exigencies of an emerging international 
gold standard created a logic favoring protectionism, imperialism, and monetary conflict 
among the leading economic powers. 
The extended campaign for international bimetallism carried out by a growing 
transnational network of monetary theorists, policy experts, and financial operators was 
animated by a spirit of economic internationalism—one most often associated with the 
pacifying vision of an open world economy.  However, these efforts arrived at a moment 
when the axioms of free trade, laissez-faire, and the gold standard had become pillars of 
conservative thought.  The monetary experts that advocated international bimetallism saw 
a proposed international accord as a means to relieve the deflationary conditions that 
were moving the world increasingly toward economic nationalism after 1870.   
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For this group of economists, financiers, and statesmen, international bimetallism 
represented a process of rationalization that paralleled many of the strands of 
internationalism that appeared in the late nineteenth-century—coordinated efforts for 
international arms control agreements or the diffusion of a uniform international system 
of weights and measures, for example.5  In this case, what needed rationalization was the 
system which determined prices, exchange rates, and credit throughout the 
commercialized world.  Advocates of international bimetallism were attempting to rescue 
the kind of economic internationalism that had defined the British world order at 
midcentury. 
In these efforts, ironically, they most often fought to save that international 
economic system from its chief architects, the political classes of Britain, who remained 
animated by entrenched sentiments favoring the gold standard.  By the time proposals for 
some form of international monetary agreement gained a legitimate foothold there, the 
geopolitics of imperial rivalry encroached to thwart any monetary progress.  The failure 
of US diplomatic efforts to establish international bimetallism left in place the 
deflationary pressures imposed on the global economy by the gold standard until the late 
1890s, when gold discoveries in the Transvaal and the Yukon provided exogenous 
monetary relief and removed the impetus for further diplomacy. 
Despite the ultimate failure of US monetary diplomacy, these efforts represent 
notable developments in the history of US foreign relations.  On the most basic level, the 
                                                 
5 For the history of internationalism, see Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(New York: Penguin, 2012). 
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long-term pursuit of an international monetary agreement on the part of the United States 
highlights the fact that exposure to global economic conditions continued to shape 
American foreign policy.  Despite the claims of skillful and well-positioned boosters of 
expanded American economic and geopolitical power like Secretary of State James G. 
Blaine, the United States late into the nineteenth century still depended on the markets 
and investment capital of Europe in ways that constrained foreign policymaking.  
Restoring, maintaining, and expanding that commercial relationship—with Britain in 
particular—was the animating line that ran through the American pursuit of international 
bimetallism.  If Britain would enter a monetary agreement, the United States, in the 
minds of policymakers, could gain some monetary relief from economic conditions 
without threatening the foreign credit flowing to public and private institutions in the 
United States.   
If American efforts to change British gold standard policy never succeeded in its 
primary objective, they did provide the opportunities for mutual confirmation of the 
importance of the transatlantic commercial relationship and the principles of financial 
orthodoxy.   Especially in the 1890s, when the parties of financial orthodoxy on both 
sides of the Atlantic recaptured executive power, the extended negotiations over an 
international monetary agreement anticipated many of the points of shared interest that 
would come to define Anglo-American rapprochement in the two decades after 1895.  
The diplomatic struggle over the gold standard and the search for viable 
alternatives are also notable developments in the larger narrative of the global history of 
the late nineteenth century.  The most prominent feature of this period was the first 
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appearance of cracks in a British world order defined by an open economy and the 
ascendancy of a fractious and multilateral imperial world order defined by increasingly 
protected economic blocs.  The extended campaign for international bimetallism 
represented not only US national interests but also the ambition on the part of bimetallic 
advocates from all countries to manage the economic distress imposed by aspects of 
globalization, in general, and by the monetary policy that prolonged deflationary 
conditions, in particular. 
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